As Russia's military commissariats begin rounding up reservists for the front, we're seeing fairly clear -- if inevitably anecdotal -- evidence that the call-up is falling hardest on the communities already hardest hit by the war, particularly ethnic minorities.
/1
As has been the case since the beginning, that means Buryats...
/2
Racism and classism are absolutely part of this process. Wars are almost always fought by the disenfranchised, marginalized and the poor on behalf of the powerful -- and Russia is no exception in that regard.
/8
But there is also a more mundane -- and, for Putin, a more problematic -- reason behind this: Bureaucratic inertia.
Tasked with mobilizing as many men as possible as quickly as possible, the military is going for the easiest targets.
/9
Inefficient bureaucracies -- whether the police, the tax authorities or the military -- will often try to hit their targets by fishing over and over again from the same ponds. It's easier than seeking new fishing holes, even if it brings diminishing returns.
/10
The diminishing returns from such behavior, meanwhile, accrue to others: to the communities being decimated by this war, and to the front-line commanders, who will have to fight with poorly trained and weakly motivated troops.
/11
I've been noting for months that the burden is falling inequitably on particular communities, creating pockets of deprivation and injustice -- and warning that the Kremlin lacks the administrative capacity to smooth things out.
/12
What we're seeing now bears that analysis out: Rather than correcting the mistakes of the earlier phases of this war, the Russian administrative machinery is deepening them. The scenes we're seeing from Dagestan are evidence of the potential consequences of that.
/13
The Kremlin's coercive apparatus will now have to pick up the tab for this administrative dysfunction, seeing off protests and rounding up reluctant recruits. If they're mostly facing down big-city liberals, they'll probably make it through.
/14
But if the Kremlin needs to suppress the communities from which the military is trying to recruit troops, it may struggle. It's not just that blue-collar workers might fight harder on the streets, though it's that, too.
/15
If the Kremlin tries to repress ethnic minorities, they will sharpen identities, imbue those identities with a sense of injustice, and swing horizontal social institutions into the fight -- institutions that can be much more legitimate in these communities than Putin is.
/END
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For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built.
A quick thread
/1
First things first: if we’ve learned anything thus far, it’s that we should give it 12-18 hours before drawing conclusions about anything involving Trump and Putin. Not that that will stop anybody.
Thus, my way too early take is that … I’m nervous.
/2
The apocalyptic scenario—another blowup in the Oval Office—was avoided, and that’s good. But the second worst possible outcome was that the European leaders who accompany Zelenskyy would breathe a sigh of relief, and I’m afraid that may be what we’re seeing.
/3
Putin's cease-fire offer is an attempt to achieve at the negotiating table what he cannot achieve on the battleground: the neutering of Ukraine as a sovereign entity.
TL;DR: It's not about territorial control.
(A 🧵)
/1
Per reporting from the @FT, Putin is "offering" to halt the war at the current line of control (minus the piece of Kursk obl. still controlled by Ukraine). Conditions appear to be recognition of Crimea and other Ru-occupied territories, plus no NATO.
What we learned yesterday: nothing we didn’t know, if we were paying attention.
What we’ll learn this weekend: whether European leaders have been paying attention.
(A 🧵)
/1
It was abundantly clear that the US administration would be guided by the following “principles” (I use the word hesitantly):
1️⃣🇺🇸 transactional interests trump all others
2️⃣ The velocity of exit from 🇺🇦 trumps the quality of exit
3️⃣ Normalization with🇷🇺 is a priority
/2
Following from these “principles” are 3 logical conclusions:
1️⃣ 🇺🇸 is unperturbed by the geo-strategic consequences of its exit from 🇺🇦
2️⃣ 🇺🇸 feels it has greater leverage over 🇺🇦 than 🇷🇺
3️⃣ the only route to a rapid exit is thus for 🇺🇦 to make maximum concessions
/3
There is very real reason to worry about the dynamic emerging between Washington and Moscow when it comes to Ukraine. But there is also very real reason to believe that Ukraine and Europe can create a better outcome.
(A rather long 🧵, obviously)
/1
First, let's start with the bad news: The Trump administration is handling the start of this process just about as badly as it is possible to do. There is no way to sugar coat that, nor should anyone try.
I'll focus on three low-lights.
/2
Low-light 1: After Waltz and Kellogg spent weeks talking up a strategy of "maximum pressure" on Russia and building trust in Europe and Kyiv, POTUS threw that out the window by announcing unconditional bilateral talks with Putin.
/3
Yashin, Kara-Murza and Pivovarov have been abundantly clear that Russia’s war is criminal and that Ukraine should win. They went to jail for that clarity. Criticizing them for not repeating it is disingenuous.
But they need to understand the genuineness of Ukrainian anger.
/1
The nuances of the Russian opposition’s arguments on sanctions and Russian public opinion cannot bring security to Ukraine, and Ukrainians justifiably worry that a focus on dreams of Russian democracy will distract from helping Ukraine win the war.
/2
Indeed, the West has a bad habit of taking shots in the dark on Russian politics rather than focusing on shoring up Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, as I wrote here:
Increasing chatter that we may see a large prisoner exchange--perhaps as early as today--involving a number of the Russian political prisoners who have gone missing in recent days, plus Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan and others.
The question is, why now?
/1
I'm on record saying I didn't think an exchange was terribly likely, because I thought the Kremlin would (a) hold out for maximum benefit and (b) avoid giving Biden a win. Obviously, I can be wrong -- I don't know (and have never pretended to know) Putin's inner thoughts.
/2
On the second, more minor point, with Biden now out of the race, giving him a win may not seem as consequential for the US elections, as a Biden win doesn't necessarily translate into kudos for Harris.
/3