ChrisO Profile picture
Sep 21 16 tweets 4 min read
1/ There'll be lots of commentary this morning about the logistical difficulties of Putin's announcement of a partial mobilisation. But I thought I'd add a few points, based on my own personal observations, of what it means politically and for the troops already in Ukraine. Image
2/ First, politics: Putin was clearly under a lot of pressure to react to Russia's defeat east of Kharkiv. This is very likely his way of responding to increasingly strident demands. IMO, this shows that he fears the nationalist flank more than the general public.
2/ Second, morale. As I've previously documented from Russian soldiers' accounts and intercepted phone calls published by Ukraine, many Russian soldiers are badly demoralised and want to go home. 20-40% of the men from some units have reportedly quit.
3/ But the Russian army has been making that increasingly difficult. Some soldiers have reportedly been kept in Ukraine despite their contracts running out in May. Putin's new decree effectively bans anyone leaving (except on certain narrow grounds, of which more later).
4/ This move will be very bad for morale. Soldiers whose contracts were due to expire this autumn will now be stuck in the army indefinitely. This is a big deal: a great many signed up for the economic benefits, not to fight and die.
5/ Putin again tried to justify the war as being in 'defence' of Donbas and 'Novorossiya' (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson). But soldiers' own accounts show that many simply don't believe this and don't know why they're in Ukraine. Again, bad for morale.
6/ So to a significant extent, I think this is about stopping the bleeding of the Russian army. The stats for killed and injured don't capture the large numbers who have simply quit and are just as much hors de combat as someone who's been killed or crippled.
7/ Third, effectiveness. Russia went into this war with a Rumsfeldian lightweight army and quickly found it didn't have enough troops. The impact on the ground has been clear. But a less obvious result has been a lack of rotation - allowing the troops to rest away from the front.
8/ This is very important because well-established evidence shows that combat effectiveness falls off quite rapidly - within 140-180 days. Many have now been fighting for more than 200 days. From John Keegan's 'The Face of Battle': Image
9/ Commentators have suggested that the newly mobilised troops could take months to arrive. I think it might actually be quicker than that. I suspect that one of their main purposes will be to allow frontline troops to be rotated and rested for a while.
10/ Winter is coming, and with it, offensive operations are likely to be at a low ebb. Both sides will be entrenching themselves within the next few weeks until the thaw comes next February-March. That's not a bad time to do a rotation.
11/ You also don't need to be all that well trained to defend a position. Ukraine's territorial defence forces proved that last spring in the defence of Kyiv. Russia's soldiers are poorly trained anyway, so giving new ones a couple of weeks' basic training isn't much different.
12/ There is also a huge rear area - the occupation zone is the size of Portugal - where Ukrainian partisans and special forces can operate without much trouble. Again, you don't need to be well trained to man a roadblock or patrol a route.
13/ Russia's crappy logistics are likely due in part to a lack of personnel to do basic things like drive trucks and handle cargos (no palletisation, as @TrentTelenko and others have noted). Using contract soldiers to do this is a waste of resources.
14/ Every contract soldier who can be freed up or temporarily replaced by a newly mobilised man is a soldier who can be rested, maybe retrained, and then sent back to the front line, where it most counts.
15/ So in short, I see this move not so much as being about creating a brand new army for Russia but as creating political cover for Putin and enabling him to rest and reorganise his current depleted army over the winter. /end

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More from @ChrisO_wiki

Sep 20
1/ Following @ian_matveev's earlier mega-thread analysing the reasons for Russia's defeat east of Kharkiv (link below), he's now posted a follow-up thread assessing Ukraine's options in the south. An English translation (in 32 parts) follows next. ⬇️
2/ From @ian_matveev: Kherson will be freed, probably before the end of the year. The only remaining question is how exactly this will happen. In this thread I will discuss three plausible scenarios for a Ukrainian offensive on the right bank of the Dnieper. Image
2/ Let me briefly recap the situation. The Russian troops are trapped - the bridges across the Dnieper are destroyed, the supply comes via ferry crossings, and this is clearly not enough. Significant forces were moved to defend the front earlier, including from the "LDNR".
Read 33 tweets
Sep 17
1/ @ian_matveev, who's one of the smartest Russian-language commentators on the Ukraine war, has posted a very interesting and detailed thread discussing the reasons for Russia's defeat east of Kharkiv. An English translation, with his permission, follows (LONG thread ahead!). ⬇️
2/ From @ian_matveev: Why was the Russian army defeated and forced to flee the Kharkiv region? Not only local mistakes and a great attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine were to blame, but also the fundamental problems of the Russian grouping in Ukraine.
3/ In recent days it seemed that something fantastic was happening. However, if you remember everything that analysts have been writing about and that we have been talking about, it becomes clear that the defeat near Izyum is a logical development.
Read 111 tweets
Sep 17
@wartranslated 1/ This is an interesting call – it reflects themes I've covered previously, such as the demoralising effect of high casualties, why Russian soldiers are breaking and quitting the battlefield, and the uselessness of Russian commanders. (See link below).
@wartranslated 2/ Transcript follows:

(R1): How are you doing there? Tell me.

(R2): It's so fucked here. Three days ago... no four now... no, three... Anyway, we attached a "Zushka" [anti-air system] to an MT-LB [armoured fighting vehicle]. Went onto hohols [Ukrainians] on it. It was ATGM'd.
@wartranslated 3/ (R1) It was what?

(R2) ATGM'd. Fucked it with an ATGM [anti-tank guided missile], basically. One 200 [dead], two 300 [wounded], one is critical. And yesterday the last village which at the time was not taken away from us. It was attacked. Twelve 200 and two 300.
Read 12 tweets
Sep 14
1/ Did a culture of institutionalised lying contribute to Russia's recent disaster east of Kharkiv, by giving its senior commanders a distorted and false picture of the true situation on the ground? A 🧵 reviewing the evidence.
2/ While reading Russian soldiers' personal accounts from published intercepted phone calls and personal accounts (link ⬇️), I've seen one point mentioned repeatedly: Russian army officers frequently lie to their superiors about their unit's status.
3/ In his now-famous memoir, the former paratrooper Pavel Filatyev complains bitterly of "the system of photo reports [фотоотчетами] that is now so widespread in the army, when the command hides problems". So what is this system, and how does it work?
Read 41 tweets
Sep 11
1/ What are the reasons for Russia's Blyatskrieg – its rapid collapse east of Kharkiv – and why might Napoleon Bonaparte have known some of the answers? Here's a 🧵 exploring some possible deeper reasons for Ukraine's stunning successes in recent days.
2/ Without detracting in any way from the heroism of Ukraine's defenders, it's clear that there's been a massive moral collapse among Russia's forces in Kharkiv oblast. They've surrended towns with barely a fight and abandoned vast quantities of equipment.
3/ In 1808, Napoleon wrote: "In war, three-quarters turns on personal character and relations; the balance of manpower and materials counts only for the remaining quarter." (More pithily expressed as "In war, moral power is to physical as three parts out of four.")
Read 41 tweets
Sep 11
1/ An interesting insight into the dynamics of the so-called "Allied Forces" on the Russian side, which unsurprisingly turn out to be rather less than allied. Translation follows as a 🧵.
2/ "Information about indications of preparations for an offensive in the Kharkiv direction came from various sources - this was not a surprise. How it was assessed, how they reacted to it, how they managed to prepare and whether they were preparing is another question.
3/ But my observations say that there was no effective system of reaction, when on receiving signals some wheels started to spin, everything was in motion and the resource, whatever it was, was brought to maximum readiness.
Read 12 tweets

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