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Ankit Panda Profile picture
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Oct 3 • 11 tweets • 2 min read
First since September 2017. IRBM or ICBM.
On the ICBM possibility.
37th ballistic missile launch this year.
Almost exactly 3 years since the last US-North Korea working-level talks broke down in Stockholm.
Chagang isn't surprising for a long-range missile.
22 minutes seems a little on the high side for a Hwasong-12. Can't yet rule out an ICBM with early booster cut-off, but need apogee/range too.
Japan leaning ICBM it seems.
I think we're likely to see a North Korean state media report on this launch tomorrow.
That's a Hwasong-12 IRBM. A longer-range shot than in August or September 2017.
I'm wondering if this launch incorporated a lighter mass payload than the Sept. 2017 launch (particularly given the apparent lighter-payload Hwasong-15 launch in March). No evidence either way at this point.
Worth also stating clearly that this is the longest demonstrated range by any North Korean missile test ever.

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More from @nktpnd

Ankit Panda Profile picture
Sep 9
carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/15/sou…
More to say soon! This is all very interesting.
This is basically a North Korean Nuclear Posture Review of sorts and the most significant explicit update to their nuclear strategy since the 2013 law. To be expected as they move toward a more fleshed out posture, including tactical nuclear weapons. (Below excerpt from my book.)
Read 6 tweets
Ankit Panda Profile picture
Sep 7
OK, I’ll tweet a few thoughts on this story. nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/…
First, everything reported here strikes me as plausible: North Korea has stocks of 122mm/152mm shells/rockets and would be willing to supply (for the right price/return).
Second, the reported transfers would constitute a violation of paragraph 8 of S/RES/2270 (2016) by Russia; North Korea is barred from military exports “that support or enhance the operational capabilities of the armed forces of another [UN] Member State.”
Read 10 tweets
Ankit Panda Profile picture
Aug 4
One of the longer term consequences of this crisis (and generally of PLA behavior in last 18-24 months): Taiwan Strait median line crossings no longer rare, but regularized by PLA in the course of future exercises; pressure on ROC to respond (& higher odds of miscalculation).
This would amount, effectively, to a constraining of Taiwan’s already limited strategic depth in peacetime.
So, my early assessment is that this crisis, on balance, is likely to advance PRC interests in the Taiwan Strait to the detriment of the US & Taiwan. Benefits of Pelosi’s visit, as anticipated, significantly outweighed by costs.
Read 5 tweets
Ankit Panda Profile picture
Aug 4
Helpful thread. Prior to this, PLA noted exercises would involve “conventional” fires only; some US analysts have seen DF-15 use (including in 3rd Strait Crisis) as nuclear signaling, but there’s no compelling evidence of DF-15 having a nuclear delivery role.
The “nuclear” DF-15 assessments, as best I know, trace their origins to a 1993 CIA assessment that suggested there could be a nuclear warhead for the system. More recent US intelligence assessments (including NASIC 2021) describe DF-15/CSS-6 as “conventionally-armed.”
(I note this to preempt concerns that China is engaging in nuclear signaling in the course of this crisis; I see no evidence of that currently.)
Read 13 tweets
Ankit Panda Profile picture
Jun 23
North Korea will eventually test and deploy tactical nuclear weapons (as Kim has said). This thread explains why the recent WPK CMC meeting might have been an important inflection point in that process.
I’d expect to see more launches involving the new close-range ballistic missile system designated for a tactical nuclear weapon delivery role. We should also expect to see weapon storage infrastructure established if warheads will be forward-based alongside KPA units.
As I explored here—and as @ArmsControlWonk notes—the big question still pertains to nuclear command and control decisions. Kim faces dilemmas in this area as he moves toward deploying tactical nuclear weapons. I discuss this in more detail here.
Read 8 tweets
Ankit Panda Profile picture
Apr 26
“North Korea’s largest-known intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) appeared at the country’s long-anticipated military parade on Monday, according to DPRK state media. ” nknews.org/2022/04/north-…
Will need to see Kim's full remarks, but comments on the role of nuclear weapons and deterrence don't strike me as fundamentally novel: North Korea has always said it hopes to deter a war/invasion of its territory, but would use weapons to blunt an invading force if it had to.
First parade pictures: Hwasong-17, Hwasong-15, Hwasong-8, new Pukguksong (?) solid fuel ballistic missile.
Read 12 tweets

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