Sunday Update. Russia (finally) mobilizes with the worst mobilization process in modern history. Plus why it wont matter that much unless they properly train and equip the forces and why people are being fooled by one vision of WWII and the Eastern Front.
If Putin understood this war after the initial setback around Kyiv, he would have mobilized . It was then. As the Russian Army was going to soon run very short of well-trained and motivated troops. I put together this thread in March.
In April, when there was talk about Putin mobilizing during his May 9 speech, I guessed it would have taken him about 9 months minimum to produce basically trained forces, and that was if they had started preparing.
Just as a point of comparison, in WWII it took the US a year from starting the process to train and equip a division for action. And this was after the US had spent a long time planning the process, training the trainers, etc. Russia has done none of that
If they really are going to give these poor conscripts two weeks of training and send them to Ukraine with old crappy weapons, it will probably make things worse, as logistically moving and maintaining them will hardly be worth their combat value.
Actually, Putin seems to be desperately trying to recreate the Stalinist experience in WWII, but he is fooling himself about that (as I would argue he and many others have fooled themselves about just how important the Eastern Front was in defeating the Nazis).
So much of his and other people's view of WWII has been dominated by the argument that the was was decided on the Eastern Front with the engagement of the Red and German armies, that they have focussed on the wrong variables--numbers of soldiers.
When people say the war was decided on the eastern front, they invariably turn to numerical Army size. And yes, most German infantry was engaged on the Eastern front from June 1941 until the summer of 1944.
However, numbers of soldiers has ceased being the key metric since the industrial revolution. Since then the key thing is the army with the best trained and motivated forces provided with the best equipment.
During WWII, the Germans actually sent a remarkably small % of their military production to the Eastern Front. Basically they always prioritized aircraft production and the land war was secondary. ie, in an industrial/technological assessment, the Eastern Front was secondary.
Ive written a 600+ page book on this so wont describe it all here. Basically if you look at WWII from the point of the creation, deployment and destruction of material, you will get a very different view than is normally the case. Here is a short summary. cepr.org/voxeu/columns/…
Long story short, the numbers of troops in and of itself is a poor indicator of success and failure in modern technological, industrial warfare. As said above its about the number of well-trained, motivated, equipped and supported forces.
The Russian mobilization process seems deliberately operated to create the opposite of this, poorly trained, disaffected soldiers with crappy equipment and poor logistics.
The big story this week was not Russian mobilization, but that Ukraine continues grinding on. The Russian front around Lyman looks decidedly ropey, and should fall in the coming days.
The Ukrainians have become the better armed, trained and motivated force. Russia will have to compete in this area, not just raw numbers of bad soldiers, if they are going to be able to hold on.
The Ukrainians being absolutely brutal about their expectations of Russia sending poorly trained conscripts to war.
@GeneralStaffUA in their evening update says the Russians are already sending some of the just forcibly raised conscripts into fighting units after no training whatsoever. If true, this is desperate stuff.
The way that Putin announced conscription and the crazy way it seems to be implemented with little preparation either physically or societally answers one of the mysteries of the war--at least for me.
Ive always wondered if Putin had any idea how disastrously his army was performing or was aware that the war was trending towards Ukraine. I think we can say now that he had no idea and was not aware.
He's always acted throughout like the Russian Army was more powerful than it was, that it was doing better than it seemed to an outside observer, and that the Ukrainians were in far worse shape than they were. Thus the decision to leave Kharkiv oblast so weakly defended...
Hi Fabian, not a Russian mobilisation expert, but see this as the minimum that Putin could do. His army would start running out of soldiers in the first half of 2023 otherwise. That being said, this seems more a move that will prolong Russian defeat.
Will they train these reservists back up (presumably they were trained shoddily to begin with)? Will they give them PT to get into shape. How long will they have to familiarise themselves with the systems they will be operating?
Unless Putin had put in place a serious training system already, that will be impossible to do quickly, so more likely they will rush unmotivated and out of shape reservists into combat worn out of date or poorly maintained equipment.
Sunday Update, a week of consolidation and one assumes preparation for Ukraine, while Russia seems to be deciding where it will try and hold a line. After the great change of the first ten days of September, things havent moved so much, but things are definitely happening.
Over the past week there was little dramatic change in the line. This moving map will give you an idea of the change from the Feb 24 invasion to today.
Though there are a few things that seem to be happening all up and down the line. On the Kherson end, there are some indications that the Russians might be preparing to pull some/all of their forces to the east bank of the Dnipro.
Excellent, we are starting to get the Ukrainian analysis of the Kharkiv operation (actually linked Kherson-Kharkiv operations), and its important to pay alot of attention. The Ukrainian position has been often overlooked in western reporting (to its great detriment).
Unlike western reports over the summer, for instance, the Ukrainians had a much better understanding of how the fighting was progressing, why the war was still trending in Ukraine's direction, and they were not deceived by the Russian Army's unthinking ability to blow stuff up.
A number of really important points being made here. In 2021 much was made about how Russian maneuvers in Zapad 2021 were a confirmation of the improvement in their capabilities. Yet, we can see now, they were able to do very little in the real world that they claimed...
to do in the manuevers. It was a general analytical failing in the estimate given by many, taking Russian claims too much at face value. Military maneuvers are often deeply deceptive. Mussolini regularly used them to make it seem his army was more capable.
In the case of Russia-Ukraine, its worth noting that it was the Ukrainians who have been able to pull off the greater combined arms operations, though the concentration before the war was almost all on the Russians.
This is a rather extraordinary claim that is being made today by the Ukrainians and some western intelligence--that Russia, in the midst of the Kharkiv collapse, has ceased sending reinforcements to its struggling army in Ukraine.
The @GeneralStaffUA update this evening provides some details. Basically they cant convince the troops to go (longer paragraph in center). A combination of soldiers hearing about all the deaths, the terrible treatment of wounded, etc
Ukraine will want to take advantage of this, because if it continues there should be other failures on the Russian line. Hard to see how they rebuild the new line in Kharkiv along the Oskil River, for instance, with the rag-tag group left over from the past 10 days.