1/ With a lot of discussion of the oil price cap many forget to think about what it means for Russia's fiscal accounts. Can Russia 🇷🇺afford to wait it out? The short answer is yes. A thread 🧵
2/ The purpose of the oil price cap is to give an exit valve for Russian oil (to bring more Russian oil to the market, not less) at a lower price, as concern was that the EU oil embargo to come on in early 2023 will be too binding. Here are the scenarios.
3/ With the Ruble that is way too high (the extreme scenario of the Ruble at $50), Russia can reduce oil export volume by 10% and face the oil price of $75, and lose about 3.2% of GDP in fiscal revenues. This means its deficit would be roughly 3.2pp higher up to 6% of GDP.
4/ With the Ruble weakening to as much as $150, Russia might gain should it cut oil exports by 10% and face an oil price of $75, as its revenues would be higher than otherwise.
5/ I do not mean to say Russia is immune, not at all; without oil and gas revenues, Russia would have been in consistently large fiscal deficits over the last decade. However, using oil and gas revenues is more akin to "dissaving" or living off selling your parents' apartment.
6/ Russia is aware of the risk and attempted to save for the rainy day ~10% of GDP at end-2021. However, ~34% of it is already committed to spending, and possibly >21% were arrested with frozen reserves, leaving only ~ 4% of GDP by the end-2023.
7/ Russia itself expects its Revenues to go down 25% over the next 3 years because of the EU's pivot away from Russia's energy and a fall in global commodity prices. It can cut spending, as it has done post-2014.
8/ Russia also can lean on the banks. After all, Russia’s financial sector is dominated by public banks (accounting for more than two-thirds of total assets) that have room to increase their holdings. But who will then finance the grand reverse structural transformation?
9/ To sum up Russia is far from suffering enough from the sanctions. The oil price cap gives it an out to sell more oil. With oil price, volumes, and Ruble moving is hard to generate a painful fiscal scenario.
Permanently moving away from Russia's energy is what will hurt Russia
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1) Russia didn’t give concessions. It, potentially got a win, 30 day no energy strikes would force Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries. Russia hasn’t been as effective as feared in disrupting Ukrainian energy.
2) Russia got validation that it is not the aggressor WH “this conflict should never have started and should have been ended … with …good faith peace efforts”
3) WH readout brings back Russia to “bilateral” discussions about Ukraine. Europe doesn’t have “spheres of influence” Trump and Putin do. It even loops Russia in MENA issues akin to the USSR/US talks.
4) Russia reiterated it maximalist demands and asserted it “legitimate security concerns”: no military or intelligence aid to Ukraine, no mobilization in Ukraine, no armament of Ukraine, inability of Kyiv regime to negotiation (hint at a regime change?).
5) the WH seems to want reset even more than Russia. WH last para on “enormous economic deals and geopolitical stability from improved bilateral relationship” goes against macroeconomic logic.
2) Russia got validation that it is not the aggressor WH “this conflict should never have started and should have been ended … with …good faith peace efforts”
3) WH readout brings back Russia to “bilateral” discussions about Ukraine. Europe doesn’t have “spheres of influence” Trump and Putin do. It even loops Russia in MENA issues akin to the USSR/US talks.
The EU should take over Russian assets. Here is why and here is how. A thread🧵
1) The EU is sitting on Russia's frozen assets, more so than any other country. It would have been wonderful to do this with the G7, but the US is now unlikely to do so. The EU is the most exposed to Russia's aggression.
2) The EU raised "financial stability" concerns in the past. The euphemism is for Saudi or China to drop bonds of European countries, for example France with debt to GPD over 110%, and significant holdings by sovereign funds.
3) Saudis warned G-7 over Russia Seizures with debt sale threat (warning made to EU states, said people familiar with matter @business
Sanctions don’t work… they say. Sanctioning Gazprom and another 50 or so banks without wavers had an immediate impact. It also came from fertile soil under macro pressure in Russia. 1/
2/ Inflow of “unfriendly” FX has already been diminishing for months to come, putting pressure on the ruble.
3/ As a result of the pivot to “friendly” currencies, Russia doesn’t have FX to support the Ruble
2/ Federal budget is back to a large deficit in April. A deficit of 3.4 trillion for the first four months of 2023—already 17% above the full-year budget target.
3/ War is expensive. Expenditure continued to trend up in April despite the stories of pre-payment that would have explained Jan-Feb pick-up. Revenues continue to underperform (-22% vs. 2022M1-4) but as big of a problem are soaring expenditures (+26%)
3/ Effect of export controls on Russia, now China and others are stepping in to save the day. Chips, drones and overall trade, recommendations how to strengthen implementation and enforcement.
1/ Russia substantially increased chip imports in 2022, past the pre-war peak. The value of chip imports is up from $1,8 bn recorded for Jan-Sept 2021 to $2,45 bn over the same period in 2022.
2/ China has stepped in to support Russia's access to chips.
3/ China and HK support can be quantified by the value of shipments as well as the number of transactions (exports of chips to Russia). Others, like the US, Germany, and the UK have scaled back.