Here’s a brief update on the situation in Ukraine, focusing on Donbas and the air picture.

Over the past week, Russian elements from the 57th and 33rd Motor Rifle Regiments penetrated Ukrainian defensive positions along the TO504 road linking Pokrovsk and Konstantynivka. Although this line has long ceased to serve as a reliable GLOC, the tempo and vectors of Russian advances northward remain concerning. (Orange colour is fortifications - made by @Playfra0->give him a follow) Russian forces are advancing along three primary axes toward Konstantynivka:

- The eastern axis from Chasiv Yar, which has seen limited gains over months;

- The southern axis via Toretsk, currently contested with Ukrainian forces holding firm;

- The eastern flank, which has gained operational momentum and now threatens Ukrainian rear areas, complicating sustainment and force disposition.

The rapid pace of the eastern push risks outflanking Ukrainian defensive lines and denies time for construction of new fortifications. Should Russian forces secure a breakthrough near Rusyn Yar, it would constitute a critical tactical gain, severely degrading Ukrainian defensive depth.

From a terrain perspective, movement from Novooolenivka toward Stepaniva affords the Russians dominant ground, enabling fire control over approaches to Konstantynivka and interdiction of Ukrainian reinforcement routes from Druzkivka.

The past few weeks have shown relatively substantial Russian territorial gains both north and south of Kurakhove. Although, using Ukrainian parlance, the overall situation remains "difficult but manageable," we generally expect the continuation of Russian ground attacks and territorial gains in the area.

On 19DEC, Russian forces reportedly launched assaults on Ulakly and Konstiantynopil, both pivotal for Ukrainian efforts to maintain their defensive line near Dache and Kurakhove. While unverified Russian reports suggest progress near both villages, confirmation of these advances would significantly undermine Ukrainian positions. If these reports are accurate, Ukrainian forces in the salient could again face difficulties in conducting effective defensive operations and risk partial encirclement. Moreover, the loss of any built-up areas would degrade Ukraine's overall ability to defend more effectively. Although the terrain in this region favors defensive operations due to the presence of waterways, the ongoing Ukrainian personnel shortage prevents full utilization of these natural features to stall Russian advances. Currently, Ukrainian units in the area are focused on static defense operations, leaving them vulnerable to drone, artillery, and glide bomb strikes. This lack of manpower also limits their ability to launch counterattacks, which could otherwise disrupt Russian momentum in the area.
On 14DEC, the commander of the OTUV Donetsk, Brig. Gen. Oleksandr Lutsenko, whose AOR span between Velyka Novosilka to the Toretsk area, was dismissed due to poor engineering preparations and quick Russian advances. Lutsenko has been replaced by Brig. Gen. Oleksandr Tarnavsky. Tarnavsky is an experienced commander, but his problems will take weeks and months to fix, let alone many issues (such as training and the quality of draftees) are beyond his control. As such, his impact on the frontline may take weeks to materialize.

Here’s a brief overview of the situation. A few weeks ago, Belarusian forces began conducting various exercises that we believe are preparations for a large-scale bilateral drill involving one operational command against another. Although this concept isn’t new (the Russians first implemented it on a large scale in 2019), Minsk only conducted a drill of this magnitude for the first time last year, in September. We closely monitored the drill and provided clear warnings and recommendations that it was purely an exercise. Our current assessment links the recent “build-up” near Ukraine to the 2024 iteration of the bilateral exercise. While many aspects of this year’s drill are similar to those in 2023, the concentration area has notably shifted. The deployment of forces into Gomel Oblast, which served as a staging area for Russian troops during the 2022 attack on Kyiv, is particularly concerning.

Drodzy Państwo, jak wspominałem w jednym z poprzednich nagrań, niedawno wziąłem udział w wyjeździe studyjnym na Ukrainę, którego celem było uzyskanie informacji na jakim etapie jest teraz wojna i w jakim kierunku zmierza, jakie zmiany zachodzą w taktyce oraz sposobach działania. O wnioskach z tego wyjazdu mogą Państwo posłuchać tutaj: A teraz krótka nitka. Jechałem na Ukrainę będąc pesymistą, a wracam umiarkowanym optymistą. Ci z Państwa, którzy mnie czytają wiedzą, że za największą ukraińską bolączką był brak ludzi. Biorąc pod uwagę, co zobaczyliśmy zakładam, że jeśli mobilizacja utrzyma swoje tempo (bardzo dobre), to front powinien się stabilizować od połowy sierpnia.

Kilka dni temu Gen. broni Krzysztof Król, doradca Doradca Szefa Sztabu Generalnego (w tekście blednie nazwanym Szef Sztabu Dowództwa Sił Połączonych NATO w Brunssum), udzielił wywiadu Radiu Kraków gdzie podzielił się swoimi ocenami dotyczącymi wojny na Ukrainie.
radiokrakow.pl/audycje/gen-br… Moją uwagę przykul jeden fragment: “Jeśli chodzi o podstawy sztuki operacyjnej, Rosjanie są pierwsza klasa. Natomiast nie zawsze się to przekłada na taktykę i właściwe jej implementowanie.” Nasza ocena jest trochę inna. Na początek jednak kilka slow wyjaśnienia.

Zapraszam na krótką nitkę o obecnej sytuacji na froncie. W skrócie, sytuacja wygląda bardzo źle i nie należy oczekiwać jej poprawy w najbliższych tygodniach. Są trzy powody obecnego stanu rzeczy i w zasadzie nie ma tutaj nic odkrywczego, gdyż problemy po ukraińskiej stronie są znane od dawna: brak amunicji, ludzi, fortyfikacji.

No tak, ta publikacja i wnioski z niej płynące trendują mi dziś na TT. Więc zapraszam na kilka słów komentarza.

https://twitter.com/mikolajnalej/status/1770885059609768357

Tekst przedstawia szczegółową analizę różnych wskaźników sugerujących, że Rosja może przygotowywać się do konfliktu konwencjonalnego na dużą skalę z NATO. Jednakże istnieje w niej kilka potencjalnych niekonsekwencji logicznych i założeń na które warto zwrócić uwagę.

W ostatnich dniach w przestrzeni publicznej pojawiło się wiele publikacji oraz komentarzy polityków o możliwej wojnie NATO – Rosja. Padały różna daty, ale najczęściej powtarzano okres 2-3 lat, kiedy FR może spróbować (być gotowa?) skonfrontować się z Sojuszem. I o tym słów kilka. Cały komponent lądowy SZ FR jest zaangażowany w wojnę na Ukrainie. Zwycięstwo w tej wojnie jest celem strategicznym Moskwy (nadrzędnym wobec wszystkiego innego) a decyzje podejmowane na Kremlu czy rosyjskim MONie mają to zwycięstwo przyspieszyć.

Last night saw the largest Shahed 131/136 attack since Russia started using this capability in September last year (🧵)
Based on Ukrainian official data, the number of Shaheds used lately was rather uneven. Russians averaged around 9 Shaheds per past ten strikes (Source:UAF) Russians continued to limit the number of precision-guided and long-range munitions. Out of the past 14 strikes, eight involved only one missile. The average missile use for the past ten strikes is 1.7. (Source: UGS)

Jak obiecałem, tak piszę. Wrażenia z ponad tygodniowego pobytu na Ukrainie. Szczegółów operacyjnych nie będzie, ale wiedzcie proszę, że spotkaliśmy się z analitykami, dowódcami pododdziałów. Wyjazd był bardzo produktywny. Zacznijmy od artykułu Załużnego w The Economist. Słowo stalemate użyte dość niezręcznie (o tym za chwilę). Ale podkreśla, to że kontrofensywa wygasła. Ukraina nie posiada obecnie potencjału do prowadzenia działań ofensywnych.

A few thoughts about unusually heavy air traffic to and out of the Kaliningrad Oblast. A 🧵
Since at least 27OCT, we have been observing very high air traffic to and from the Kaliningrad Oblast. Daily flights include Il-76 and An-124s transport aircraft. 1/ Some aircraft landed at K-grad International Airport (Khrabrovo), while some were sent to Chernyakhovsk. Russian aircraft transponders over the Baltic Sea are on (and in many cases over K-grad), but they are switched off upon entering Russia near St. Pete or south of Moscow. 2/

Już tłumaczę skąd moja ocena. Szacunki UA są oczywiście zawyżone. Dodam, że wlasnych nie posiadam, ale o tym dlaczego poniżej.

https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1606019811116359680

Zacznę jednak od czegoś innego. Niepotrzebnie emocjonują się Państwo tą liczbą. 100k funkcjonuje tylko w obiegu medialnym. Ta liczba nie jest ważnym etapem tej wojny i absolutnie niczego nie zmienia. Ważne jest to, co Szojgu wczoraj mówił na kolegium MON, a nie liczby UA.

Belarus 🧵 We're seeing new developments in Belarus, which could have major repercussions for Belarus and Ukraine. Today, Sergei Shoigu arrived in Belarus. The visit was reportedly unannounced. Straight after landing at Machulishchy Air Base, he met his Belarusian counterpart... Viktor Khrenin and signed amendments to the 1997 treaty on establishing the Union State (changes pertained to the defence and security part of the document). After that, Shiogu met with Lukashenko, who confirmed Belarusians are providing logistics support to Russian units in BLR.

Since March,we've been tracking Belarusian military activity. There are some important points to be made. Apart from @MotolkoHelp and @Rochan_CONS, no one else does this as the Belarusian Armed Forces are relatively weak, and apart from Luka's rhetoric, there's nothing there. 1/

https://twitter.com/tretyamirovaya/status/1579534717183217664

The Belarusian Armed Forces are largely a mobilisational force. Their manpower is at around 50-60% of the required peacetime strength. To reach 100%, they'd need to mobilise at least 20k men. Operationally, they are subordinated to the Russian Western MD. 2/

Kharkiv Oblast is either fully liberated or will soon be liberated. I think that just as Russians could not recover from losses suffered north or Kyiv, which ultimately proved determinantal to their failures elsewhere in the second stage of this war, 1/ I think the loss of equipment in Kharkiv may decimate Russian offensive combat potential. Or in other words, combined with the UAF initiative, with what they currently have, the Russian ability to wage any type of offensive is probably non-existent over the medium term (+6m). 2/

Ukraine Conflict Monitor: It is important to note that most of the best Russian formations (or what is left of them) had in recent weeks been deployed to the Kherson Oblast, which means that proxies and Wanger mercenaries are doing most of the fighting. 1/5 (data source @DefMon3)

Po 1. od ponad miesiąca mówiłem, że duża ofensywa a tym kierunku jest mało prawdopodobna. Po 2. Teraz dużej ofensywy nie widzę. Po 3. Nadal upieram się że atak mógł wyjsc za wcześnie, a data jego rozpoczęcia nie była decyzją stricte wojskową i podjętą przez SG.

https://twitter.com/wolski_jaros/status/1565673289598603272

Po 4. Ukraincy nie przekazują żadnych informacji, aby w przypadku wtopy jeszcze bardziej nie pogorszyć swojej sytuacji (uważam że FR ma dobre rozpoznanie ma tym kierunku wiec wie jakimi siłami i środkami dysponują SZ UA). Po 5. nie wiemy jakie tak naprawdę cele postawił Kijów.

Not quite. Since 2019 a lot has been done to force company and battalion commanders to show leadership and “tactical flexibility” on the battlefield. This has probably been one of the largest departures from the Soviet era thinking on a tactical level since the end of the ColdWar

https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1523180401220472832

Surely, you cannot train subunits’ commanders to show ingenuity in three years, especially given such heavy legacy. Yet, the process started and was abruptly stopped by the war. The fact that so many high-level commanders have been killed probably means that they don’t think..

From today's Ukraine Conflict Monitor: On 01APR2022, Ukraine's General Staff reported that Russia controlled Izium with elements of the 1st Guard Tank Army and the 20th Guard Combined Arms Army. @capellaspace SAR acquired 2305Z 03APR2022 shows Russian ground force positions ..1/4 in prepared fighting positions south of the city. These positions were north of the pontoon bridges. With elements being redeployed from around Kyiv and Chernihiv, it is expected that Izium, and the Kharkiv region more generally, could be reinforced. 2/4

A quick round-up of this weekend's events. 1) We are seeing more equipment being moved to the border with Ukraine. Clearly, Russians are preparing 4-5 staging areas from Belarus to Crimea. 2) We are seeing more aircraft and helos coming into Belarus and Western Russia. In a typical fashion, Russians are using reserve airbases (Luninets and Novoozernoe) to move airframes closer to the frontline (this actually also refers to land forces ->easy to supply with helos and aircraft).

Courtesy of @capellaspace, @CSBiggers and I took a look at imagery of areas in Western Russia that have recently been under cloud cover. There are some important changes in Russian force compositions and their locations. Firstly, Yelnya is being drawdown. Secondly, we are seeing a massive influx of vehicles and personnel in Kursk where elements of the 6th CAA are stationed. Subunits from the 9th Artillery Brigade may have arrived, along with another BTG. We are now waiting for Iskanders and probably guests from the High North.