Thread by @RALee85

Thread:
1) There are more unknowns than knowns at this point
2) It is one of the most significant/riskiest political decisions Putin has ever made
3) He is still resisting a broader mobilization
4) It is an acknowledgment that Russia's war was failing and a change had to be made

https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1572480793225707522

Much of this depends on how this order is applied. The number of reservists with combat experience is limited, though they may include everyone who deployed to Syria. Shoigu is notoriously unreliable when it comes to figures so don't treat them as fact. 2/

https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1572482664917078016

There are two important immediate effects from this order: conscripts currently serving in the Russian military likely will be deployed to fight in Ukraine, and volunteers serving on short contracts will be stop-lossed into continuing to serve. 3/

https://twitter.com/DmitryOpines/status/1572474655872630785

In the short-term, those two steps could be enough to prevent a collapse of Russian forces. Otherwise, Russia's manpower issues could have become catastrophic this winter when many short-term volunteers likely would not sign another contract. 4/

But the war will now increasingly be fought on the Russian side by people who do not want to be there. The difference in morale, unit cohesion, and other critical factors between Ukrainian and Russian units will grow even greater. 5/

This is true, which is why we'll need to wait and see how the order is applied. Russia may start by mobilizing a small share of reservists under the narrow conditions Shoigu mentioned and then increase that over time in response to developments. 6/

https://twitter.com/Capt_Navy/status/1572556463981350915

Russia dismantled parts of the Soviet mobilization system with cadre units with officers and equipment ready to take on mobilized conscripts. Conscripts and reservists may be used as combat replacements to fill out understrength Russian units currently in Ukraine, instead. 7/

Each regiment and brigade was supposed to have one conscript battalion (also with officers and contract NCOs), but Russia's manpower issues have been so serious that I assume most of these officers and NCOs were already deployed. Not sure they are still coherent battalions. 8/

If we’re only talking about Russia deploying reservists who were previously contract soldiers and not conscripts, that would narrow the number available. However, conscripts will likely face greater coercion to sign contracts to deploy regardless. 9/

https://twitter.com/dalperovitch/status/1572570183851732993

The other important short-term effect is that there are criminal penalties for soldiers who refuse to fight. Considering that this was 20-40% of soldiers in some units, that isn't insignificant. But an involuntary fighting force won't have great long-term prospects. 10/