Rob Lee Profile picture
Sep 19 4 tweets 2 min read
Video from Ukraine's Terra unit showing a tank battle in the Kherson direction.
Footage of the tank battle in Kherson Oblast. 2/
Footage of three Russian T-72 series tanks firing at Ukrainian positions. They then come under UAV-corrected artillery fire and retreat. 3/

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More from @RALee85

Sep 21
Thread:
1) There are more unknowns than knowns at this point
2) It is one of the most significant/riskiest political decisions Putin has ever made
3) He is still resisting a broader mobilization
4) It is an acknowledgment that Russia's war was failing and a change had to be made
Much of this depends on how this order is applied. The number of reservists with combat experience is limited, though they may include everyone who deployed to Syria. Shoigu is notoriously unreliable when it comes to figures so don't treat them as fact. 2/
There are two important immediate effects from this order: conscripts currently serving in the Russian military likely will be deployed to fight in Ukraine, and volunteers serving on short contracts will be stop-lossed into continuing to serve. 3/
Read 10 tweets
Sep 20
My tentative view is that the Kremlin is still resisting mobilization and will try everything short of it first (e.g. recruiting prisoners). Russia's strategy since April has involved a # of short-term solutions strung together in hopes that they would lead to long-term success.
The medium and long-term military factors favor Ukraine. This may achieve short-term benefits, but it would likely lead to greater problems over time. Conscripts currently serving will be less likely to sign contracts and a much higher % of Russians will dodge the fall draft. 2/
If Russia decides to escalate, the first step would likely be to deploy the conscript battalions in the Russian military rather than necessarily mobilizing Russian society or conscripting civilians across Russia. 3/
Read 7 tweets
Sep 20
I wonder if this will actually be passed, or if it is designed as a threat to coerce currently serving Russian servicemen who are refusing to deploy.
The number of Russian soldiers who are refusing to fight is not an insignificant number. 20-40% of units in some cases. Getting them to fight, even if unmotivated, would provide an important manpower boost. But it is still a short-term solution to a longer-term problem.
Good point. Even if passed, it isn't clear how it will be applied. The Kremlin certainly hopes this is enough to coerce refuseniks to fight, but doesn't actually want to put many soldiers in prison. Maybe there will one or two well-publicized cases. 3/
Read 6 tweets
Sep 16
Captains and senior lieutenants (couldn't tell for the first photo) likely from naval infantry units. That officers who should be serving as company commanders or deputy commanders in elite units are refusing to deploy tells you something about the extent of the refusenik problem
I've heard of other Russian units in which 20% or more of soldiers, including officers, refused to deploy to Ukraine. Given Russia's manpower problems, the number of refuseniks is a not insignificant factor in the Russian military's struggles in Ukraine.
I don't think most of them refused to deploy because they are necessarily against the war, but because they realized it was going to be a disaster, especially when they were given a few hours' notice they were invading Ukraine. Another consequence of how Russia planned this war.
Read 6 tweets
Sep 13
One of the Russian military's biggest weaknesses is that it is slow to respond to changes on the battlefield. Once Kyiv received Harpoons and long-range artillery, it was clear that Russia's position on Snake Island was unsustainable, but they waited and took unnecessary losses.
Same with HIMARS. They knew for weeks that Ukraine would receive them and their capabilities are well-known, and yet Russian forces were caught flatfooted when Ukraine started using them. Their lack of a response to the Ukrainian buildup in Kharkiv is part of a pattern.
There are different explanations for why these mistakes are being made, but they indicate a very fundamental problem with Russian military leadership. The Russian military's decision-making is still very centralized but it also just makes poor decisions (or doesn't make them).
Read 4 tweets
Sep 12
Probably made some mistakes but my quick count from this thread:
Captured:
8 MT-LB
6 BTR-82
1 BTR/comm variant
2 T-72 and 1 tank
2 BMP-2 (one may be in UA service)
1 Msta-B
3-4 Msta-S
1 2S3 Akatsiya
1 Ural truck
2 KamAZ trucks
Destroyed:
TOS-1A
T-72 and 1 tank
BMP
Ural
I overcounted the destroyed T-72 tank. It is actually just the hull of the destroyed TOS-1A.
Read 4 tweets

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