@Strategic_Ark 🇺🇦 trip thread 2. Military matters 1. Air defence notably vs cruise & other missiles is now on top of 🇺🇦's list of concerns & therefore of materiel acquisition policy. The US (Patriot, NASAMS), UK-France-Italy (the MBDA countries, as it were. SAMP-T came up) 1/12
Germany's IRIS-T got strong mentions. The objective is to "close the sky" of 🇺🇦 to 🇷🇺. The alternative of 🇺🇦 acquiring long-range missiles to do to the 🇷🇺 population what 🇷🇺 does to Ukraine was not mentioned by the officials I heard 2/12
2. What should the West supply?
Air defence always came first follwed by ATACMs & other long range precision (emphasis) strike weapons; tanks & AICVs; U (C) AVs of all sorts; jammers; advanced coms. The list is clearly not exhaustive but it appeared to be prioritised. 3/12
There is unhappiness with the logistical problem of running disparate systems & the discovery that NATO standards (eg 155mm shells) doesn't lead to full interoperability. There is a strong desire to have maintenance facilities hosted outside of 🇺🇦 (my note: indeed why not 4/12
3. Next offensive? At the appropriate mil level, there is a keen understanding that the current Eastern offensive must not be pushed beyond its militarily rational limits; the troops used (army, police, border guards) & their materiel weren't particularly fresh to begin with 5/12
The Kherson offensive had helped distract the 🇷🇺s from Kharkiv but wasn't a feint. The Russians in the South are seen as more demoralised than those in the North 4. Personnel. I got no sense of what kind of renewal and sustainability system 🇺🇦 would adopt for its forces as...6/12
...the war lengthens (note: in WWI 🇫🇷 it wasn't till 1915 that home leave+unit rotation policies began to emerge. They are part of organising for a long war). 5. Views on Western arms supplies: unsurprisingly, there are never enough foreign supplies (more in thread 3). 7/12
There were sharp words at a high political level vis à vis 🇮🇱; the Realpolitik of 🇮🇱 not delivering offensive weapons is understood but not the refusal on anti-missile systems. There was also a keen desire to tap into countries with Soviet legacy ammo, spares etc... 8/12
...with Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan being mentioned. Frustration was expressed, all the more so since their assets and leaders are well known. The assumption is that only the 🇺🇸 make them move. 🇫🇷 🇬🇧 🇩🇪 were not mentioned in this respect. 9/12
Bottom-lines :
A) with the limited exceptions mentioned in the previous point, I found the Ukrainians (not only the @ZelenskyyUa) to be remarkably easy-tempered, unabrasive, with a calm+confident mood but no cockiness
B) air-missile defence is of the essence & a big push...10/12
...here has much to commend it strategically and in human terms compared to the alternatives of doing symetrical strikes against Russian cities, or of doing nothing
A 3d thread on what the West is and should be doing on the military supply side will follow tomorrow 11/12
And a few pictures from the war. The white poster is about recruitment. 12/13
And a few others. The orange stencil says the equivalent of "looters will shot" 13/13
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🇺🇦 trip @Strategic_Ark Thread 🧵 number 3 focussing on Western aid via 🇵🇱.
During our stay we spent some time at the main military aid hub operned on 27 FEB (location not disclosed here; I'll use the generic POLLOGHUB name). Some general points. 1. What the West does well:
1/7
Clearly enough has been sent to support succesful defensive & now counteroffensive ops. Close to 1.1 Mt by early SEP of which ammo is a large chunk (~5000 t a day) with 3 to 14 flights a day as well as rail & road, with different mixes at the other hubs in 🇵🇱 . 2/7
The Western choice not to make NATO operationnally responsible has been wise, with an ad hoc Support Assistance Group Ukraine (SAGU) located in Wiesbaden. This enlarges the pool of donors (the 50 plus countries of the Ramstein group and in my view provides a rung in the...3/7
La question des armes françaises à l' 🇺🇦. Fil 🧵
1.Argumentaire: La 🇫🇷 fait valoir que son effort est moins médiocre que ne le disent certains: comme certains autres pays (oui); nous faisons sans toujours faire d'annonces & sans entrer ds le details; nous menons des OPEX.. 1/6
...réelles qui limitent ce que nous pouvons raisonnablement faire alors que certains (cf 🇩🇪) s'abritent derrière des besoins hypothetiques pour justifier la modestie de leur effort (Oui); surtout,certaines statistiques étrangères mêlent 🍎 (argent) & 🥕 (matériels) et...2/6
...ne font pas tous la différence entre promesses et livraisons (Oui). Ergo, les ~2% dont nous sommes crédités seraient une sous estimation (Non cf infra). Enfin certains de nos matériels livrés sont remarquables (cf CAESAR) (Oui; mais nos partenaires ne sont pas tous nuls). 3/6
This isn't a simple issue. In July 1941, the 🇺🇸 (not yet at war until December but supporting the 🇬🇧 which was at war, rather like 🇺🇦 today) stopped giving visas to all Germans & people in German occupied territories (eg Benelux, Czechia, occupied France). 🇺🇸 also convinced...1/6
...a number of Latin American countries to followed suit. Reasons invoked: bar 5th columnists, spies, smugglers. Made a lot of sense. Except that a substantial number of people seeking a visa were anti-Nazis and even more so, Jews. Of course, the Nazis themselves eventually...2/6
...barred emigration by Jews from October 1941 onwards, as a prelude to their soon-to-be-decided (Wannsee January 1940) European-wide extermination. During the July-October 1941 period the US & some others ceased to issue new visas. People died. 3/6
A bit earlier than planned, here's a reminder of what the election of Le Pen could mean in european+security policy🧵 1. Eventual FREXIT since her planned revision of Schengen treaty & "national preference" suppose major treaty changes which will be rejected by other members 1/.
This will lead to a Cameron type process and a referendum. Given Le Pen's politics, attempts to enforce rule of law in the EU will cease. 2) withdrawal from NATO integrated command structure (but not from rhe Washington Treaty). 3) deep & longstanding complicity with Putin...2/.
...a 'funding founder' with the aim of eventually 're-establishing an alliance' with Putin's 🇷🇺 4) the special relationship between 🇫🇷&🇩🇪 will be dropped, leaving what will remain of the🇪🇺 bereft of its historical anchor. Joint defence programmes (MBT,FCAS)
to be scrapped.3/.
Since Friday midnite, 🇫🇷is in the strictly enforced "silence period" before our presidential elex,so no polls or f'casts here but a few pointers to interpret the 1st round results Sunday 🧵 1) the incumbent needs to be in the lead as in 2017. If not, then he's in big trouble.1/
If he's ahead by more than 3%, the runner-up will find it very diffficult to catch up. 2) The logic is very different from 2017 in which a 2.7% gap in Macron's favour ensured a huge 2/3 win because:
- in 2017, all mainstream parties called to vote Macron in the runoff 2/
Not so this time.
Meanwhile, the mainstream parties have shrunk substantially since then wheras the hard right has a reservoir of votes with Zemmour's party & Z. served as a lightning rod making her look moderate in comparison
- Macron was the brand new challenger. No longer. 3/
A lesson for the Europeans. 🇺🇸's current definition of self defence for non-allied countries is that they will not receive direct support (no US troops, no no-fly zone...). Worse & less understandable, even striking back at the invader's territory is viewed as questionable 🧵
(eg CNN coverage of 🇺🇦 attack vs Belfgorod), and the entirely legal and legitimate tranfer of counteroffensive weapons is heavily restricted: LSAMs, fighters, antiship missiles while Russian navy shoots at Odesa...NATO Europe follows US self-deterring 'lead' (art 5 is a package).
This is as far away as one can get from art 51.(UN) & R2P. Of course, one can (and should) argue that the simple solution is to join the art 5 club, eg 🇫🇮🇸🇪? But we are on notice that 🇺🇸 trend is towards less commitment and 'reverse red lines' (signalling what one won't do).