As Russia's military commissariats begin rounding up reservists for the front, we're seeing fairly clear -- if inevitably anecdotal -- evidence that the call-up is falling hardest on the communities already hardest hit by the war, particularly ethnic minorities.
/1
As has been the case since the beginning, that means Buryats...
/2
Racism and classism are absolutely part of this process. Wars are almost always fought by the disenfranchised, marginalized and the poor on behalf of the powerful -- and Russia is no exception in that regard.
/8
But there is also a more mundane -- and, for Putin, a more problematic -- reason behind this: Bureaucratic inertia.
Tasked with mobilizing as many men as possible as quickly as possible, the military is going for the easiest targets.
/9
Inefficient bureaucracies -- whether the police, the tax authorities or the military -- will often try to hit their targets by fishing over and over again from the same ponds. It's easier than seeking new fishing holes, even if it brings diminishing returns.
/10
The diminishing returns from such behavior, meanwhile, accrue to others: to the communities being decimated by this war, and to the front-line commanders, who will have to fight with poorly trained and weakly motivated troops.
/11
I've been noting for months that the burden is falling inequitably on particular communities, creating pockets of deprivation and injustice -- and warning that the Kremlin lacks the administrative capacity to smooth things out.
/12
What we're seeing now bears that analysis out: Rather than correcting the mistakes of the earlier phases of this war, the Russian administrative machinery is deepening them. The scenes we're seeing from Dagestan are evidence of the potential consequences of that.
/13
The Kremlin's coercive apparatus will now have to pick up the tab for this administrative dysfunction, seeing off protests and rounding up reluctant recruits. If they're mostly facing down big-city liberals, they'll probably make it through.
/14
But if the Kremlin needs to suppress the communities from which the military is trying to recruit troops, it may struggle. It's not just that blue-collar workers might fight harder on the streets, though it's that, too.
/15
If the Kremlin tries to repress ethnic minorities, they will sharpen identities, imbue those identities with a sense of injustice, and swing horizontal social institutions into the fight -- institutions that can be much more legitimate in these communities than Putin is.
/END
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For context and insight, it might be useful to go back to something @gbrunc and I described in "Putin vs the People", about how Putin understands and utilizes crises and tragedies:
So many thoughts have been expressed in the time that it has taken me to collect my own, that I'm not sure what this is worth. By the key words are Navalny's own: не сдавайтесь. Don't surrender.
/1
Navalny is not the first of Putin's political opponents to die. He will not likely be the last. But it is up to those who care to find a way -- any way -- to keep Russia's other political prisoners alive. The pressure must always be on.
/2
Vladimir Kara-Murza. Ilya Yashin. These names you know, or should know. Evan Gershkovich, too. Or Navalny's own lawyers, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin and Alexei Liptser. But there are hundreds more.
/3
This excellent thread from @DrRadchenko is in part a rebuttal to one aspect of my thread yesterday, in which I argued, inter alia, that Putin needs a forever war. Sergey argues Putin needs victory and would be happy for the war to end. It’s worth unpacking this.
First, I think we both agree that Putin needs the war to continue — in some form or another — through the March 2024 presidential election. The Kremlin has predicated Putin’s campaign on this war continuing and will not want to pivot too quickly.
/2
Second, I agree with Sergey’s point that, from a macro-historical perspective, there is no predetermination here. I also share Sergey’s aversion to monocausal explanations. It was never inevitable that Putin would take this path.
/3
Does Vladimir Putin want negotiations? Almost certainly yes.
Does Putin want to negotiate? Almost certainly not.
The difference is not semantic.
(A long-ish 🧵)
/1
We have all, by now, read the reporting in the @nytimes about "quiet signals" evidently being sent from the Kremlin to Washington. We have all, I imagine, also seen the criticism of that reporting on this website and elsewhere.
/2
And, to be sure, we have also seen Russia's continual escalation of its violence in Ukraine, including today's massive aerial bombardment of civilians.
/3
I’d ignore the bluster about weapons production. Yes, of course Russia makes more than Ukraine. We already knew that. And so did the people Putin’s talking to.
But why throw ideology into the mix?
Because it’s ideology, not artillery, that wins the war at home for Putin.
/2
Putin is asking people in the Russian military to believe that this is a war worth fighting. He’s asking the rest of the elite and society to believe this is a war worth making sacrifices for. Ideology is key to both, but not in a straightforward way.
/3
A senior European diplomat told me (amongst others) last night that this (👇) would be the stance taken by the Allies in Vilnius.
He wasn't wrong.
/1
On the face of it, what NATO did in its communiqué wasn't too bad. It said, in essence, that Ukraine has done everything it needs to for accession, except for winning (or otherwise ending) the war. Moving beyond MAP is genuine progress and shouldn't be minimized.
/2
But in order to bridge the gap between "you're in" and "you're not in", NATO has had to put itself in an uncomfortable and, I'm afraid, ultimately untenable position.
/3