Putin's announced mobilization of 300,000 "reservists" was jaw-dropping to me this morning, but not for the reason some might suspect.
Why? Because know how Russian soldiers are trained, in basic training & in their units.
A brief 🧵 on some fun facts. 1/
While I commanded US Army Europe before retiring, before that I commanded all basic & advanced soldier training for the Army (2009-11).
During that period,≈150,000 new soldiers/year at (then) 5 basic training sites & 21 advanced training locations, received training.2/
Most new US soldiers get 10 weeks of basic training (some get more at one-station unit training (OSUT) sites, like infantry, artillery, MPs). Those that don't go to OSUT travel off to different length courses for advanced training in a "specialty" (logistics, intel, etc). 3/
It's a long period of time, trained by very professional drill sergeants. There is an extremely high resource overhead to all this.
Soldiers report to their units ready to be integrated in the specific mission.
Remember, the US population is 344 million & we train≈150k. 4/
Russia, on the other hand, has a population of 144 million citizens, spread over 11 time zones.
Theirs is a conscript force w/ 1 basic training site, (Labinsk in S. Russia). Some RU get advanced specialty training, but most RU soldiers get most training in their 1st unit. 5/
Russian soldiers got just a few days of basic training before being sent to Belarus starting last November (pre-invasion). themoscowtimes.com/2022/07/20/rus… 6/
During 2 visits to RU, I saw basic & unit training. It was awful. Familiarization versus qualification on rifles, rudimentary first aid, very few simulations to conserve resources, and...most importantly...horrible leadership by "drill sergeants." 7/ themoscowtimes.com/2020/02/17/dec…
Officers admitted to me that theirs was a "one year" force, with some - the poorest - volunteering or being elected for leadership roles. 8/
Remember, RU soldiers get almost ALL training in units vs at basic.
How units are resourced play a big part.
One tank unit i visited near Moscow proudly told me they get 1 tank round/crew each year (US units spend hours in simulators & crews fire dozens of real rounds/year). 9/
BTW, Ukraine's army has taken the US model to heart after receiving training from US personnel in both individual and unit training techniques since 2014.
The establishment of JMTG-U by US Army, Europe was instrumental in that. Heres a link to that. 10/ eucom.mil/topic/jmtg-u
But I digress...
The issue is the Russian army is poorly led & poorly trained. That starts in basic training, and doesn't get better during the RU soldier's time in uniform.
A few thoughts on what occurred in two different conflicts yesterday...the use of "killer pagers" by Israel and Ukraine's attack on the large ammo cache at Toropets military base 300+ miles inside Russia.
A short 🧵 1/12
First, the pagers.
In this article (gifted) from the @nytimes, the author claims there "no clear strategy" for this coordinated attack.
I disagree. Having used electronic & signals countermeasures in Iraq, the strategy is clear. 2/
Terrorist organizations - unlike conventional militaries who have encrypted signal capabilities - must find ways to communiate. It is important to continue to disrupt & counter this ability.
In Iraq, terrorist use of cell phones allowed US and ISF to glean valuable information & disrupt their networks. 3/
On a daily basis during my time in command of Army forces in Europe, every day the intelligence "black book" would provide more information on Putin's Russia attempts at malign influence against the west...and especially against the US.
Today, the @TheJusticeDept has taken action...but because of current divisions in the US, many Americans will have questions.
So let's talk about it...
A thread 🧵 1/12
During my service in Europe, I saw intelligence on:
-Rusian acts of sabotage within allied governments
-The creation of "frozen conflicts" w/in the territorial integrity of nations (including Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan, two of the three Baltic countries, and the Balkans)
-the stoking & support of migration & human trafficking
-malicious cyber activities against whole of governments (most egregious example was Estonia)
-disinformation campaigns and election interference
-attempted and successful assassinations on foreign soil. 2/
In my last year of command of @USArmyEURAF (that was 2012), the Russian television station @RT_com asked me to do an interview, as we had just conducted an exercise with the Russian Army and I had invited the Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Col-Gen Chirkin to a conference. 3/
Woke up to several texts from journalists asking my thoughts on "West Point dropping duty, honor, country from their motto?" and one wrote "does this mean the Academy has gone 'woke'?"
My first thought: "let me get a cup of coffee before addressing this craziness."
A 🧵 1/9
This week, graduates received a letter from LTG Steve Gilland -the Superintendent (the USMA college president)- of @WestPoint_USMA informing of changes in the MISSION STATEMENT (NOT the motto).
The letter specifically said the MOTTO "Duty, Honor, Country" has NOT changed. 2/
Now, I know LTG Gilland well. He's a great soldier, terrific leader, and a common-sense guy.
As any leader - general or business CEO - knows, you have to continuously assess and analyze your mission statement.
In fact, I teach this to MBA students in leadership classes. 3/
Many of you have heard me say this multiple times with respect to the war in Ukraine.
Now we'll start seeing the same in Gaza with JLTOTS pronounced "Jay-Lots" for the media).
A 🧵 1/9
"Logistics determine the art of the possible."
Many of you have heard me say this multiple times with respect to the war in Ukraine.
Now we'll start seeing the same in Gaza with JLTOTS pronounced "Jay-Lots" for the media).
A 🧵 1/9
Airdropped humanitarian aid is precise and speedy, but it's limited in it's capability and capacity for certain kinds and large amounts of supplies. It's also relatively expensive.After you deploy expensive parachutes and GPS devices into the area, it's hard to get them back! 3/
On 24 Feb 2022, I scribbled some thoughts about what I believed were Putin's strategic objectives in invading Ukraine (see chart).
In the 1st 18 months of the conflict, Ukraines' action, NATO collaboration & US support caused him to fail.
We're at an inflection point. A 🧵1/
Addressing each: 1. Zelenskyy is still strong 2. Ukraine's army is still fighting 3. Ukraine's population is resilient 4. Ru does not control the Black sea ports 5. The west - especially the US - has returned to being divided, and NATO may now take fewer risks. 2/
Putin now knows that Ukraine's continued capability will - for the short term - continue to require support from the west.
So he is pulling out all stops, w/ mobilizations (over 400k new (untrained) soldiers as "meat" for attacks), a ramped up industrial base, & oppression. 3/
GEN Zaluzhnyi is 51 y.o., extremely young for a Commander of any nation's Armed Forces. Most 4-star generals are in their 60's with much more experience.
Since Feb '22 he's been the tactical, opn'l & strategic leader of the toughest fight we've seen in the 21st century. 2/
Here's what I mean by "tactical, opn'l, strategic" commander:
1. He commands the 2000+ mile tactical front 2. He coordinates each battles into an operational campaign plan 3. He "plays" in the strategic arena with his nation's leaders & over 50 supporting nations. 3/