Senior advisor for Europe, IISS, conseiller spécial/special adviser FRS
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Jan 21, 2023 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Morning thoughts🧵.This sort of 🇫🇷 🇩🇪 kabuki is an art form, not a viable strategy - a 'théâtre d'ombres'. This is deeply worrying because there is no stable anchor for the EU outside of a strong French-German couple. There are no ready substitutes out there 1/7
Other formats are possible & desirable, notably revolving around 🇵🇱. But they aren't alternatives to the French-German bipole; they are either enabled by the bipole (eg Weimar triangle) or serve as pressure groups (eg Visegrad). A solid EU implies a functioning 🇩🇪🇨🇵 couple 2/7
Sep 17, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
🇺🇦 trip @Strategic_Ark Thread 🧵 number 3 focussing on Western aid via 🇵🇱.
During our stay we spent some time at the main military aid hub operned on 27 FEB (location not disclosed here; I'll use the generic POLLOGHUB name). Some general points. 1. What the West does well:
1/7
Clearly enough has been sent to support succesful defensive & now counteroffensive ops. Close to 1.1 Mt by early SEP of which ammo is a large chunk (~5000 t a day) with 3 to 14 flights a day as well as rail & road, with different mixes at the other hubs in 🇵🇱 . 2/7
Sep 16, 2022 • 13 tweets • 4 min read
@Strategic_Ark 🇺🇦 trip thread 2. Military matters 1. Air defence notably vs cruise & other missiles is now on top of 🇺🇦's list of concerns & therefore of materiel acquisition policy. The US (Patriot, NASAMS), UK-France-Italy (the MBDA countries, as it were. SAMP-T came up) 1/12
Germany's IRIS-T got strong mentions. The objective is to "close the sky" of 🇺🇦 to 🇷🇺. The alternative of 🇺🇦 acquiring long-range missiles to do to the 🇷🇺 population what 🇷🇺 does to Ukraine was not mentioned by the officials I heard 2/12
Sep 16, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
La question des armes françaises à l' 🇺🇦. Fil 🧵
1.Argumentaire: La 🇫🇷 fait valoir que son effort est moins médiocre que ne le disent certains: comme certains autres pays (oui); nous faisons sans toujours faire d'annonces & sans entrer ds le details; nous menons des OPEX.. 1/6
...réelles qui limitent ce que nous pouvons raisonnablement faire alors que certains (cf 🇩🇪) s'abritent derrière des besoins hypothetiques pour justifier la modestie de leur effort (Oui); surtout,certaines statistiques étrangères mêlent 🍎 (argent) & 🥕 (matériels) et...2/6
Aug 11, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
This isn't a simple issue. In July 1941, the 🇺🇸 (not yet at war until December but supporting the 🇬🇧 which was at war, rather like 🇺🇦 today) stopped giving visas to all Germans & people in German occupied territories (eg Benelux, Czechia, occupied France). 🇺🇸 also convinced...1/6
...a number of Latin American countries to followed suit. Reasons invoked: bar 5th columnists, spies, smugglers. Made a lot of sense. Except that a substantial number of people seeking a visa were anti-Nazis and even more so, Jews. Of course, the Nazis themselves eventually...2/6
Apr 18, 2022 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
A bit earlier than planned, here's a reminder of what the election of Le Pen could mean in european+security policy🧵 1. Eventual FREXIT since her planned revision of Schengen treaty & "national preference" suppose major treaty changes which will be rejected by other members 1/.
This will lead to a Cameron type process and a referendum. Given Le Pen's politics, attempts to enforce rule of law in the EU will cease. 2) withdrawal from NATO integrated command structure (but not from rhe Washington Treaty). 3) deep & longstanding complicity with Putin...2/.
Apr 9, 2022 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Since Friday midnite, 🇫🇷is in the strictly enforced "silence period" before our presidential elex,so no polls or f'casts here but a few pointers to interpret the 1st round results Sunday 🧵 1) the incumbent needs to be in the lead as in 2017. If not, then he's in big trouble.1/
If he's ahead by more than 3%, the runner-up will find it very diffficult to catch up. 2) The logic is very different from 2017 in which a 2.7% gap in Macron's favour ensured a huge 2/3 win because:
- in 2017, all mainstream parties called to vote Macron in the runoff 2/
Apr 3, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
A lesson for the Europeans. 🇺🇸's current definition of self defence for non-allied countries is that they will not receive direct support (no US troops, no no-fly zone...). Worse & less understandable, even striking back at the invader's territory is viewed as questionable 🧵
(eg CNN coverage of 🇺🇦 attack vs Belfgorod), and the entirely legal and legitimate tranfer of counteroffensive weapons is heavily restricted: LSAMs, fighters, antiship missiles while Russian navy shoots at Odesa...NATO Europe follows US self-deterring 'lead' (art 5 is a package).
Feb 25, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Some people wonder whether I am being alarmist when I suggest that Russia may test EU and NATO's resolve directly. My answer is (a) that many people discounted the possibility that Putin would invade a country the size of France, that he wasn't simply venting. 🧵1/
(b) the December 🇷🇺 draft treaties are as ambitious and clear in terms of reordering Europe as Putin's July 2021 article on 🇷🇺+🇺🇦. He means it.(c) He's a man in a hurry for both personal & national reasons (his remarks last fall about talk re his succession; preempting NATO'S 2/
Dec 25, 2021 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
In the pre-1914 imperial era, buffer states were useful in separating colonial appetites (eg Afghanistan, Siam, Nepal). In the 20th century, being a buffer state was sometimes good for that state (eg 🇳🇱, Scandinavia,🇨🇭 in WWI; 🇸🇪🇨🇭in WWII; 🇦🇹 🇫🇮 Yugoslavia in the Cold War) but 1/
for others, it served no purpose: USSR attacked 🇫🇮 and annexed 🇪🇪🇱🇹🇱🇻, 3d Reich invaded 🇧🇪🇫🇷🇱🇺🇳🇱, 🇳🇴🇩🇰. There is little evidence that the existence of buffer states deterred or limited conflict in 20th century Europe: certainly not for WW I & II. As for Cold War: 2/
Aug 16, 2021 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Thread on the issue of the US credibility as a defence guarantor. There are 3 types of players: 1) the "guaranteed" countries: will confidence in the US guarantee diminish as a result of the Afghanistan debacle? The Saigon precedent suggests not: NATO wasn't badly weakened.1/7
NATO had/still has 🇺🇸 nukes & GI's on the spot. Asia: though 🇰🇷 & Taiwan🇹🇼 were tempted to go nuclear, the US managed to reassure
the Asians.
🇰🇷, 🇯🇵, 🇹🇼 face an immensely stronger 🇨🇳 today, with no US nukes on the spot anymore & no US troops in Taiwan. Unclear whether the...2/7
Aug 16, 2021 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Thread: When analysing the strategic impact of an event (ie the fall of Afghanistan), one must consider the 1) WHAT (the fall of Kabul like that of Saigon rates a 7 on the Richter scale of strategic upsets, not a 10 like Berlin 1989) nytimes.com/2021/08/13/wor…2) the WHERE (Afghanistan may rate a 7 on a scale of 10, rather like South-Vietnam in terms of strategic value, but less than, eg former USSR); 3) the WHO (the Talib have a bad global track record with bin Laden and 9/11 so I credit them with an 8, versus a 4 for Hanoi 1975)...
Aug 16, 2021 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
When one compares the strategic impact of different events, it can be useful to parse them into discrete categories: 1) the HOW: the fall of Kabul was comparable in nature and speed to the take-over of Saigon. 2) the WHO: the Taliban have a worse track-record than Hanoi & the...
...Viet-Cong in terms of intertnational disruption (Al Qaeda) though the fate of Laos+Cambodia was largely shaped by Vietnam war. 3) the WHAT: strategically, both Afghanistan & Vietnam were intrinsically and regionally important. But not as significant as USSR & its collapse
Aug 9, 2021 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
"Origins tracing terrorism"?? China apparently sees any attempt to understand where SARS-COV-2 comes from as "terrorism" (sic). This is either stupidity -not something one normally expects from China-, rank incompetence, gross dereliction of duty, or an avowal of responsibility.
Your choice. Note: China is emulating the Russian use of multiple & mutually incompatible narratives when things go wrong: 1) it can't be a lab leak; 2) it came from a lab leak (Ft Detrick,Busan); 3) origin was natural transmission from bats; 4) virus didn't come from an animal;
Jun 27, 2021 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Initial reaction to French regional elections #electionsregionales2021 :
Winners: 1) all incumbent regional region heads are re-elected (all fm mainstream parties).
2) with strong wins by Bertrand (North) & Wauquiez (Lyon area), the mainstream Right has 2 strong potential...1/
...presidential candidates. But it will have to decide who will be the actual candidate in order to have a chance to beat Macron. Losers: 1) The extremes:
LePen's party does as poorly as last Sunday. The defeat is particularly stinging in the South. LePen is badly hurt as a...2/
Jun 20, 2021 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Lots of losers in the French regional elex #electionsregionales2021 : ultra-low voter participation (32%); poor figures for Macron's lists; abysmal results for hard left, mostly divided left+greens. But in strategic terms:1) Le Pen's party has failed worst, below 2015 outcome. 1/2) mainstream right (but not official LR) candidates Xavier Bertrand in the North & ValériePécresse (Paris region) did well, making each a strong right wing contender for the presidential race. The 2d round next Sunday race may yet confirm the current configuration of the...2/
Mar 30, 2021 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Notwithstanding Macron's use of the word, it never was an "alliance" in the sense that Russia would side with China against Vietnam in the SCS, or that China would support Russia in its Georgian or Ukrainian ventures. If it had tried to be, it would have broken down. 1/
It is a strategic partnership in which the two parties have free hands to do what they want to do (eg Russia in Crimea, China in SCS...). China benefits from access to Russian military know-how, energy and not having to worry about Russia siding with US "à la Mearsheimer" 2/
Jan 9, 2021 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
PANDEMIC'S PROGRESS ( thread 1. GLOBAL: This is possibly the darkest moment up to now, with ca 16K daily deaths worldwide. At this rate the 2 million toll will be reached by mid January. Remember: undercounting is the norm 2. SEASONAL OR NOT? Much hope is placed in Europe,US 1/
...on pandemic's supposedly seasonal nature because of SARSCoV-2's propensity for cool temperatures. Fact is that in Brazil, it's definitely not winter & pandemic is running amok as badly as it did a few months ago, at +1K daily deaths, breaching 200 K level on 8 JAN. 2/
Jun 29, 2020 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
My take on French municipal elections THREAD: 1) a resounding defeat of President's party: not a single victory of note by "En Marche!". This is a personal setback 2) conversely, the no less resounding victory by Macron's PM at Le Havre is a big problem for Prez who can... 1/5
...hardly fire such a popular figure; but with such a popular PM, the President will inevitably be cramped in a way which will weigh on 2022 elex. And of course, Édouard Philippe can jump ship. 3) massive abstention (close to 60%) is in part a reaction to Covid mismanagement: 2/5
Apr 8, 2020 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
THREAD 1/5 Superb report on UK much of which could be applied word-for-word to the pre-March French situation: Special Report: Johnson listened to his scientists about coronavirus - but they were slow to sound the alarm | Article [AMP] | Reuters reuters.com/article/us-hea…
Both countries have similar populations & centralised top-down healthcare systems. Both had well-developed pandemic plans (largely related to interhuman transmission of H5N1 avian flu). Having been involved on the French version, I agree with the assessment that these plans...2/4
Apr 4, 2020 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
HOW NOT RUN A CRISIS
France isn't the only country to be facing a shortage of masks. Even China was caught barefaced when the then-"Wuhan virus" broke out in that city. Indeed, France shipped masks+PPE to Wuhan (quietly because China wanted it that way: no geopolitics) 1/9
But there were several ways to handle such a problem. France had an acute mask shortage because its big buffer stocks (1.7bn FFP2s & surgical masks) built up to face a pandemic had not been renewed from 2011 onwards, whereas the risk of a pandemic figured prominently in its...2/9
