It is time for Russia to give the πΊπ¦ flags and shibas what they have long demanded. #CloseTheSky
American SIGINT is an invulnerable (because no πΊπΈπ·πΊ war) force multiplier worth factors more than all the Cold War surplus supplied to Ukraine. Just a few truckloads of gravel will put an end to Americans supplying the UAF with coordinates & nullifying Russia's shells advantage.
As long as US satellites are not directly targeted, it is also formally deniable, & while the culprit will be obvious, it will in any case be a legitimate response to American sabotage of Nord Stream. It is the US that decided to escalate thus, not Russia.
Since the US has a vast space advantage relative to all other Powers, I expect China will quietly welcome this development. It will greatly simplify any Taiwan operation, without China itself having to go to the very risky step of killing American satellites itself.
Although weaponized Kesslerization is obviously very risky, but much less so than breaking out the nukes, and provides a concrete war-winning military advantage in a way that limited tactical nuke usage doesn't.
In the event that the Americans do respond to this militarily, then the game is over anyway; "always was."
In the event that Russia loses anyway, at least other free nations will subsequently be able to confront Western Supremacism on a more even ground.
ΠΠ°ΠΊ ΡΠ΅Π±Π΅ ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΎΠ΅, ΠΠ»ΠΎΠ½ ΠΠ°ΡΠΊ?
ππππͺ¨πͺ¨πͺ¨π₯π₯π₯
Re-Russian capabilities. It has massive spacelift capacity, how can that be an issue, LOL. Though I would consider looking into more exotic propulsion mechanisms (e.g. Orion Drives) to get more mass up there cheaper & faster to start knocking out satellites sooner.
Basic idea: Mount spacecraft/payload onto a pusher plate & explode a series of shaped nuclear charges to accelerate the cargo into space. You could explode them in rapid succession if sudden acceleration is of no concern (i.e. no human crew). unz.com/akarlin/coloniβ¦
Traditionally viewed as a method of blasting payloads into space in a much cheaper and scalable way than chemical propulsion, Orion Drives should be just as efficacious at fast & thorough Kesslerization.
Re-American responses. None of this would be illegal. All satellites destroyed as a result of this will be accidents, strictly speaking. There will be no legal grounds for escalation.
Re-collateral damage. Yes, Russia & others will lose their own LEO satellites, but as I said earlier, the US has close to space dominance. In *relative* terms, it will hurt US power and the globalist system it underwrites far more any of its Great Power competitors.
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My assessment remains unchanged. Ukraine has a limited window of opportunity before the influx of Russian reservists make further gains untenable, and the strategic initiative either shifts to Russia or results in stalemate in November.
That question in turn depends on what kind of loss ratios we are seeing on the fronts, in which 1:1 = stalemate; 3:1 = Russia wins (at least short of Russia to total war tier levels that are beyond its current state capacity).
Now while I long credited the 3:1 ratio, the sustained power of Ukrainian advances in the past month in the face of what are evidently strongly attritioned Russian forces means that 1:1 must now be seen as a real possibility, at least from late summer on.
The chances of Russia using tactical nukes for military purposes in Ukraine are near zero.
As I said before, one key aspect about this war is force densities are very low (10x lower than on same fronts in WW2). As such, only *mass* usage of tactical nukes makes military sense.
Obviously the costs of isolated nuke usage (probable NATO intervention) far outweigh the meager military benefits. Russia's post-mobilization war plan revolves around leveraging its population advantage into a manpower one. Nothing new was said about nukes.
Mass Russian usage of tactical nukes is only credible in a scenario in which there is extensive NATO intervention that threatens to overrun Russian territory (which Taurida will presumably soon become).
@Annatar_I has pointed out that Russia didn't have a reservist system as such from 1991 to August 2021.
(Incidentally, that's just one month after Putin's article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" en.kremlin.ru/events/presideβ¦
Which is yet another piece of evidence that the decision to go to war with Ukraine was only made in summer 2021, but I digress.)
Anyhow, all that Russia really has is a list of ~25M names of people who served in the military or did military courses in university.
Moreover, military commissariat workers are not exactly the cream of the crop.
Hence the calling up of students, engineers in missile assembly plants, other non-eligibles, etc. It's a bureaucratic nightmare, but one that's generally resolved when the mobilized reach their units.
With Russia finally leveraging its population preponderance (5:1), Ukraine will be left at a manpower disadvantage (2:1) once the 300k new troops are allocated into their units over the next 1-3 months.
Military success is mostly just a function of manpower, munitioning, and combat effectiveness; as such, by winter, Russia will have a huge preponderance in both the first two, an advantage further augmented by winter favoring Russia in net terms (energy crisis + less foliage).
As such, right now Ukraine's strategic situation somewhat resembles Germany's after the entry of the US into WW1; it has a limited window to go all in on victory (the Spring Offensive), before the entry of new enemy manpower makes its prospects untenable.
The only thing stunning here is that what was obvious by April latest took so long. If this was a strategy game, Putin was either a noob at it or gunning for some ultra-hard achievement like "conquer Ukraine with <200k troops" (the Pentagon did claim Putin was an autist...).
I did *allow the possibility* Russian military analysts had calculated & political leadership agreed that the SMO 1.0 force would be sufficient to bleed out Ukraine over several years while maintaining normalcy on the home front. But that was attributing them too much competence.
Only real argument I saw for postponing it so long was to have mobilization demands driven at least in part from the bottom up, instead of being imposed on the citizenry top-down. But IMO that's a stretch, Russians were sufficiently riled up enough after 1 month.
Russia's primary problem is lack of manpower. Since Russians have no combat effectiveness advantage over Ukrainians, this meant old SMO was to be a static war of attrition trading Russian munitions advantage for Ukrainian manpower advantage. π§΅
Could work, but take a long time; & would be contingent on Ukrainians not leveling the munitions disparity and further increasing their combat effectiveness advantage; both very plausible developments in light of NATO provisioning it with progressively higher end weapons systems.
However, for a state with a 5x population advantage, fighting this way is absurd, akin to a strategy video game achievement challenge "conquer Ukraine with 200k troops" (a point originally made by @Annatar_I). Doable in principle, but risky.