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Sep 27 β€’ 8 tweets β€’ 3 min read
* What do Russians think of sham 'referendums' in occupied πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦? * TL;DR: on avg, our respondents tend to: (a) think that the majority of residents in occupied πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ territories want to join πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί, and (b) support annexation of those territories. But levels of uncertainty are high. 🧡 1/
We asked to what extent πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί respondents agree that the majority of residents of so-called LNR, DNR, Kherson & Zaporizhzhia oblasts want to join πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί. If we exclude DK/NA responses, ~81% agreed; if we include these in denom., ~60% agreed. 2/
This suggests that while the majority of Russians think that Ukrainians in these occupied territories want to join πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί, there is a lot of uncertainty. 3/
(Note: we originally asked abt each territory individually. The distributions of responses were almost identical across Qs, suggesting that πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί ppl are not drawing major distinctions btwn the 4 regions. On this basis we decided to combine them into one Q.) 4/
We also asked to what extent respondents think πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί shld annex these πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ territories if the majority of their residents vote to join πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί. Here the pattern is similar: ~79% (excl. DK/NAs) , or ~61% (incl. DK/NAs in denom.) said πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί shld annex. 4/
For context: today was the final day of 'voting' in πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί-staged 'referendums' on occupied πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ territories. πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί's Central Election Commission claimed that btwn 87% (Kherson) & 99% (DNR) of voters in these regions support annexation: meduza.io/en/feature/202…. 5/
The 'voting' process was marred by reports of fear & coercion, and Western leaders say the 'referendums' are illegal under international law: npr.org/2022/09/27/112…. 6/
For more public opinion data from πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί, see our website: russiawatcher.com. /END

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More from @russia_watcher

Sep 28
A 🧡 on partial mobilization in πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί. TL;DR - our respondents generally 1) think the effects of part. mob. will be felt equally thru/out πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί & 2) believe Russians w/ mil. experience will be called up first; & 3) seem uncertain abt whether gen. mob. will be declared soon. 1/
(1) We asked respondents to what extent they agreed w/ statement that the effects of partial mobilization will be felt equally in all regions of πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί. The share that agreed was ~78% (excluding DK/NA responses) or ~59% (including DK/NAs in denominator). 2/ Image
This general belief that part. mob. will affect all regions equally contrasts w/ reports we've seen suggesting that ethnic minorities from poorer regions are being mobilized in disproportionate numbers. Still, ~24% of Russians gave DK/NA responses this Q. 3/
Read 8 tweets
Sep 26
❗️Putin approval: since Sep 8, we’ve seen a downward trend in public approval of Vladimir Putin. On 8/1, we estimated Putin approval at ~80%. Putin approval stayed fairly constant during August. On 9/8, avg approval was ~79%; today (9/26) it’s at ~76%. 1/ Image
A 3pp drop in support may not seem like much, but it occurred over the course of less than 3 weeks. This is the lowest estimate of Putin approval we’ve registered since we started our Russia Watcher survey on 5/19. 2/
Note that we exclude β€œdon’t know” and β€œprefer not to answer” responses from the denominator here. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Sep 23
🚨 New data: How are Russians reacting to Putin's declaration of "partial" mobilization in πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί? Support for "partial" mob. has been ~58-59% since 9/21, when the policy was announced (~47% if we include "don't know"s & NAs in denominator). But support is not consolidated. A🧡: 1/
On 9/21, Putin announced "partial" mobilization of military reservists. That same day, we began asking Russians whether they support Putin's decision. From 9/21-9/23 (today), average support has remained relatively consistent: ~58-59%. 2/
However, the vast majority of Russians are still opposed to general (total) mobilization. We've asked respondents this question regularly since June 6, and support for gen. mob. has remained under 25%. Nor have we seen a substantial increase over the past few days. 3/
Read 7 tweets
Sep 22
How many πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί soldiers do ordinary Russians think have died in πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦? We presented survey respondents w/ 6 different casualty "bands" to choose from. Plurality of respondents (27.7%) say 5-10k πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί troops have died, but 47% think it's >10k. 1/
While we have been asking this question regularly since mid-June, these averages are from the beginning of August to present. 2/
Context: πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί officials rarely speak abt how many troops have been killed in the so-called "special military operation" in πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦. The first update in ~6 mo. came on 9/21 from Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who claimed that 5,937 πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί soldiers have died: reuters.com/world/europe/r…. 3/
Read 7 tweets
Sep 21
What Russians think about the counteroffensive--PART 3. TL;DR: avg belief that πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ mil. actions pose significant threat to πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί forces is on the rise again. Perhaps related to intro of "mobilization" to criminal code on 9/20, then Putin's declaration of "partial" mobilization? 1/ Image
From 9/14-9/18, share of Russians who said πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ military actions in S&E pose significant threat to πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί forces has decreased from 60.1% to 51.6%. From 9/18-9/21 (today), % has increased to 56.5%. 2/
Around 70% of Russians believe that πŸ‡ΊπŸ‡¦ has launched a new offensive. The share went up from 60% @ end of Aug, when πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί narrative was still consolidating, to 78.1% on 9/14. Then it began to decrease. Today's (9/12) estimate is 71.9%. 3/ Image
Read 7 tweets
Sep 17
What is the relationship btwn support for the "special military operation" and television consumption in πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί? We found that on average, the more often Russians encounter info abt the SMO on TV, the higher their level of support for the "operation." 1/
This comes as no surprise, given the hawkish rhetoric and propaganda that is regularly broadcast on Russian TV channels--which are both highly popular sources of news and tightly controlled by the state. 2/
In fact, ~62% of our respondents encounter info abt the SMO in Ukraine on television more than once a day. Only ~7% said they never get info on the SMO from TV. [Note that these figures exclude don't know/ NA responses.] 3/
Read 5 tweets

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