In my speech @ForoLaToja in beautiful Galicia I talked about “Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis” and had an interesting panel discussion about inflation with my former colleague Carlos Costa and with Antón Costas @CESEspana, moderated by Alejandra Kindelán @Aebanca. 1/15
High inflation means that many people are suffering a concerning loss in their purchasing power as their real, that is inflation-adjusted, wages are declining. My speech discusses what this decline in real wages means for monetary policy. 2/15
Real consumer wages in the euro area have declined by nearly 5% since 2021 Q3. Low-income households are most affected. The difference between the inflation rate of the lowest- and highest-income households has risen markedly. 3/15
Real wages matter for monetary policy because they affect private consumption and hence aggregate demand (“demand channel”). Demand factors have contributed to the rise in inflation in the euro area, both for goods and services. 4/15
The demand channel points to easing inflationary pressures going forward. Falling real wages have contributed to the sharp decline in consumer confidence. This will weigh on demand and should, in isolation, ease inflationary pressures. 5/15
Real wages are also an important part of firms’ costs (“cost-push channel”). Real labour costs deflated by producer prices have fallen and profits have increased, suggesting that labour costs are not currently adding to inflationary pressures. 6/15
Will real wages continue to decline? This will depend, among other things, on fiscal policy. Targeted fiscal measures can support those suffering the most from the current crisis. But too broad-based fiscal measures could reinforce inflationary pressures. 7/15
The evolution of real wages will also depend on workers’ bargaining power. Over the past decades, the labour income share fell significantly, coinciding with a decline in trade union density, while the profit share increased. 8/15
But nominal wage growth has recently accelerated. Whether future wage agreements will lead to a wage-price spiral ultimately depends on monetary policy. If long-term inflation expectations remain anchored, the risks of a wage-price spiral will be limited. 9/15
To what extent will a decline in real wages ease inflationary pressures? Inflation may remain high because the damage from the current crisis to the supply side is likely to be significant, meaning that lower demand may not necessarily lead to larger slack. 10/15
Current order books confirm this view. Despite a notable slowdown in new orders, euro area firms are only slowly reducing the backlog of orders stemming from the pandemic. This suggests that significant supply-side constraints remain. 11/15
Firms’ efforts to protect their profit margins may also limit downward pressure on inflation. Firms may not pass lower real labour costs on to consumer prices. In fact, firms plan to raise prices further because of higher energy costs. 12/15
It would thus be imprudent to assume that slowing demand reduces the need for raising rates. High underlying inflation and prospects of continued high inflation mean that monetary policy must ensure that inflation expectations remain anchored. 13/15
Doing so means that, at times of large disruptive change, central banks cannot narrowly rely on uncertain model-based forecasts. A “robust control” approach puts more weight on incoming data to assess the risks of a de-anchoring. 14/15
Given these data and the above-target medium-term inflation outlook, further increases in our key policy rates will be needed to ensure that inflation returns to our 2% target in a timely manner. See the full speech for all arguments and references. 15/15 ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date…
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The euro area economy is stagnating. But some countries are growing much faster than others. What explains this heterogeneity and how can we escape stagnation? This was the topic of my #WalterEuckenLecture @EuckenInstitut. 1/25
Weak growth reflects the exceptional shocks that hit the euro area economy in recent years as well as the tightening of monetary policy. Yet, although the peak impact of monetary tightening is likely to be behind us and real incomes are rising, growth remains shallow. 2/25
Aggregate growth figures mask, however, significant heterogeneity across euro area economies. Since interest rates started to rise, growth has become increasingly uneven. In Malta, Spain and Portugal, for example, output has expanded measurably. 3/25
In my speech at the BOJ-IMES conference, I reviewed the benefits & costs of asset purchases based on a large body of research. Central banks have used asset purchases for two main purposes: to stabilise financial markets and to ease financing conditions near the lower bound. 1/19
According to the signalling channel, asset purchases signal a commitment to a period of low interest rates, made credible by central banks’ exposures to duration risk. But this has not stopped central banks from raising rates when inflation surged, weakening this channel. 2/19
By contrast, the liquidity channel was powerful in times of stress. In a dash for cash, it is actual purchases that matter. On other occasions, it has been enough to credibly announce the intention to intervene if necessary, even if purchases were zero or small. #OMT #PEPP 3/19
As @paulkrugman once noted, “productivity isn't everything, but, in the long run, it is almost everything.” Yet, the euro area’s productivity trajectory has been dismal. In today’s speech @EUI_EU, I asked how euro area firms could be turned from laggards into leaders. 1/20
At the turn of the millennium, the euro area was operating at the global productivity frontier. But in the following years, it fell behind other economies like the United States and has not been able to recover from this loss of competitiveness. 2/20
One root cause is firms’ failure to reap the efficiency gains from information and communication technologies. Over the past decades, a gap in the IT-related capital stock has emerged between the euro area and the United States, also leading to a gap in productivity growth. 3/20
Today we released our new experimental statistics on #DistributionalWealthAccounts (DWA). These data combine macroeconomic national accounts data from the Quarterly Sector Accounts with granular information from our #HouseholdFinanceAndConsumptionSurvey (HFCS). 1/6
We thereby benefit from the respective advantages of the two data sources: the timely and comprehensive coverage of aggregate wealth in national accounts, and rich distributional information in the HFCS. Linking micro & macro data is a promising step for closing data gaps. 2/6
As confirmed in our 2021 monetary policy strategy, we analyse the interaction between income & wealth distributions and monetary policy as part of the policy process. Distributional effects matter for monetary policy transmission and are part of our proportionality analysis. 3/6
Looking back at 2023, my most interesting (and experimental) communication experience was an interview with @SZ without words. #SagenSieJetztNichts #InterviewWithoutWords 1/14 sz-magazin.sueddeutsche.de/sagen-sie-jetz…
First question: What is inflation? 2/14
What does it look like when you want to convince Christine @Lagarde? 3/14
Yesterday I had the pleasure to deliver the Homer Jones Memorial Lecture at the @stlouisfed. In my speech I compared the disinflation process to long-distance running, arguing that "the last mile" is likely to be the hardest. 1/23
Headline inflation in the euro area declined rapidly to 2.9% in October from its peak of 10.6% one year earlier. The bulk of this large drop reflects the substantial decline in the contributions from energy and food inflation. 2/23
This is largely due to base effects. Oil and gas prices have come down fast from the highs in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. According to a recent IMF study, such base effects in the past have often given rise to “premature celebrations”. 3/23