Ukraine is not making any significant attacks from the Kupyansk bridgehead in any direction. Instead, they use drones and artillery to fire on Russian positions while recon and special forces exert pressure on Russian defenses.
Ukraine moved north and east from the Lyman bridgehead to liberate Pidlyman, Borova (1), Shyikivka, Izyumske, and Druzhelyubivka (3).
Russia withdrew without much of a fight after being defeated in Pidlyman. Russia doesn't have much presence north of Borova, and perhaps Ukraine has liberated those towns already. I expect confirmation of liberation along the Oskil River to Kupyansk in the next day or two.
Russia is withdrawing to Svatove in Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine's next objective. Ukraine is moving northeast from the Lyman bridgehead toward Raihorodka (2), and there are conflicting reports about the town's state. Ukraine may have liberated it already.
Ukraine has likely released the entire right bank of the Zherebets River up to Raihorodok, including Makiivka.
There are conflicting reports that Ukraine has pushed east from Nevske and taken control of the P66 highway intersection between Ploshchanka (A) and Krasnorichenske (B). There are even rumors that Ukraine has liberated Krasnorichenske (5).
However, other reports claim only Ukrainian recon has made it this far and that the P66 highway remains in Russian control, albeit under constant threat of Ukrainian fire. Therefore, this entire area is labeled "contested" on the map.
Ukraine is firing artillery into Kreminna, although I do not believe they are assaulting the town. The primary Russian defensive position is in the northwest near the cemetery (red), and they appear to have an HQ in the blue highlighted area. Ukraine is heavily shelling both.
There are whispers of a Ukrainian advance toward Lysychansk near Siversk, but I have not seen any proof.
Instead, Russians are complaining about Ukraine's robust defenses near Spirne (6), where Ukrainian defenders are taking advantage of underground industrial areas. Russia is trying to push to Vyimka (7), but Russian sources say their advance has been slow and fraught with danger.
Near Bakhmut are stories about Ukraine performing a widescale counterattack and fleeing the areas around Bakhmut. I believe this is Russian propaganda. On the other hand, they may have some tiny amount of truth.
I have stated before that Ukraine performs daily counterattacks around Bakhmut. And I believe the Ukrainians rotated some units out of combat. But stories about a wholesale withdrawal or a large offensive are unsupported by available evidence.
Russia is attacking Bakhmutske (8), Bakhmut (9), Vesela Dolyna (10), Zaitseve (11), and Odradivka (12). They have been attacking these same areas for weeks now. I believe Russia has made some progress in Zaitseve, which suffers extremely heavy shelling.
Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Pervomaiske (13) and Nevelske (14). There are Russian claims of considerable advances in Pervomaiske, but I have been unable to verify the claims. I am not saying it is false, merely that I have had trouble contacting people in the area.
In the Kherson area, On October 2nd, Ukraine launched a massive armored attack down the T-403 highway that runs roughly parallel to the Dnipro river.
This attack occurred during stormy conditions that limited Russian air cover and the use of drones and coincided with an electronic warfare attack that jammed all Russian communications.
Ukraine charged down the highway, shattering the first line of defenses and rolling down to Havrylivka and Dudchany, over 20km from their starting positions (15).
Russia reportedly blew the bridge in Dudchany, hindering the Ukrainian advance. This statement is controversial, there are rumors that Ukraine broke through Dudchany, but I cannot find evidence. Perhaps more evidence will emerge in the coming days.
Ukraine also pushed southwest and took Lyubymivka (18), Bilyivka (19), Shevchenkivka, and Ukrainka (17). There are rumors that Ukraine also took Chervone (C) and Novovokresenske (D).
On October 2nd, Ukraine also moved toward Davydiv Brid and established positions in the wooded areas southwest about 1km from the town (21).
Ukraine will need to attack and secure four major towns in this area of Kherson to break the Russian position.
First, Dudchany (E). Ukraine likely controls at least half the town, but if Russia still holds the southern part of the town, they can still move supplies (although it will be under Ukrainian artillery fire).
Second, Mylove (F) is a significant artery that feeds toward the Russian position on the Inhulets river to the northwest. But neither of these towns is enough because there are still roads to get around them.
Finally, the two vital towns are Tryfonivka (G) and Borozenske (H). If Ukraine controls these two towns, then Davydiv Brid and everything north of it on the Inhulets is encircled. Ukraine would hold every road in and out.
Russia is continuously attacking Ukrainian cities. They launched suicide drone attacks on Odesa and missile strikes on Kryvyi Rih, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Bakhmut.
On the night of October 3rd, Russia struck the power plant in Kharkiv, causing a massive fire and a power outage.
The strike on Kupyansk directly hit and destroyed the hospital and killed an anesthesiologist. The strike destroyed all four floors of the hospital.
What a weird twitter bug where it posted every tweet twice. I think I fixed it. First time I have had that happen.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
For the past two years, we have discussed how Ukraine is building drones that can hit targets 100 to 150 kilometers away. These drones are being produced in enough numbers to disrupt Russian logistics. During this time, some people doubted this was possible, calling it too optimistic or asking, "Why can't Russians do the same thing?"
To me, the answers were clear. Ukraine has better technology across various forms of communication, either on its own or with allies' help. Starlink is one example, but it is not the only or even the most important one.
Ukraine also has more experience and stronger command-and-control systems for drones. While these systems are not perfect, they are better than what Russia has, especially at the scale needed for this kind of operation.
Ukraine developed many different technologies and weapons in parallel, and for a good deal of time, none of these projects had much, if any, impact on the war itself. So, for a long time, it seemed nothing was happening, and this, along with Russia's media narrative (and the profound willingness of people to fall for Russian propaganda), led many to believe Russia was inevitably winning, which was never true, and is certainly untrue now.
Now, these technologies and weapons have reached the front line at about the same time, within a few weeks or months of each other. Some are better or more specialized than others, and some will be countered or may fail. Still, the fact that they all appeared together makes it very hard for Russia to adapt and stop them.
Ukraine will be able to send very cheap drones with a range of over 100 kilometers into Russia's rear areas. These drones can be guided by many different methods to hit every important target at first, and probably, in time, every target.
Russia has already had to close some roads and routes because of the threat. This is just the start. The danger will only grow as Ukraine increases production over time. These drones are cheap and easy to make, and Ukraine will produce them in large numbers. Russia does not have any technology that can handle this threat right now.
SHORAD can create small protected areas, but if it is used often, it will eventually be destroyed.
Electronic warfare probably will not solve the problem, but it might help a little.
Nets along highways will help, but only slightly. And nets can pose risks and hazards of their own. When they collapse, they can close roads, forcing vehicles through chokepoints that can be mined and attacked.
Interceptor drones can work, but they need a lot of resources that would otherwise go to offensive operations.
The Russian military is dealing with a problem no army has faced before, and there is no clear solution. Their best option is to spread supplies across many vehicles and use every possible road and path to move them forward. However, this is very inefficient and only helps as much as Ukraine's drone production allows.
The "russia will figure it out" crowd should sit down and give me your list of excuses for how Russia still doesn't have heavy bombers after more than 4 years of trying to replicate them.
Russia doesn't have an answer to bombers or their own bomber. They have nothing. And you think they can solve strike drones? Something an order of magnitude harder to develop and harder to stop? On what basis do you think this? It is just cope.
Russians waving flags in Verkhnia Tersa, a lesser known highly pro-Ukrainian town in Zaporizhzhia. I remember reading the news story about the first civilian KIA in this town, and how shocking it was to them, in 2023 I think. Seeing the place like this now is sad.
Here is translated text from Al Ta about the situation in Ukraine. He is a Russian propagandist, a soviet anti-Putinist who views reviving the full Soviet Union (including Poland) as the primary number one goal of this war. He's also pretty honest about the situation. Its long. (racial slurs and whatnot are removed btw)
Preservation of one’s own forces and resources (including manpower).
On paper, everything looks neat and classical: we strike the enemy at its foundations and core, while we ourselves conserve strength and wait for the right moment for a decisive blow. But in reality, everything is both simpler and more complicated at the same time.
If you think through the basic principles of a classical war of attrition, then at the initial stage, when the enemy’s potential is being destroyed, when strikes are delivered against its economy, communications, and supply routes for raw materials and weapons, the side that holds the initiative should remain on the defensive, abandoning unimportant territories and максимально protecting its soldiers. This attrition is carried out through the remote destruction of the enemy’s potential.
Strictly speaking, the correct strategy in such a war should include:
1. Readiness for total and continuous mobilization.
We remember that this kind of war is one of mobilizing all the strength of the people. Total mobilization is necessary to achieve a manpower advantage, which should allow final military actions to be carried out quickly once the enemy’s ability to resist is completely broken. In addition, prolonged combat, even in a well-organized defense, still leads to losses, which are unavoidable. Therefore, there is a constant need to replenish the front with personnel.
2. Readiness for total destruction and the deaths of the enemy’s civilian population (and your own, if the enemy is not weaker than you).
It is extremely difficult, more likely impossible, to “delicately” destroy a country’s economic foundation. Therefore, a country that begins such a war must be prepared to act decisively and harshly. This is the price of survival.
3. Defense as the foundation of the first phase of such a war.
Preserving soldiers’ lives is the key to a future victorious offensive. It is physically impossible to conserve personnel while conducting offensive operations. Many are familiar with the standard ratios required for an attacking force to outnumber a defending one. Even taking into account more advanced and destructive weapons, the need for such a ratio remains, it will never be 1:1. In essence, the main function of troops (infantry supported by tanks, artillery, and aviation) in such a war is to occupy territories where the enemy can no longer resist. Frontal or stubborn assaults are not characteristic of a war of attrition.
4. Seizing territory in the initial and main stages of such a war is not the primary objective.
Territory should be taken either after the course of the war has been turned and the enemy’s ability to resist has been broken, or through the imposition of postwar conditions.
5. Emphasis on firepower.
The enemy should be subjected to an overwhelming barrage of destructive force using every possible means. Everything available should be directed at the target. Naturally, this places emphasis on highly destructive weapons: artillery and aviation. The nature of the current war has also added UAVs (unmanned systems). We already see strike systems in the air and at sea, and soon ground systems will be added.
The goal is to inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy before you yourself suffer unacceptable losses. If you like, it resembles a boxing match: both sides exchange blows, but in the end the stronger one wins. At the same time, for every artillery shot fired at you, ten should be fired in return; for every drone launched, ten drones should respond. Only this way.
Yet, for example, by the results of March 2026, “so-called Ukraine” surpassed us in the number of drones launched at our territory.
Each of you can compare these principles with what is actually happening at the front. After all, “we haven’t even started yet,” if some leaders are to be believed.
I want to start by saying I don’t have access to official documents or meetings, so I’m piecing together their motivations based on what I observe and logical reasoning. Keep that in mind as you read on.
This year, Russia's goals are threefold. First, to capture the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. Second, to capture Kostyantynivka. Third, to capture Slovyansk.
Each of these goals has necessary steps. To capture the bank in Zaporizhzhia, you must first capture Orikhiv. To capture Slovyansk, you must first capture Lyman. You could argue that to capture Kostyantynivka, you must first capture Chasiv Yar.
These goals are very ambitious and, honestly, impossible to fully achieve. So let’s think of them as aspirations and focus instead on how close Russia might get to reaching them.
Ukraine launched several counterattacks in the Verbove and Ternove areas of Zaporizhzhia. They were quite successful, pushing Russia out of several settlements and possibly capturing some. This also threatened Russia’s main supply route to the west. Because of this, Russia has to do two things: divert resources from their main attack to stabilize the area and try to recapture this ground to keep pushing west toward Orikhiv. Meanwhile, Ukraine gains time to strengthen defenses, plan their strategy, and prepare for more counterattacks, something Russia worries about given their timeline.
This has already delayed Russia’s offensive by months, and it will take many more weeks for them to regain their previous position.
Recently, Russia tried an armored assault on Orikhiv, which failed badly (A). They also tried to advance through Mala Tokmachka (B) before, but that failed too. A direct attack on Orikhiv is unlikely to succeed without heavy losses, so Russia wants to avoid it unless they have no choice. Still, based on past experience, they might end up having to take the town this way.
The military analysis of Iran has been the absolute worst military analysis I have ever seen in my entire life.
There have been times where I listen to some "expert" where almost every word they say in the entire interview is factually wrong. Some of these people are so wrong that I feel like you could have a big box of words and reach in and draw them randomly and it be more factual.
To prove my point, I just asked a LLM to analyze the form of a normal military interview on cable news and using strictly randomly generated words and no access to the actual news please give me a report on what's going on in Ian (unironically, this is what LLMs are good at, probably, just lying about shit):::
From an operational standpoint, the expanding American strike corridor may complicate Iran’s layered coastal defenses, which could scatter missile batteries inland.
At the tactical level, the Iranian drone screen might disrupt a forward U.S. maneuver package, which could stall momentum along the maritime axis.
From the broader battlefield geometry, the concentrated American carrier posture may pressure Iran’s southern command network, which could trigger rapid repositioning of defensive units.
Right now on the ground, the reinforced Iranian coastal belt might absorb the initial U.S. probing attacks, which could slow the opening phase of the campaign.
The main thing that any educated person needs to keep in mind at all times is that realpolitik is fake and everyone who believes in it is typically universally wrong on every single word they ever say.
It is especially funny because realpolitik people are almost never experts in any domain, and they get their info from aggregators. And those aggregators know the realpolitik people use them, and as such present info in a way most likely to influence the realpolitik.
They end up just being unwitting amplifiers of misinformation.