...Correlator (DSMAC) can overwhelm air defenses of fixed targets.
Every fixed headquarters or major logistical hub within 1,800 km of a Shahed 136 drone box launcher will be hit if, it lacks significant air defenses.
This is utterly devastating for US expeditionary forces
2/
... which lack such defenses because of an over investment in crewed jet fighters at the expense of appropriate ground based air defenses.
The only thing that will beat a well wrangled drone swarm is another drone swarm.
3/
The only real counter to a drone swarm of ultra maneuverable drones having both significant small explosive forging fragment (EFF) warheads and top end artificial intelligence/electronic warfare is another drone swarm.
Directed energy weapons (DEW) are a partial answer, 4/
...but weather, terrain and electronic countermeasures can overwhelm DEW fire control rapid engagement capability.
The fact of life with drones is the smaller the mass of the drone, the more vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse (EMP)/high power microwaves (HPM).
5/
For all a quadcopter's fragility, a swarm of them that has coordinated ECM with approach/evasive maneuvers will screw to utter h--l of even a top end DEW, simply because of the beam director's slew rate and pointing limits.
Ditto if the DEW is augmented with mini-missiles.
6/
Consider that a half second cycle time is insufficient against a micro-drone swarm closing at 80 mph, if they pop out from behind a terrain feature at 450 m with a 150 m range EFF warhead.
The swarm only has to close 300 meters. The numbers:
80 mph = 13.7 meters per sec.
7/
300/13.7 = 22 seconds.
A half second cycle time means maybe 40-50 of 70-80 micro-drones in a swarm could be eliminated before EFF detonation.
40-50 hypervelocity cannon balls that can slice through the side of an Abrams tank is bad news in anyone's book.
8/
And before the usual F-35 fanboy suspects start gibbering about winged drones aren't quadcopter drones, so they won't have the range.
This is the latest trend in drones, compound helicopters.
Only an opposing swarm with specialist drones possessing multi-shot drone air-to-air weapons, or non-nuclear EMP, as opposed to one-shot vehicle killing EFF, has the endurance and below line of sight reach to oppose the enemy swarm.
Manned ships and vehicles will become both drone tenders and C3I nodes.
And by tenders I mean they will be additive manufacturing points for semi-expendable drone swarms. The storage efficiency of additive manufacturing powder, electronics & small drone
12/
...power components means you can simply have more, more, more, for protracted drone combat at a distance in a given tender volume.
These drone tenders will be satellite linked to weapon/UAV design houses producing new & adaptive drone swarm members based on real time
13/
...combat intelligence.
Effectively we are talking terrestrial versions of the missile and spacecraft producing battle stations a'la science fiction author @Jringo1508 "TROY RISING" alien invasion book series are the future of warfare.
Naval ships and AFV's can have robust EMP/HPM protection.
They can field such weapons as "close area defense" against smaller/better drone swarms.
More mass intensive EMP/HPM proofed drones are not going to be both ultra maneuverable and
15/
...cheap/expendable like smaller drones and are thus good mini-missile targets.
A drone tending sea/ground vehicles can integrate smallest/electronically fittest defense drones as long range defense, with coordinated EMP/HPM weapons versus the incoming enemy drone swarm
16/
...such that battle drone tender defensive weapon engagement rates won't be overwhelmed.
NB: A really powerful electronically scanned radar array can act as both a HPM weapon at close range and G-d's own wide bandwidth data link at longer ranges to coordinate non-EMP
17/
...proof smaller/better defense drones onto mass-intensive enemy drones so a coordinated mid-to-short range defense of EMP/HPM weapons & the point defense DEW beams that can handle the incoming threat.
18/
The drone tender concept represents a fundamental problem not just for the F-35, but also US Navy's DDG(X).
It simply lacks the required size, space and power for drone tending as well as lacking the proper weapons & C3I fit necessary for 21st century drone warfare. 19/
Given the Sea RAM point defense missile runs $900K USD a shot.
The US Navy is over specialized for anti-ship cruise missiles and under armed for drone and guided artillery rockets.
At $50K USD a shot, Reshef-class corvettes with Sea Tamir simply 20/
Electronic warfare 101 -- Always use radio transmission antennas remote from your command center.
Electronic Warfare 201 - Always put a decoy command center next to the remote transmitting antennas.
2/4
Electronic Warfare 301 - Always have a radio silent backup command center with your best technology, signals & maintenance people there because the enemy always gets a vote.
Since most militaries never truly practice robust EW, and are thus plug ignorant of EW 101 thru 301.
3/4
For those who have missed the implications of text in this map clip, the Russian Rybar channel is reporting the Ukrainian light mechanized 'Cossacks' to its rear now.
Lyman's main resupply road is logistically cut off from unescorted truck resupply convoys.
1/
And what Rybar is representing here is the best case for Russian forces still in Lyman.
There is still a chance of either Russian relief columns or a break out & retreat.
But the clock is ticking as these Ukrainian light forces are going to be setting up mined road blocks
2/
...to stop Russian logistical movements into and out of Lyman.
A mined roadblock covered by heavy machine guns, mortars, plus possible light AFV autocannon and ATGM, is a serious delay for any Russian combat unit escorted truck column.
3/
People should also have the thought of these kind of vehicles being moved by Ukrainian reconnaissance units across water obstacles like the S.D river as well people on foot in zodiac watercraft.
The ability to rapidly move 2-3 cases of mines to place to stop a convoy, setting it up for a volley of 2-3 Skif ATGM, will cause a great deal more hurt than a squad of men on foot with disposable rockets.
3/4
This 2 min 20 sec length video is a walk through of a 122mm Grad rocket launcher battery ammunition supply point after being struck by artillery counter battery fire.
Every vehicle has fragmentation, fire and blast damage.
The destruction of the Russian 4th Division, 1st Guards Tank Army and 3rd Corps in Ukraine's recent Kharkiv offensive has left Russian forces without large mobile blocking forces to support their Lyman garrison.
And it shows in the battles on the left bank of the Oskil river.
2/
The AFU operational objective seems to be less the encirclement of Lyman than cutting the last North-South rail link across Ukrainian territory to the LPR as well as occupy the Svatove-Borova road.
There are no natural terrain obstacles eastwards until the Russian border.
3/
Jet & chopper pilots are the horse cavalry of the 21st century.
They can become drone swarm wranglers or dead.
There are no other viable technological alternatives.
2/
The US Army field artillery isn't far behind in that technological obsolescence trend.
Also from the Uke Sitrep:
"Using drones for smaller targets beyond the front lines instead of standoff land attack cruise and ballistic missiles, which are very costly and in dwindling...
3/