As things are moving fast on the Kherson front I drew up a few maps to explain the situation.
A short thread🧵:
In Kherson the russians hold a sizeable bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro river (shaded red), which could only be supplied by two bridges, one 1/n
just a bit North of Kherson and the other over the dam at Nova Kakhovka (purple pentagons).
Since the arrival of M142 HIMARS both crossing have been pounded heavily by Ukrainian forces.
Since August the Antonovsky bridge near Kherson is impassable for vehicles (photo), while 2/n
the dam at Nova Kakhovka is still passable for trucks, but not heavy vehicles (photo).
Over the last month Ukraine has been wearing the russian forces in Kherson down: through artillery fire, constant probing attacks, drone attacks, and by destroying their ammo and supplies. 3/n
russia brought in pontoons to supply its forces in the South near Kherson (photo), but thanks to HIMARS Ukraine has been hitting and sinking these pontoons.
Now Ukraine went on the offensive in the North and quickly overran the starving, demoralized russian forces there. 4/n
This is the same map as in tweet 1, but seeing this map makes it easier to understand Ukraine's initial attacks (blue arrows):
One attack pierced the russian line near the Dnipro, using the 5 km wide river to cover its eastern flank. At the same time Ukrainian troops attacked 5/n
from their Inhulets bridgehead - thus fixing the russians forces there in place.
Meeting little resistance Ukrainian forces pushed South to Dudchany. This meant that the russian troops still holding the front in the North are now at risk of being encircled. The latest news
6/n
indicate that these russians are already fleeing from there (red arrows).
Kherson is steppe = a flat landscape with some thin treelines as only cover. There are no natural barriers, which makes it impossible for the russians to set up an improvised defensive line.
7/n
The russians can't stop retreating until the next natural barrier: either the Dnipro river or the Inhulets river
Retreating over the Dnipro Nova Kakhovka would make more sense for the russians, as
(Photo of the landscape in northern Kherson - ideal armored warfare country) 8/n
here their trucks and light vehicles can still cross and once on the left bank the russians could set up a defensive line to secure the rear of their forces fighting in Zaporizhzhia.
The other option is to retreat South to the Inhulets river (blue line). 9/n
Retreating to the Inhulets would be what a complete moron does... so the russians will do it.
Let's look again at the map with the second phase of the operation in Kherson: the russians retreat either over the Nova Kakhovka dam or over the Inhulets river: 10/n
if they retreat over the dam they will have to leave all their heavy vehicles behind, if they retreat over the Inhulets they will have to abandon most of their vehicles for lack of fuel.
And if the russians retreat over the Inhulets, the Ukrainians can cross the Dnipro and
11/n
establish a bridgehead on the left bank, from which they can attack towards Crimea and Melitopol. At Kakhovka they can also cut the water to Crimea.
In short the russians only have bad options (putin the "strategic genius" at it again).
Some russians will flee over the
12/n
Nova Kakhovka dam, but most will retreat over the Inhulets... and as said that's the most moronic option, because then the russians there will be boxed in by Ukrainian troops from three sides, with M777 howitzers able to hit almost every spot, and 13/n
AHS Krab, PzH 2000, Zuzana 2 and CAESAR able to hit every spot. And the only supply line will be pontoons, whose landing spots on both sides of the Dnipro are in Ukrainian artillery range.
Retreating over the Inhulets is retreating into a death trap. Once Ukrainian M777 can
14/n
hit the pontoons no ammo, no fuel, no food - nothing will reach the 15,000 russians stuck there. It's starve to death or freeze to death or surrender for them.
And they can't flee across the Antonovsky bridge as Ukrainian spotters will see them & artillery will shred them.
15/n
And in fall/winter they can't swim across the 1 km wide Dnipro river with its freezing water, as that would mean death by hypothermia.
putin just annexed Kherson, so he refuses to give it up... which means he has doomed all the russian troops there to death.
16/n
This is a textbook example how a smart, capable, flexible, motivated army can use terrain, enemy incompetence, and operational art to beat a cretinously led army.
We're gonna see more of this, because putin is a moron and General Zaluzhnyi is a genius.
17/end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Gripen fans continue to spam my mention with claims how fantastic Sweden's Bas 90 and Gripen combination is... and that it would work for Canada's North too...
Ok, let's quickly compare Canada's three northern territories (Yukon, Northwest, Nunavut) and Sweden... ... 1/6
Land area:
🇸🇪 450,295 km2 (173,860 sq mi)
🇨🇦 terr.: 3,593,589 km2 (173,860 sq mi)
The land area of just the three territories (without Canada's 10 provinces) is already 8 times bigger than all of Sweden...
(In total Canada's land area is 9,984,670 km2
2/6
(3,855,100 sq mi) or 22 times Sweden).
Population:
🇸🇪 10.61 million
🇨🇦 terr.: 0.13 million
Sweden's population is 81.6 times bigger than that of the three territories... and if you look at population density:
🇸🇪 23,6/km2
🇨🇦 terr.: 0,013/km2
3/6
Saab loooves to tout the claim that the Gripen can "operate from dispersed air bases".
They do that, because they know no one of you knows what it means. And every time I see someone regurgite "dispersed air bases" (or "road runways" or "short runways") I know I am dealing
1/36
with someone, who knows absolutely nothing about the topic.
So allow me to take you on a deep dive into what "operating from dispersed air bases" actually means.
Let's start with Såtenäs Air Base in Southern Sweden - the most important Swedish air base. 2/n
When the Viggen entered service, Såtenäs received it first.
When the Gripen entered service, Såtenäs received it first.
When the Gripen E entered service, Såtenäs received it first.
In the 1950s Sweden developed the Bas 60 system, which would have dispersed the Swedish 3/n
The 11th Airborne Division is the least likely to be used to invade #Greenland.
The division's deputy commander is Canadian. He is responsible for Operations. The 11th would have to arrest part of their own officers, before being able to plan a Greenland invasion.
Also
1/6
there are just 8 C-17 Globemaster aircraft at Elmendorf Air Force Base. The USAF would need to fly a dozen more up to Alaska, which of course Canada would notice. Then to reach Greenland the C-17 would have to cross Canada's North, which NORAD's Canadian officers would report
2/6
to the Canadian and Danish governments.
It is much more likely the US will inform allies that a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg will fly to the Middle East, which means the air route will take them right over Greenland. And at Fort Bragg you also have the
3/6
This is a typical clown tweet by someone, who knows nothing about WWII.
3 years before D-Day, the Soviets & nazis were in a love-feast, while the US had not entered the war; & when it did it had to cross an ocean full of nazi submarines to stage troops & materiel for D-Day.
1/14
And unlike the warmongering Soviets, which in June 1941 fielded 304 divisions, the US Army fielded just 37 divisions when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor (+ two Marine Corps divisions).
Before any D-Day the US Army had to start forming new divisions (38 in 1942 and 17 in 1943) &
2/n
then ship those divisions across the Atlantic, which was teeming with German subs, while the Soviets just used trains to bring troops and materiel to the front (& if the Soviet had had to ship troops across an ocean, they would have just accepted that a third of their troops
3/n
The @RoyalAirForce - once the strongest air force in Western Europe... but now...
7 Eurofighter Typhoon squadrons are expected to fulfill the tasks, for which 35 years ago the RAF fielded 40 squadrons (31 active & 4 reserve + 5 shadow squadrons, which would have been formed
1/27
from the personnel & fighters of the RAF's operational conversion units).
At the end of the Cold War these 40 squadrons were assigned to 4 commands, each with a specific mission & enough aircraft to fulfill their mission.
No. 1 Group was tasked with striking Soviet forces
2/27
in Northern Germany, including with WE.177 tactical nukes.
The Group fielded 8 active, 4 reserve and 2 shadow squadrons, which flew Tornado GR1, Jaguar GR1A, and Harrier GR5 fighters (the reserve squadrons flew Hawk T1A). The group also included the RAF's 3 aerial
3/27
Since there are still people claiming the Gripen is the "ideal fighter for Canada"... here are the refueling stops the Gripen C/D needed to get from Ronneby in Sweden to Eielson Air Base in Alaska.
So of course this is an "ideal fighter" for Canada... as it will have to stop 1/5
at every Canadian airfield to refuel...
For the curious ones:
On 13 July 2006 five Gripen C and two Gripen D left
their base in Ronneby Sweden. They refueled at RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland, then flew to NAS Keflavik in Iceland, where they refueled and stayed overnight.
2/5
On 14 July the Gripens flew to Sondre Stromfjord in Greenland for another refueling, then proceeded to RCAF Iqualuit in Canada for refueling and the night.
On 15 July the Gripens flew to Churchill, refuelled and then flew to RCAF Cold Lake, where they spent 16 July to rest.
3/5