Sam Greene Profile picture
Sep 22, 2022 15 tweets 3 min read Read on X
As Russia's military commissariats begin rounding up reservists for the front, we're seeing fairly clear -- if inevitably anecdotal -- evidence that the call-up is falling hardest on the communities already hardest hit by the war, particularly ethnic minorities.

/1
As has been the case since the beginning, that means Buryats...

/2


... and inevitably many others, including ethnically Slavic rust-belt towns.

/7


Racism and classism are absolutely part of this process. Wars are almost always fought by the disenfranchised, marginalized and the poor on behalf of the powerful -- and Russia is no exception in that regard.

/8
But there is also a more mundane -- and, for Putin, a more problematic -- reason behind this: Bureaucratic inertia.

Tasked with mobilizing as many men as possible as quickly as possible, the military is going for the easiest targets.

/9
Inefficient bureaucracies -- whether the police, the tax authorities or the military -- will often try to hit their targets by fishing over and over again from the same ponds. It's easier than seeking new fishing holes, even if it brings diminishing returns.

/10
The diminishing returns from such behavior, meanwhile, accrue to others: to the communities being decimated by this war, and to the front-line commanders, who will have to fight with poorly trained and weakly motivated troops.

/11
I've been noting for months that the burden is falling inequitably on particular communities, creating pockets of deprivation and injustice -- and warning that the Kremlin lacks the administrative capacity to smooth things out.

/12


tldrussia.substack.com/p/pyrrhic-vict…
What we're seeing now bears that analysis out: Rather than correcting the mistakes of the earlier phases of this war, the Russian administrative machinery is deepening them. The scenes we're seeing from Dagestan are evidence of the potential consequences of that.

/13
The Kremlin's coercive apparatus will now have to pick up the tab for this administrative dysfunction, seeing off protests and rounding up reluctant recruits. If they're mostly facing down big-city liberals, they'll probably make it through.

/14
But if the Kremlin needs to suppress the communities from which the military is trying to recruit troops, it may struggle. It's not just that blue-collar workers might fight harder on the streets, though it's that, too.

/15
If the Kremlin tries to repress ethnic minorities, they will sharpen identities, imbue those identities with a sense of injustice, and swing horizontal social institutions into the fight -- institutions that can be much more legitimate in these communities than Putin is.

/END

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Sam Greene

Sam Greene Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @samagreene

Jan 9
I study authoritarianism for a living, so I do not say this lightly: America isn't facing an authoritarian future. America is living an authoritarian present.

(A long 🧵)

/1
Hollywood would have us believe that authoritarianism wins when Voldemort takes over Hogwarts or Sauron conquers Gondor. But that's wrong. There are no pitched battles between good and evil. Democracy dies in banality and plain daylight, not glory and darkness.

/2
Power is a process, not a thing someone holds. Authoritarian power is thus a process in which we decide not to defend ourselves -- because it's risky, uncertain, or just inconvenient.

Authoritarianism wins every day citizens decide not to fight. To wait. To watch.

/3
Read 21 tweets
Dec 5, 2025
European priorities for Trump’s new National Security Strategy:

() whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…Image
Kinda puts this reporting into context:
And this. If you thought the Musk/Vance interventions were a passing fad, maybe think again. Image
Read 4 tweets
Aug 18, 2025
For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built.

A quick thread

/1
First things first: if we’ve learned anything thus far, it’s that we should give it 12-18 hours before drawing conclusions about anything involving Trump and Putin. Not that that will stop anybody.

Thus, my way too early take is that … I’m nervous.

/2
The apocalyptic scenario—another blowup in the Oval Office—was avoided, and that’s good. But the second worst possible outcome was that the European leaders who accompany Zelenskyy would breathe a sigh of relief, and I’m afraid that may be what we’re seeing.

/3
Read 12 tweets
Apr 22, 2025
Putin's cease-fire offer is an attempt to achieve at the negotiating table what he cannot achieve on the battleground: the neutering of Ukraine as a sovereign entity.

TL;DR: It's not about territorial control.

(A 🧵)

/1
Per reporting from the @FT, Putin is "offering" to halt the war at the current line of control (minus the piece of Kursk obl. still controlled by Ukraine). Conditions appear to be recognition of Crimea and other Ru-occupied territories, plus no NATO.



/2ft.com/content/5d8484…
Not reported are any details on:
1⃣ Security guarantees (including a European force)
2⃣ Sanctions relief
3⃣ Western positions on the territories

On all three, no news ain't good news.

/3
Read 21 tweets
Mar 1, 2025
What we learned yesterday: nothing we didn’t know, if we were paying attention.

What we’ll learn this weekend: whether European leaders have been paying attention.

(A 🧵)

/1
It was abundantly clear that the US administration would be guided by the following “principles” (I use the word hesitantly):
1️⃣🇺🇸 transactional interests trump all others
2️⃣ The velocity of exit from 🇺🇦 trumps the quality of exit
3️⃣ Normalization with🇷🇺 is a priority

/2
Following from these “principles” are 3 logical conclusions:
1️⃣ 🇺🇸 is unperturbed by the geo-strategic consequences of its exit from 🇺🇦
2️⃣ 🇺🇸 feels it has greater leverage over 🇺🇦 than 🇷🇺
3️⃣ the only route to a rapid exit is thus for 🇺🇦 to make maximum concessions

/3
Read 11 tweets
Feb 13, 2025
Ok folks, deep breaths.

There is very real reason to worry about the dynamic emerging between Washington and Moscow when it comes to Ukraine. But there is also very real reason to believe that Ukraine and Europe can create a better outcome.

(A rather long 🧵, obviously)

/1
First, let's start with the bad news: The Trump administration is handling the start of this process just about as badly as it is possible to do. There is no way to sugar coat that, nor should anyone try.

I'll focus on three low-lights.

/2
Low-light 1: After Waltz and Kellogg spent weeks talking up a strategy of "maximum pressure" on Russia and building trust in Europe and Kyiv, POTUS threw that out the window by announcing unconditional bilateral talks with Putin.

/3
Read 29 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(