* What do Russians think of sham 'referendums' in occupied πΊπ¦? * TL;DR: on avg, our respondents tend to: (a) think that the majority of residents in occupied πΊπ¦ territories want to join π·πΊ, and (b) support annexation of those territories. But levels of uncertainty are high. 𧡠1/
We asked to what extent π·πΊ respondents agree that the majority of residents of so-called LNR, DNR, Kherson & Zaporizhzhia oblasts want to join π·πΊ. If we exclude DK/NA responses, ~81% agreed; if we include these in denom., ~60% agreed. 2/
This suggests that while the majority of Russians think that Ukrainians in these occupied territories want to join π·πΊ, there is a lot of uncertainty. 3/
(Note: we originally asked abt each territory individually. The distributions of responses were almost identical across Qs, suggesting that π·πΊ ppl are not drawing major distinctions btwn the 4 regions. On this basis we decided to combine them into one Q.) 4/
We also asked to what extent respondents think π·πΊ shld annex these πΊπ¦ territories if the majority of their residents vote to join π·πΊ. Here the pattern is similar: ~79% (excl. DK/NAs) , or ~61% (incl. DK/NAs in denom.) said π·πΊ shld annex. 4/
For context: today was the final day of 'voting' in π·πΊ-staged 'referendums' on occupied πΊπ¦ territories. π·πΊ's Central Election Commission claimed that btwn 87% (Kherson) & 99% (DNR) of voters in these regions support annexation: meduza.io/en/feature/202β¦. 5/
The 'voting' process was marred by reports of fear & coercion, and Western leaders say the 'referendums' are illegal under international law: npr.org/2022/09/27/112β¦. 6/
For more public opinion data from π·πΊ, see our website: russiawatcher.com. /END
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A 𧡠on partial mobilization in π·πΊ. TL;DR - our respondents generally 1) think the effects of part. mob. will be felt equally thru/out π·πΊ & 2) believe Russians w/ mil. experience will be called up first; & 3) seem uncertain abt whether gen. mob. will be declared soon. 1/
(1) We asked respondents to what extent they agreed w/ statement that the effects of partial mobilization will be felt equally in all regions of π·πΊ. The share that agreed was ~78% (excluding DK/NA responses) or ~59% (including DK/NAs in denominator). 2/
This general belief that part. mob. will affect all regions equally contrasts w/ reports we've seen suggesting that ethnic minorities from poorer regions are being mobilized in disproportionate numbers. Still, ~24% of Russians gave DK/NA responses this Q. 3/
βοΈPutin approval: since Sep 8, weβve seen a downward trend in public approval of Vladimir Putin. On 8/1, we estimated Putin approval at ~80%. Putin approval stayed fairly constant during August. On 9/8, avg approval was ~79%; today (9/26) itβs at ~76%. 1/
A 3pp drop in support may not seem like much, but it occurred over the course of less than 3 weeks. This is the lowest estimate of Putin approval weβve registered since we started our Russia Watcher survey on 5/19. 2/
Note that we exclude βdonβt knowβ and βprefer not to answerβ responses from the denominator here. 3/
π¨ New data: How are Russians reacting to Putin's declaration of "partial" mobilization in π·πΊ? Support for "partial" mob. has been ~58-59% since 9/21, when the policy was announced (~47% if we include "don't know"s & NAs in denominator). But support is not consolidated. Aπ§΅: 1/
On 9/21, Putin announced "partial" mobilization of military reservists. That same day, we began asking Russians whether they support Putin's decision. From 9/21-9/23 (today), average support has remained relatively consistent: ~58-59%. 2/
However, the vast majority of Russians are still opposed to general (total) mobilization. We've asked respondents this question regularly since June 6, and support for gen. mob. has remained under 25%. Nor have we seen a substantial increase over the past few days. 3/
How many π·πΊ soldiers do ordinary Russians think have died in πΊπ¦? We presented survey respondents w/ 6 different casualty "bands" to choose from. Plurality of respondents (27.7%) say 5-10k π·πΊ troops have died, but 47% think it's >10k. 1/
While we have been asking this question regularly since mid-June, these averages are from the beginning of August to present. 2/
Context: π·πΊ officials rarely speak abt how many troops have been killed in the so-called "special military operation" in πΊπ¦. The first update in ~6 mo. came on 9/21 from Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who claimed that 5,937 π·πΊ soldiers have died: reuters.com/world/europe/rβ¦. 3/
What Russians think about the counteroffensive--PART 3. TL;DR: avg belief that πΊπ¦ mil. actions pose significant threat to π·πΊ forces is on the rise again. Perhaps related to intro of "mobilization" to criminal code on 9/20, then Putin's declaration of "partial" mobilization? 1/
From 9/14-9/18, share of Russians who said πΊπ¦ military actions in S&E pose significant threat to π·πΊ forces has decreased from 60.1% to 51.6%. From 9/18-9/21 (today), % has increased to 56.5%. 2/
Around 70% of Russians believe that πΊπ¦ has launched a new offensive. The share went up from 60% @ end of Aug, when π·πΊ narrative was still consolidating, to 78.1% on 9/14. Then it began to decrease. Today's (9/12) estimate is 71.9%. 3/
What is the relationship btwn support for the "special military operation" and television consumption in π·πΊ? We found that on average, the more often Russians encounter info abt the SMO on TV, the higher their level of support for the "operation." 1/
This comes as no surprise, given the hawkish rhetoric and propaganda that is regularly broadcast on Russian TV channels--which are both highly popular sources of news and tightly controlled by the state. 2/
In fact, ~62% of our respondents encounter info abt the SMO in Ukraine on television more than once a day. Only ~7% said they never get info on the SMO from TV. [Note that these figures exclude don't know/ NA responses.] 3/