@Annatar_I has pointed out that Russia didn't have a reservist system as such from 1991 to August 2021.
(Incidentally, that's just one month after Putin's article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
Which is yet another piece of evidence that the decision to go to war with Ukraine was only made in summer 2021, but I digress.)
Anyhow, all that Russia really has is a list of ~25M names of people who served in the military or did military courses in university.
Moreover, military commissariat workers are not exactly the cream of the crop.
Hence the calling up of students, engineers in missile assembly plants, other non-eligibles, etc. It's a bureaucratic nightmare, but one that's generally resolved when the mobilized reach their units.
This Rybar post on how mobilization is going seems representative: t.me/rybar/39263
I do not consider claims of mobilization being heavily loaded towards ethnic minority republics likely to be true. The West and Ukraine has an open (and logical) agenda of trying to incite dissatisfaction and separatism amongst Russian minorities. Take with a grain of salt.
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The chances of Russia using tactical nukes for military purposes in Ukraine are near zero.
As I said before, one key aspect about this war is force densities are very low (10x lower than on same fronts in WW2). As such, only *mass* usage of tactical nukes makes military sense.
Obviously the costs of isolated nuke usage (probable NATO intervention) far outweigh the meager military benefits. Russia's post-mobilization war plan revolves around leveraging its population advantage into a manpower one. Nothing new was said about nukes.
Mass Russian usage of tactical nukes is only credible in a scenario in which there is extensive NATO intervention that threatens to overrun Russian territory (which Taurida will presumably soon become).
With Russia finally leveraging its population preponderance (5:1), Ukraine will be left at a manpower disadvantage (2:1) once the 300k new troops are allocated into their units over the next 1-3 months.
Military success is mostly just a function of manpower, munitioning, and combat effectiveness; as such, by winter, Russia will have a huge preponderance in both the first two, an advantage further augmented by winter favoring Russia in net terms (energy crisis + less foliage).
As such, right now Ukraine's strategic situation somewhat resembles Germany's after the entry of the US into WW1; it has a limited window to go all in on victory (the Spring Offensive), before the entry of new enemy manpower makes its prospects untenable.
The only thing stunning here is that what was obvious by April latest took so long. If this was a strategy game, Putin was either a noob at it or gunning for some ultra-hard achievement like "conquer Ukraine with <200k troops" (the Pentagon did claim Putin was an autist...).
I did *allow the possibility* Russian military analysts had calculated & political leadership agreed that the SMO 1.0 force would be sufficient to bleed out Ukraine over several years while maintaining normalcy on the home front. But that was attributing them too much competence.
Only real argument I saw for postponing it so long was to have mobilization demands driven at least in part from the bottom up, instead of being imposed on the citizenry top-down. But IMO that's a stretch, Russians were sufficiently riled up enough after 1 month.
Russia's primary problem is lack of manpower. Since Russians have no combat effectiveness advantage over Ukrainians, this meant old SMO was to be a static war of attrition trading Russian munitions advantage for Ukrainian manpower advantage. 🧵
Could work, but take a long time; & would be contingent on Ukrainians not leveling the munitions disparity and further increasing their combat effectiveness advantage; both very plausible developments in light of NATO provisioning it with progressively higher end weapons systems.
However, for a state with a 5x population advantage, fighting this way is absurd, akin to a strategy video game achievement challenge "conquer Ukraine with 200k troops" (a point originally made by @Annatar_I). Doable in principle, but risky.
As I ultimately expected, the radicalization of Russian society has front run Western munitioning.
Ukraine was only ever going to have a chance against a Russia with 5x population & 15x its GDP if it blanched from seriously mobilizing this preponderance in service of victory.
The main open question is why Russia dallied on this for so long, which I'll now speculate on.
One reason: Giving diplomacy a chance, but this has gotten increasingly untenable (i.e. on terms that wouldn't destroy Putin) in line with unambiguous Ukrainian victories on the ground. Possibly there was also a desire to get Chinese acquiescence, and perhaps that just happened.
No cope. This is unambiguously a major operational level defeat for Russia, and fulfills one of the two conditions (other being Kherson) I outlined that would make me tilt towards turning bearish on Russia's prospects in this war:
In immediate terms, this pushes back the liberation of western Donbass, let alone Kharkov, into the indefinite future. This is just assuming the Ukrs have run out of steam & the new line stabilizes along the Oskol, worst case it gets pushed to LNR's borders.