Saudi production and oil export by volume numbers aren't released quickly, so calculating the Saudi break even (the price that balances the current account) takes a bit of guess work. But it is clearly well below the current oil price.
2/x
The Saudi break even has been pretty constant since 2008, apart from a brief spending spree from 2012 to 2014. I assume that the Crown Prince's big ambitions (Neom, etc) will raise imports over time, but it hasn't really happened yet.
3/
What has happened is a big shift in how the external surplus that the Saudis appear intent on maintaining through production cuts is managed -- it no longer primarily goes into reserves. As @jnordvig has noted, the Saudis now primarily buy equities.
4/
OPEC decisions are of course primarily viewed through their impact on the oil market. But higher oil prices also have implications for global capital flows given the size of the Saudi surplus. And now, unlike in the past, the Saudis aren't buying bonds ...
5/5
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The ultimate scale of the restructuring of China’s Belt and Road lending remains to be determined – Zambia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and Laos are a given. Angola and Pakistan constitute bigger exposures, but aren’t a certainty. Venezuela is a unique case. There are others.
2/
But Zambia was first in line and it cannot avoid setting a number of precedents for unwinding BRI loans gone bad
Chinese lending in Zambia has huge: it totals at least $6b, ~ 2x the exposure of the fx bond market and 3/4 of all official bilateral lending
As a description of the past, the fall in headline reserves is a bit misleading. Falls in the value of US Treasuries easily could account for $400b of the drop in headline reserves (through q2), falls in the EUR, GBP and JPY could explain another $500b (through q3)
As a forecast for the future, it is much more reasonable. Intervention has picked up recently - the $20 billion fall in Korea's headline reserves in September is a case in point. That isn't all valuation changes.
The fact check here is ultimately sort of boring: neither the IMF COFER data on dollar holdings (adjusted for Treasury mark to market) or the US BoP data show official sales in the first half of the year. Q3 will likely tip the balance toward sales. (chart is trailing 4qs)
I have been struck by the fact that the decline in Asian currencies has been led by the countries with the strongest external balance sheets (Japan, Korea, Taiwan). All have substantial reserves, and/or large sovereign funds.
2/x
It isn't a secret why some currencies (India's rupee, the Thai baht) have moved less -- their central banks generally have intervened more.
Korea and Taiwan actually scaled back their intervention in July and August (the chart tho only covers data through q2)
Chinese companies (the big energy SoEs and ENN) have struck a number of long-term purchase contracts for US LNG at favorable prices, and are now reselling US gas to Europe at a large profit (while importing Russian gas at a discount). Capitalism ...
2/x
There is a geeky balance of payments angle here.
A Chinese company (a tax resident of China) buying US gas for sale to Europe is a classic example of "merchanting" -- the gas never crosses China's customs border but it should count in the balance of payments ...
3/x
The FT followed yesterday's examination of the factors pulling down China's economy, notably the property market and risks to infrastructure finance, with a look at one possible way that China could revive its economy -- support for household consumption.
. @edwardwhitenz is not exactly optimistic -- China has had ample opportunity to reform the policies that lead to high savings and low level of consumption in the past, and Beijing consistently hasn't made the most obvious policy changes.
The policy shifts that would help raise consumption in China aren't exactly a secret. Reducing out of pocket costs for access to medical care, more access to social services (and retirement benefits) for migrant workers, and the like. China is an extreme outlier in many ways.
Only Martin Wolf could summarize China's economy so perfectly in a single sentence.
"The fundamental macroeconomic problems are excess savings, its concomitant, excess investment, and its corollary, growing mountains of unproductive debt"
The original sin of China's response to the global financial crisis was that it solved one problem (excessive reliance on exports) by adding to another (excessive investment). An already exceptionally high level of investment was raised to the stratosphere.
2/
The underlying source of China's reliance on a mix of exports and investment for (rapid) growth was never addressed -- a low level of household income and corresponding weakness in household consumption.