When Azerbaijan took a military action in 2020, there was something interesting about some pro-Kremlin pundits. They interpreted these events as a proof that “Aliyev has shown that geopolitical conflicts can be solved by force, and from now on they will be solved by force”. 1/4 This was a sign of things to come. Today, the pro-Kremlin channels are celebrating with an impressive Schadenfreude what is clearly a tragedy for Russia’s official military ally in CSTO. 2/4

Defeat. A thread 1/23 One important indicator for me is how often people in Russia talk about possible defeat. I must confess that it happens now really often, which is a dramatic turn from the early months of the war 2/23

There’s a lot of confusion around the new call-up legislation in Russia.
Everybody’s focused on the paper call-up notices being replaced by electronic ones. This is both untrue and unimportant 1/4 What has really changed is that the burden of learning about the call-up is shifted on the citizens.
Previously, it was the state who was obliged to deliver the notice, and if the notice was not accepted it was considered as not delivered. This mattered in courts 2/4

An important investigation released by Dossier Center on the ongoing planning within FSB to invade and annex Moldova. Unfortunately, I was not able to find any English translation 1/11

The investigation makes evident what many people, including myself, have been saying for a long time: the invasion of Moldova is not a question of whether, but a question of when. It is now delayed out of tactical considerations 2/11

afsa.org/moldova-putins…

There are three reasons why Putin is losing this war. Two of them cannot be fixed. That’s why Putin doubles down on solving the third 1/9 First: Motivation. Russian army has no business in Ukraine. No number of draftees will solve this problem. In fact, it will only make things worse, because every next batch is less motivated that the previous one. Russia is simply running out of idiots 2/9

The chaotic and barbaric shelling of Ukrainian cities looks like an act of desperation. Rather than pursuing a military purpose, it is rather meant to solve the rapidly internal problem 1/8 First, these attacks are precisely something the radicals were demanding long time ago. Putin was ignoring these demands for quite a while, and now he yielded to them immediately after the blowup of the bridge 2/8

There will probably appear very soon some poll numbers suggesting that Russians are incredibly enthusiastic about annexation. This was the case in 2014 with annexation of Crimea: on the Russian territory proper polls functioned as ersatz-plebiscites on admission 1/21 Several concepts that might be helpful in interpreting Russian polls.

(They partly rely on my recent piece in the @JofDemocracy) journalofdemocracy.org/articles/do-ru… 2/21

A brief summary of what current mobilization is from the political viewpoint.
It is, of course, not partial at all, but I would still call it targeted/selective, and therefore not total.
There is a clear asymmetry in terms of groups affected 1/10 In the villages and little towns roughly 3% are mobilized, which is up to 10% of adult men (elderly excluded). The numbers tend to be higher among ethnic minorities that have even less real political representation and leverage compared to other Russians 2/10

Many requests to explain how Russians are likely to react to Putin’s speech.
Basic fact: the majority of Russians only care about their everyday life.
Hence, the reaction will depend on whether these decisions will affect everyday lives 1/5 This is unclear yet. Putin can very well continue with his piecemeal strategy. He created legal framework to extend it and stop/compensate for the leaks in his military. In that case, few people will be affected. 2/5

Several points on recent dramatic developments in Armenia. They are largely overlooked but provide evidence of a catastrophic collapse of Russian foreign policy in a hugely important region🧵1/10 Point #1. Azerbaijan is not Ukraine, and Armenia is not Russia. Armenia is a democratic republic where large-scale protests against the government are normal. Azerbaijan is a despotic state. Azerbaijan has a common border with Russia, while Armenia doesn’t 2/10

Since there is a lot of interest in what is the reaction to the recent military setbacks in Russia, a🧵with an update.
There are three distinct groups in Russia:
1/25 1) radicals – a sizeable but extremely loud minority that actively supports war, is engaged, follows the news and in rare cases even goes to the frontlines (15-25%). This is the audience of the milbloggers, Telegram channels and vampires like Solovyov or Skabeeva 2/25

I have been traveling a lot across Europe recently. Everywhere it was obvious that there is a major war in Europe, with one exception: Moscow.
A🧵on how Moscow has changed over the last month and how what I call the “normalization party” is emerging 1/19 2/19 Visible impact of war on everyday life is still very limited. After the two weeks of initial panic, the economy cheered up. People who rushed to buy foreign currency and withdraw cash are now blaming themselves for not trusting enough in Putin 2/19 economist.com/finance-and-ec…

Some interesting news on why TNCs in Russia are reluctant to leave. Essentially, their personnel are threatened with prison sentence for doing that 1/9 🧵 Russian parliament is going to pass a new bill on “punishment for implementing sanctions”. It applies to CEOs and punishable with up to 10 years in prison 2/9
vedomosti.ru/politics/artic…

A report on the scope of current crackdown in Russian unviersities from THE.
I'll add several facts that I am aware of 👇

https://twitter.com/timeshighered/status/1513680803112402948

There are already dozens of cases of students reporting about their insturctors in universities & elem schools being critical about the war. Some instructors expelled, at least two teachers facing several years in prison

Putin’s political aim in this war is military control over Ukraine. Practical implementations can be discussed, but fundamentals are clear: Ukraine cannot be a sovereign country 1/10 This aim hasn’t changed a bit since the beginning of the war. Yes, several attempts to achieve it have failed, but there will be more 2/10

All too often I hear that Putin’s main weapon is propaganda. This is not true. Putin’s key ally is GREED. Let me unpack 🧵this 1/19 Here are some recent news about Volkswagen planning to resume the functioning of its factories in Russia on May 12. Perfect timing: since Putin plans to have his military victory by May 9 (Victory Day in Russia), VW prepares a present for him 2/19 gizchina.com/2022/04/04/vol…

Unfortunately, I am not surprised by the atrocities in the occupied zone in Bucha. One thing people tend to underestimate is the narrative built in Russia to justify this war. It sounds so outlandish to most observers that it is too easily written off. But it works. A🧵1/11 The narrative mounted by Putin from the first days of war focuses on “de-nazification” of Ukraine. Nazism is understood in Russia (just like anywhere else) as an absolute evil. However, it is seen an external evil, Russia is by definition free from Nazism (we defeated it!) 2/11

I am constantly asked about atmosphere in Russia. I am making a THREAD🧵to give an impression of how it feels in Moscow but also to explain how what I call “A few months theory” reigns supreme 1/19 In Moscow, one is unlikely to recognize at first that this is a country at war. However, tuning in to occasional chatting reveals that people are constantly discussing international situation. “Haven't we already taken Kherson?”, or “the Chinese will never let us down” 2/19