This 2 min 20 sec length video is a walk through of a 122mm Grad rocket launcher battery ammunition supply point after being struck by artillery counter battery fire.
Every vehicle has fragmentation, fire and blast damage.
The fundamental issue of artillery combat in the 21st century is artillery batteries that group together, die together.
Counter battery radar gives searching drones a "Hot datum" from firing batteries to vector drones to search.
This puts a premium on 'shoot & 'scoot'
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...in order to survive.
Grad rocket launchers can do that tactic.
However Grad rocket launchers, unlike a HIMARS launchers, have an extended manual labor reload times running into hours.
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That means they cause groups of trucks to sit at ammunition resupply points for extended periods of time while the 122mm Grad rockets are being fused & loaded into launchers for the next fire mission.
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Competent military intelligence officers looking at counter battery radar data and listening to/direction finding on radio traffic can identify operational patterns to predict lists of areas where they can 'task' drones to investigate for these ammunition supply points.
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The US Army designed it's MLRS system to avoid this issue and have "reload & scoot" ammunition supply points to go with individual or small units of "Shoot & scoot" launchers.
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This @noclador thread helps explain the difference between the HIMARS/M270 "Reload & Scoot" rocket pod system and the 'sit in place for hours and get killed' reloading of Russian artillery rocket launchers.
The problem going forward in the 21st century is towed guns and manually reloading self-propelled guns are increasingly going to get killed while grouping at ammunition resupply points.
If you aren't hiding or moving between fire/reload positions in single or small numbers.
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The chances are you are going to get picked up by counter battery surveillance drones or loitering munitions vectored by your logistical operational patterns related to your radar spotted firing positions.
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There are only so many likely places battery sized groupings of fire support & logistical vehicles can be, based on road networks & firing points.
It is the inability of modern militaries to keep drones out of its less than 2000 foot altitude airspace deep into
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...its tactical depth that is driving this phenomena of "Artillery batteries that reload & fire together, die together."
Artillery is simply too vulnerable to its own kind with universal drone spotting to survive as grouped six-to-eight gun/launcher batteries.
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The pending 150 km range GMLRS for M270/HIMARS means shoot & scoot will work for them for the simple reason they have far greater areas to hide & scoot in.
Guns & large mortars of 40 km or less range are going to have real issues with loitering munitions suppressing their
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...fire simply by inhabiting the air space overhead within line of sight.
This Chinese compound helicopter drone mothership dropping a dozen Switchblade 300 class loitering munitions is the sort of counter battery threat 13/
Switchblade 300 class drones fitted out with directional microphones and imaging sensors like the Northrop Grumman Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) munition will literally fly to the sound of the guns & mortars. 14/ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brilliant…
I've talked over and over again about the USAF Standoff Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at Barksdale AFB because what they do for JASSM targets can be done for small drones with a local digital map on an armored fighting vehicle.
There is absolutely no reason that a similar capability for nape of the earth multi-copter drones on a local digital map can't be out into an AFV for piloting it's own drones.
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The Stryker air defense vehicle equipped with the AeroVironment Shrike electric quadcopter and Hellfire missiles would be an ideal candidate for such an app.
A 12 km fire & forget Hellfire directed by a AeroVironment Shrike with BAT style directional microphones homing on gun & mortar blasts will make 155mm/39 caliber/18 liter propellent charge class guns obsolescent in the close support role.
The range push back of such small forward observer drones will require 155mm/52 caliber/23 liter propellent guns to simply maintain 1991 Desert Storm era close support artillery fan coverage.
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And, frankly, the 70 km range of a US Army 155mm/52 caliber/23 liter propellent ERCA guns is utterly inadequate for the heavy division general support role given the range & sensor trends of 21st Century drone warfare.
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This @battle_order video on the US Army heavy force restructuring is painfully embarrassing to watch given the trends in drone tech.
Fifty four M106A6 155mm/L39 guns and zero M270 or HIMARS GMLRS launchers?!?
What the heck was the US Army thinking?
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US Army divisional artillery force structures built around 54 155mm/L39 caliber guns is the ground force equivalent of the US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship.
It is a force structure which will get it's servicemen killed in 21st century peer-to-peer conflict if attempted.
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This level of ossification and technological illiteracy leaves the US Army artillery branch leadership looking a whole lot like John Knowles Herr, the last chief of the US Army Horse cavalry. 24/ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Know…
The US Army field artillery branch leadership is no more willing to give up the 155mm/L39 gun that General Herr was to give up a single cavalry horse.
My guess, based on that WW2 US Army institutional history, is that it will suffer the same fate.
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The Field Artillery is going to be abolished and replaced by a new drone combat branch like the horse cavalry was killed/absorbed by the Armor branch.
The vestiges of the Field Artillery hanging on in name-only like "Armored Cavalry Regiments" have in the armor branch.
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The destruction of the Russian 4th Division, 1st Guards Tank Army and 3rd Corps in Ukraine's recent Kharkiv offensive has left Russian forces without large mobile blocking forces to support their Lyman garrison.
And it shows in the battles on the left bank of the Oskil river.
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The AFU operational objective seems to be less the encirclement of Lyman than cutting the last North-South rail link across Ukrainian territory to the LPR as well as occupy the Svatove-Borova road.
There are no natural terrain obstacles eastwards until the Russian border.
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Jet & chopper pilots are the horse cavalry of the 21st century.
They can become drone swarm wranglers or dead.
There are no other viable technological alternatives.
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The US Army field artillery isn't far behind in that technological obsolescence trend.
Also from the Uke Sitrep:
"Using drones for smaller targets beyond the front lines instead of standoff land attack cruise and ballistic missiles, which are very costly and in dwindling...
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Untrained Russian infantry with steel helmets, WW1 rifles, no radios, headed into winter, w/o winter boots, gloves, hats, sleeping bags, w/o trucks & supported by mobilized T-62 tanks with untrained crews are military liabilities, not combat power.
The chances of a 1917 style Russian Army collapse in Ukraine, followed by the disintegration of the Russian Federation actually INCREASE with the deployment of such troops.
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The Iranian Shahed-136 drone in the Russian's hands is acting as a small propeller cruise missile several hundred kilometers from the nearest Russian position.
No USAF, USMC or US Army airbase or heliport is safe from such munitions
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Long range precision strike, to a depth of 1,800 km, is a game that anyone can play in now.
The US Military services have lost air superiority below 3,000 feet, and it is unclear if they will get it back for decades.
The mal-investment in the utterly irrelevant to this
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...threat F-35 is a large part of the problem.
The F-35 is simply cost INEFFECTIVE for this threat, but the political-military factions invested in it will force it to be used for dealing with lawn mower engine powered drones with air-to-air missiles costing up to 50 times
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