Thread by @YudinGreg

There will probably appear very soon some poll numbers suggesting that Russians are incredibly enthusiastic about annexation. This was the case in 2014 with annexation of Crimea: on the Russian territory proper polls functioned as ersatz-plebiscites on admission 1/21

Several concepts that might be helpful in interpreting Russian polls.

(They partly rely on my recent piece in the @JofDemocracy) journalofdemocracy.org/articles/do-ru… 2/21

1. Depoliticization. Almost all Russians have deep scorn and contempt for politics. Those who believe politics is meant to make society more just or free are usually considered childish or outright insane 3/21

In public service, people interested in politics are considered unreliable. In commercial sector, they are regarded as dangerously naïve and silly, failing to understand some elementary truths about how the world runs 4/21

If you want to know the opinion of Russians on some political issue, it is safe to assume that the vast majority strongly supports “leave me alone”. (Unless proven otherwise: mobilization is a counterexample) 5/21

2. Acclamation. Russia is a plebiscitarian regime. The vast majority doesn’t interpret polls (or voting) as choosing which decision they would prefer. The decisions are already made by the leader, the role of the people is to say “yes” – to acclaim 6/21

The right question in Russia is not “do you approve policy X?” but rather “if Putin takes policy X, would you approve?”
And that’s what you would normally get:

https://twitter.com/ABarbashin/status/1557105907955384320

7/21

It is safe to assume that Russians are fine with any decision taken by Putin. Had he handed Luhansk and Donetsk over to Ukraine on February 24, the ‘approval’ would have been exactly the same 8/21

3. Nonreponse. While survey nonresponse is an issue in many countries, it affects Russian polls disproportionately. Our research shows that Russians interpret polling as interaction with the state, irrespective of who does the survey. This is not the case in the West 9/21

Therefore, those who agree to participate are more likely to be loyal to the state. The higher distrust in the state, the less incentives to take part in surveys. Younger people, men in particular, are much less likely to cooperate 10/21

Response rates are frighteningly low – 10-25% depending on methodology. Many (although not all) pollsters report that in 2022 the rates further plummeted. A colleague in the industry I trust completely told it was at 1% even before mobilization 11/21

Response rates are almost never reported. Looking at the poll numbers, it is safe to assume that very few people agreed to participate, unless proven otherwise 12/21

4. Surveillance. Since people tend to perceive polls as communication with the state, they use it as an opportunity to complain. “Please tell Putin that we struggle to get X here” is a line that almost every interviewer had heard 13/21

This makes the favorable responses for the government even more likely, for you normally show respect to the person you complain to. This also a reason why polls are interpreted as a tool for surveillance 14/21

It is safe to assume that respondents generally perceive themselves being watched and not protected, unless proven otherwise 15/21

5. Fear. I have always resisted the idea that Russians are just afraid to tell their true opinions, while in reality we are all scared dissidents. This assumes that these opinions do exist in the first place, which is most often not true 16/21

However, with this war and especially with mobilization fear has definitely become a major factor. Previously, in pollsters’ internal reports interviewers often mentioned fear as a common emotion among respondents that skewed their responses. Now it has become massive 17/21

I already heard reports about women meeting interviewers crying “Please don’t take them away from us”. At this point, I seriously think polling not only faces issues of validity, but becomes ethically dubious. A researcher should not participate in terror, even unwillingly 18/21

It is safe to assume that behind the numbers you read there are people completely disoriented and scared about what the state will do to them, approached by someone they believe is an agent of the state 19/21

You will probably very soon meet people who would say that Russian referenda in Ukraine are sham, while Russian polls in Russia are totally fine and representative 20/21

I usually respond that in Russia, there will be first the change in power, and then the change in poll numbers 21/21