I see one answer to two puzzles about the recent course of this war. Why did Russia leave Kharkiv oblast so exposed? And why is Russia now focusing on tiny gains in Bakhmut while weakly countering Ukraine's preparations for another NE offensive? In short: Potemkin syndrome.🧵
Russia didn't just fail to react to Ukraine's build-up in Kharkiv. @DefMon3 has compiled evidence that Russia was drawing down troop levels in the region, leading him to suggest that Russia might have been attacked while already planning a withdrawal. /2
But a planned withdrawal would make no sense: the section of Kharkiv oblast that Ukraine liberated included the Russian occupants' main northern rail and road supply arteries, both via Kupyansk. /3
Russia's relentless, dense shelling all along the arc from Izyum to Avdiyivka, all summer, makes it clear enough that Russia intended to grab all the territory within that arc. And it was still trying, even as the Kharkiv offensive got underway, as seen on Sep. 6's liveuamap. /4
ISW wrote recently on more recent similar behavior: Russia's continues to focus its energies on making incremental gains towards Bakhmut, while not much resisting Ukraine's crossing of the Oskil in preparation for another NE offensive. /5
Everyone's probably familiar enough with the "Potemkin village" story to know what I mean by "Potemkin syndrome." Historians think the story's exaggerated, but it no doubt captured something real about Russia that's still true today. /6 observers.france24.com/en/20131211-pu…
"Potemkin syndrome" can be broadly defined as doing work solely to give the appearance of having done something useful. From Czarist times to the present day the syndrome has pervaded Russian society, from small-time local affairs to the highest level of the ruler's court. /7
For Russia's military brass, the way to demonstrate that they have done useful work is to seize territory. So they manage the war in such a way that on most days, they can report to their ruler and on TV about the territory they have gained. /8
If they had to draw forces from behind the front to keep the front supplied, manned and going forward, who would rebuke them? To someone not wise enough to scratch the surface, day after day of small territorial gains by any means looks like winning. /9
Naturally this strategy suffers collapses: of Russia's Kyiv, Sumy and Chernihiv offensives in April, of its occupation of eastern Kharkiv oblast this month. But somehow these collapses don't lead to any change in approach. If I figure out why not, I'll let you know. /10 end
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A thread on Russia's rail supply lines to its occupying forces in Ukraine - how these have been affected by the recent Kharkiv offensive, and what's likely to happen next if, as I expect, Ukraine moves next to retake northern Luhansk oblast. 🧵
The hubs of the rail network supplying Russia's occupation of northeast Ukraine are laid out like a pyramid. At the top is the primary supply hub Voronezh, then the junctions of Stary Oskol and Liski, and finally the forward supply hubs of Belgorod, Valuyki and Millerovo. /2
Belgorod till recently was the most important forward hub and most in the news. Its rail routes west to Sumy, south to Kharkiv and southeast to Kupyansk made it a natural invasion staging ground. But after the Kharkiv offensive, all those routes lead to liberated territory. /3
After five days of Ukraine's northeast advance being paused at the Oskil river, we are starting to hear plausible rumors of preparations for a continuation. According to two Russian milbloggers monitored by ISW, things are afoot along the north and south parts of the river.🧵
By one account, the Ukrainian army has crossed the Oskil and emplaced artillery at Hryanykivka, about 25km SW from where the Oskil enters Ukraine from Russia. If true this is either very bold, or Russian forces in the NE remain very weak.
Hryanykivka is <45km or <60km by road from a rail line used by Russia to supply its forces in Luhansk oblast. It runs SE through Troitske. Sentinel imagery shows the larger of two bridges at Hryanykivka was damaged between 9/3 & 9/10, but the smaller bridge appears to be intact.
The Balaklia offensive makes this 3-month-old map relevant again. It's all about Russia's attempt to make a very long front more defensible in order to stalemate Ukraine into accepting a frozen conflict. The difference is, now Ukraine has the initiative. 🧵
In June, my point was that Russia knew its offensive capacity was dwindling, so its targets were chosen to improve defensibility. Taking Ukraine-held pockets NE of the Donets would turn the river into a defensive barrier, and taking the Lysychansk area would shorten the front. /2
Much of that happened. Small pockets around Severodonetsk, Lyman and Svyatohirsk (the red dots) all fell. But as I noted then, there was a fourth, larger Ukraine-held pocket NE of the Donets that wasn't under attack. And Russia continued to ignore it. /3
Today's Trump filing in short. 🧵 1) There's a 10-page retelling of the case so far, mainly arguing that Trump was fully cooperating. It's frivolous. Notably, it hints he might want to use his silly "I declassified everything" claim in court. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.usco…
2) pp. 11-12 argue the warrant was overbroad by allowing seizure of case-unrelated items merely in the vicinity of case-related items. This will matter and will be a court fight if agents found and seized something incriminating unrelated to presidential documents.
3) p. 12 suggests the Feds might have faked a classified-documents case because they were frustrated by the presidential records act's lack of an enforcement mechanism. The suggestion is couched in "did they ...?" sentences that avoid alleging they did. This is frivolous.
I want to revisit the topic of Ukrainian vs Russian views of the Turkic world, because Kamil blocked me for arguing, which seems cowardly. Kamil writes much I like, but I think he's more Russified and ignorant of Ukraine than he realizes. /kamilkazani/status/1551383280498483207
In this thread, Kamil set out the position that Ukrainians learned to believe Turkic and steppe cultures were inferior from their former hegemon, Russia. While surely that influence matters, Kamil made two big, glaring mistakes, which deserve to be rebutted.
First, while both Russia and Ukraine have long histories of racism towards Turkic and Mongol cultures, in the folk-culture xenophobia way and the modern ideology of race way, that history is very different in Russia and Ukraine, mainly because of modern Russia's hegemon status.
A thread explaining how very serious the espionage case against Trump is. We still don't know what information he took home and twice withheld from official demands. But if we read the investigation documents and the law, it becomes clear that he's likely to go down for life.🧵
The section of espionage law that Trump is being investigated under is 18 USC § 793, according to the search warrant for the recent FBI raid of his home. documentcloud.org/documents/2213…
Paragraph (f) of this section of law makes it a crime for anyone with lawful access to any kind of information related to the national defense to remove it from proper custody. The penalty for doing so is either fine or imprisonment up to 10 years. law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18…