It's general election day in Italy. I have again seen lots of strange stories and statements on Italy in the international press.
So here's a data-based summary thread that may help in debunking claims about a "profligate, reform-lazy Italy", pulling all of Europe down. 🧵#CAIN
"Italy has been living beyond its means; now Italians finally need to adjust!"
In fact, 🇮🇹 has exported more goods and services than it imported since 2012 - also during the Covid crisis. Italians consume less than they produce - living below their means.
"Italy is just a debt mess at the costs of others in Europe."
In fact, private sector debt is relatively low in Italy compared to other OECD countries, which typically goes unmentioned when people complain about Italy's debt problems.
"The next Italian government will just continue with profligate government spending."
In fact,🇮🇹 ran large and consistent primary budget surpluses before Covid: revenue exceeded spending excl. interest payments. 🇮🇹 has done more fiscal consolidation than 🇩🇪.
"Italy will just continue with profligate government spending for social protection."
Eurostat data show that per capita government spending in Italy on social protection and health is well below the levels in Germany and France. #CAIN
Italy's public-debt-to-GDP ratio remains high, but this is due to the 1980s legacy (when borrowing costs skyrocketed) and the impact of the financial crisis, € crisis and Covid crisis. Italy did more fiscal consolidation than any other country, contributing to slower growth.
"🇮🇹 received much more or very much more money from the EU budget than it payed in [3 out of 4 Germans believe this] - living off others in Europe."
In fact, Italy was a net contributor to the EU budget for decades. And the simple payer-receiver logic falls short (spillovers!).
"Italy is an economic mess, helped out a bit by tourism."
Italy remains the second-largest industrial location in the EU behind Germany - well ahead of France, Spain, Poland etc.
"Italy's industry faces severe competitiveness problems."
There are structural problems for Italian industry, but there are also things that are not mentioned. Industrial production in Italy lost out during 1990s and 2000s, but has performed better than Germany's since 2015.
"What's Italy without tourism?"
The EU's second-largest industrial location, where firms produce and export lots of high-tech goods. Italy plays an important role in European industry networks.
"The increase in 🇮🇹borrowing costs reflects weak fundamentals."
In fact, history shows that moves in interest rates on 🇮🇹government debt go beyond fundamentals and reflect self-fulfilling market sentiment against which only ECB action (a crisis backstop) is effective.
"🇮🇹 fails to do structural reforms to calm investors."
This ignores labour market flexibilisation since the early 1990s with contested macro effects. Furthermore, 🇮🇹has committed to "structural reforms" with Next Gen EU, which the next government will continue to pursue.
"Italy must finally liberalise its economy."
🇮🇹 has carried out many market-liberal reforms. Labour market flexibilisation brought a sharp increase in fixed-term contracts and a decline in real wages. However, this type of structural reforms has not boosted productivity growth.
"Italy's labour market is sclerotic."
Labour market liberalisation generated temporary jobs. However, cheap labour reduced real wages and diminished incentives for companies to make labour-saving investments – with negative productivity effects, the basis for long-term growth.
"Italy needs to improve price competitiveness".
The dark side of the policy mix to reduce labour costs in 🇮🇹is that real wages have declined strongly vis-a-vis 🇩🇪🇫🇷 while temporary employment has increased. This has weakened domestic demand, contributing to weak growth.
"🇮🇹 households are wealthier than their 🇩🇪 peers anyway."
No. The median Italian household holds more net wealth than the comparable German or Austrian household (more private-property ownership!). But the average household is clearly wealthier in Germany and Austria #CAIN
Let's stop these one-sided stories about a more or less completely run-down 🇮🇹, incapable of doing "structural reforms", artificially kept alive by ECB and EU. Let's improve the intellectual quality of our economic policy debates - also in facing any new government.
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Our paper on reassessing Italy’s long decline in the context of European integration and globalisation is now out in "Italian Economic Journal". We synthesise (competing) supply-side and demand-side explanations, accounting for long-term processes and sectoral interdependences.🧵
Italy large economy has fallen behind other Eurozone peers over the last decades; given the Eurozone's institutions and rules, there are constantly questions on how to manage Italy's high public debt under constraints on monetary, fiscal, industrial and wage policy.
We use a structuralist-evolutionary framework to synthesise different supply-side and demand-side explanations for Italy's decline, accounting for long-term processes and sectoral interdependences.
I have a new paper on fiscal consolidation and its growth effects. I review how large the fiscal consolidations in €zone countries were in the past, what the research record shows about growth effects, and what that implies for the austerity outlook for the next years. Thread 🧵
Pressure to implement fiscal consolidation during the early 1990s coincided with the introduction of the Maastricht provisions. On average, the €zone countries had a cumulative fiscal adjustment of 5.3% of GDP over the 1992-1998 period, with the largest consolidation in Italy.
The 1999-2007 period (i.e. from the establishment of the common monetary union until the outbreak of the financial crisis) was marked by some sizeable fiscal adjustments motivated by deficit-reduction desires, but these were concentrated in only a handful of countries.
How far from full employment? Our paper in European Economic Review: based on unemployment-vacancy data, we find full employment episodes in EU countries during the 1970s. Labour markets became tighter when recovering from COVID-19, but few countries hit full employment. Thread:
Based on contributions by Michaillat/Saez, we apply a full employment concept derived from the unemployment-vacancies relationship to European countries. We use the Beveridge (full employment-consistent) rate of unemployment (BECRU) to study labour markets over 1970-2022.
We find full employment episodes in EU countries in the 1970s. The European unemployment problem emerged in 1980s and 1990s. Slack in labour markets initially increased during the pandemic. Labour markets became tighter recovering from COVID-19; few countries hit full employment.
Do higher public debt levels reduce economic growth? My meta-analysis is out in the September issue of Journal of Economic Surveys. By analysing 816 estimates, I find
- publication bias in favour of negative growth effects
- no uniform public-debt-to-GDP threshold
Summary 🧵
Reinhart/Rogoff (2010) had an impact on the policy debate; policy-makers used their results (threshold in public-debt-to-GDP of 90% beyond which growth slows) to argue for austerity. But what does the evidence tell us about growth effects of higher public debt? /2
Several papers argue that there is indeed evidence for a negative causal effect of higher public-debt-to-GDP ratios on economic growth, and for a (close to) 90% threshold in the public-debt-to-GDP-ratio beyond which growth falls significantly. /3
How did Italy become the Eurozone's Achilles heel, the monetary union's most vulnerable spot? In a new working paper, we answer this question by reassessing Italy's long decline in the context of European integration and globalisation 🧵
Italy is the Eurozone's Achilles heel; its large economy has fallen behind other Eurozone peers; given the Eurozone's institutions and rules, there are constantly questions on how to manage Italy's high public debt under constraints on monetary, fiscal, industrial and wage policy
We use a new structuralist framework to synthesise different supply-side and demand-side explanations for Italy's decline.
We need to promote public debate on fiscal policy and EU fiscal rules. Yesterday, I did a presentation in Vienna on climate investment in the context of public investment needs and EU fiscal rules reform. I stressed three main points (short thread):
1. If policymakers are serious about meeting the climate goals, they will need to significantly increase public investment for climate and energy. We are talking about *additional* public investment of at least 1% of EU GDP per year.
2. The European Commission has published EU fiscal rules reform orientations that were welcomed by EU finance ministers. Tough political negotiations ahead, but what's on the table will not sufficiently increase the scope for public climate investment.