Why 12th GUMO? It is not about trucks as it was mentioned in the Guardian. According to our knowledge and military analysts we work with, this Vystrel vehicle with a 30 mm turret is used solely as protection for 12th GUMO.
There is also this vehicle that we have seen in other 12th GUMO-related movements. Combined these two pieces of info, add the context of Putin's recent nuclear threats and this video (trust me, such videos are never published by accident), and there you go.
I am cc'ing here @julianborger (no, the Guardian did not contact me for comment) and @larisamlbrown, who also played with the story.

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More from @konrad_muzyka

Sep 11
Kharkiv Oblast is either fully liberated or will soon be liberated. I think that just as Russians could not recover from losses suffered north or Kyiv, which ultimately proved determinantal to their failures elsewhere in the second stage of this war, 1/
I think the loss of equipment in Kharkiv may decimate Russian offensive combat potential. Or in other words, combined with the UAF initiative, with what they currently have, the Russian ability to wage any type of offensive is probably non-existent over the medium term (+6m). 2/
It is now important to look beyond Kharkiv. UAF has the momentum to carry forward. The obvious choice is to move into the Luhansk Oblast. It's important to note that Moscow recognised LPR and DPR within their administrative borders. UAF could very soon enter this territory. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Sep 5
Ukraine Conflict Monitor: It is important to note that most of the best Russian formations (or what is left of them) had in recent weeks been deployed to the Kherson Oblast, which means that proxies and Wanger mercenaries are doing most of the fighting. 1/5 (data source @DefMon3)
This especially pertains to the most neuralgic areas in the Donetsk Oblast. The frontline between Kharkiv and Zaporozhihia is therefore deprioritised as long as the situation in the Kherson Oblast is not stabilised. This has three consequences. 2/5
Read 7 tweets
Sep 2
Po 1. od ponad miesiąca mówiłem, że duża ofensywa a tym kierunku jest mało prawdopodobna. Po 2. Teraz dużej ofensywy nie widzę. Po 3. Nadal upieram się że atak mógł wyjsc za wcześnie, a data jego rozpoczęcia nie była decyzją stricte wojskową i podjętą przez SG.
Po 4. Ukraincy nie przekazują żadnych informacji, aby w przypadku wtopy jeszcze bardziej nie pogorszyć swojej sytuacji (uważam że FR ma dobre rozpoznanie ma tym kierunku wiec wie jakimi siłami i środkami dysponują SZ UA). Po 5. nie wiemy jakie tak naprawdę cele postawił Kijów.
Ciężko jest wiec określić czy jest sukces, czy porażka. Jest tez na to za wczesnie. Po 6. Z perspektywy osoby, która patrzy na to z boku, widzę juz oznaki wyczerpania UKR potencjału ofensywnego. Ale dużo zależy,czy i ile wejdzie rezerw do boju i czy to jest na pewno kierunek...
Read 7 tweets
May 8
Not quite. Since 2019 a lot has been done to force company and battalion commanders to show leadership and “tactical flexibility” on the battlefield. This has probably been one of the largest departures from the Soviet era thinking on a tactical level since the end of the ColdWar
Surely, you cannot train subunits’ commanders to show ingenuity in three years, especially given such heavy legacy. Yet, the process started and was abruptly stopped by the war. The fact that so many high-level commanders have been killed probably means that they don’t think..
Low level commanders can get job done. And I am not surprised.
Read 4 tweets
Apr 5
From today's Ukraine Conflict Monitor: On 01APR2022, Ukraine's General Staff reported that Russia controlled Izium with elements of the 1st Guard Tank Army and the 20th Guard Combined Arms Army. @capellaspace SAR acquired 2305Z 03APR2022 shows Russian ground force positions ..1/4
in prepared fighting positions south of the city. These positions were north of the pontoon bridges. With elements being redeployed from around Kyiv and Chernihiv, it is expected that Izium, and the Kharkiv region more generally, could be reinforced. 2/4
Concurrently, a part of the original group that captured the city is now probing defences towards Nova Dmytrivka and Barvinkove. Russian operational pace appears to be high as there seem to be relatively few breaks between various stages of tactical operations. 3/4
Read 4 tweets
Feb 13
A quick round-up of this weekend's events. 1) We are seeing more equipment being moved to the border with Ukraine. Clearly, Russians are preparing 4-5 staging areas from Belarus to Crimea. 2) We are seeing more aircraft and helos coming into Belarus and Western Russia.
In a typical fashion, Russians are using reserve airbases (Luninets and Novoozernoe) to move airframes closer to the frontline (this actually also refers to land forces ->easy to supply with helos and aircraft).
This week Russia's reportedly to start its Grom strategic nuclear force exercise. It'll test all legs of Russia’s nuclear triad and probably theatre-range systems. If an attack on Ukraine happens soon, the exercise could be used as a deterrent against Ukrainian or NATO's response
Read 4 tweets

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