It's interesting how Russian propagandists are now the quickest to report Ukrainian advances. Rybar (Telegram) reports today UAF has crossed the Donets in force near Kreminna, and the road to Lyman from the east is under fire and unsafe. Here's their map to read with caveats. 🧵
If true, Russia is quickly losing safe road routes to supply the Lyman area, and its occupation of the NE corner of Donetsk oblast is about to collapse. Rybar reported yesterday that UAF capture Nove, cutting another main road route to Lyman from the north.
There's one more road route from the north, running along the east bank of the Zherebets -which is no defensive barrier, as it's small and its west bank is higher. The large area of water is not a dam reservoir, just several shallow artificial ponds intersected by earth bridges.
Sorry, "earth bridge" probably not a great term, I mean causeways.
As I was posting this thread, @AndrewPerpetua was posting: "Ukraine confirmed to have pushed all the way to the Luhansk oblast line north of Lyman near Nove and Ridkodub." That's c. halfway from Nove to Nevske and Russia's last safe road route to Lyman.
I see one answer to two puzzles about the recent course of this war. Why did Russia leave Kharkiv oblast so exposed? And why is Russia now focusing on tiny gains in Bakhmut while weakly countering Ukraine's preparations for another NE offensive? In short: Potemkin syndrome.🧵
Russia didn't just fail to react to Ukraine's build-up in Kharkiv. @DefMon3 has compiled evidence that Russia was drawing down troop levels in the region, leading him to suggest that Russia might have been attacked while already planning a withdrawal. /2
But a planned withdrawal would make no sense: the section of Kharkiv oblast that Ukraine liberated included the Russian occupants' main northern rail and road supply arteries, both via Kupyansk. /3
A thread on Russia's rail supply lines to its occupying forces in Ukraine - how these have been affected by the recent Kharkiv offensive, and what's likely to happen next if, as I expect, Ukraine moves next to retake northern Luhansk oblast. 🧵
The hubs of the rail network supplying Russia's occupation of northeast Ukraine are laid out like a pyramid. At the top is the primary supply hub Voronezh, then the junctions of Stary Oskol and Liski, and finally the forward supply hubs of Belgorod, Valuyki and Millerovo. /2
Belgorod till recently was the most important forward hub and most in the news. Its rail routes west to Sumy, south to Kharkiv and southeast to Kupyansk made it a natural invasion staging ground. But after the Kharkiv offensive, all those routes lead to liberated territory. /3
After five days of Ukraine's northeast advance being paused at the Oskil river, we are starting to hear plausible rumors of preparations for a continuation. According to two Russian milbloggers monitored by ISW, things are afoot along the north and south parts of the river.🧵
By one account, the Ukrainian army has crossed the Oskil and emplaced artillery at Hryanykivka, about 25km SW from where the Oskil enters Ukraine from Russia. If true this is either very bold, or Russian forces in the NE remain very weak.
Hryanykivka is <45km or <60km by road from a rail line used by Russia to supply its forces in Luhansk oblast. It runs SE through Troitske. Sentinel imagery shows the larger of two bridges at Hryanykivka was damaged between 9/3 & 9/10, but the smaller bridge appears to be intact.
The Balaklia offensive makes this 3-month-old map relevant again. It's all about Russia's attempt to make a very long front more defensible in order to stalemate Ukraine into accepting a frozen conflict. The difference is, now Ukraine has the initiative. 🧵
In June, my point was that Russia knew its offensive capacity was dwindling, so its targets were chosen to improve defensibility. Taking Ukraine-held pockets NE of the Donets would turn the river into a defensive barrier, and taking the Lysychansk area would shorten the front. /2
Much of that happened. Small pockets around Severodonetsk, Lyman and Svyatohirsk (the red dots) all fell. But as I noted then, there was a fourth, larger Ukraine-held pocket NE of the Donets that wasn't under attack. And Russia continued to ignore it. /3
Today's Trump filing in short. 🧵 1) There's a 10-page retelling of the case so far, mainly arguing that Trump was fully cooperating. It's frivolous. Notably, it hints he might want to use his silly "I declassified everything" claim in court. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.usco…
2) pp. 11-12 argue the warrant was overbroad by allowing seizure of case-unrelated items merely in the vicinity of case-related items. This will matter and will be a court fight if agents found and seized something incriminating unrelated to presidential documents.
3) p. 12 suggests the Feds might have faked a classified-documents case because they were frustrated by the presidential records act's lack of an enforcement mechanism. The suggestion is couched in "did they ...?" sentences that avoid alleging they did. This is frivolous.
I want to revisit the topic of Ukrainian vs Russian views of the Turkic world, because Kamil blocked me for arguing, which seems cowardly. Kamil writes much I like, but I think he's more Russified and ignorant of Ukraine than he realizes. /kamilkazani/status/1551383280498483207
In this thread, Kamil set out the position that Ukrainians learned to believe Turkic and steppe cultures were inferior from their former hegemon, Russia. While surely that influence matters, Kamil made two big, glaring mistakes, which deserve to be rebutted.
First, while both Russia and Ukraine have long histories of racism towards Turkic and Mongol cultures, in the folk-culture xenophobia way and the modern ideology of race way, that history is very different in Russia and Ukraine, mainly because of modern Russia's hegemon status.