New reality of modern warfare that was anything but unforeseeable: the 'democratization' of long-range precision strikes via cheap, hard-to-spot, hard-to-shoot down, and potentially overwhelming 'suicide' drones. And yes, this puts critical fuel and weapons storage areas at risk.
https://twitter.com/maria_avdv/status/1577553529539100673
And for every one you shoot down, you spend a valuable kinetic effector (SAM). The shot exchange $ rate is extremely lopsided, just ask the Saudis. I have written about this topic for more or less a decade. Many laughed at it, until it became too real and started moving fast.
Ukraine has used the exact same type of capability but in more improvised form to hit targets well beyond the territory it controls & into Russia, although in very small numbers. The Iranians mass produce these & we are just seeing the start of what they can supply Russia, but...
But imagine a peer state that is prepared and has the ability to produce all the components in-house? Say China. You will deal with thousands of these traveling to targets over long distances. It is the bottom of the aerial threat barrel, but it is perhaps the most vexing...
There is no man in the loop, these fly on autopilot to strike pre-defined coordinates or they fly to a loitering area to detect and attack air defense radars autonomously. As I have written about for months, Russia will turn to using suicide drones, once it has ample supplies...
As modern-day Vengence Weapons against populated areas. While nobody has a perfect crystal ball, there is a good chance we will see these used in such a way as the conflict wears on. But above all else, these relatively simple weapons have given Russia the ability to reach...
Where Russian manned airpower will not tread—far beyond the front lines. Allowing for precision strikes on targets deep inside Ukraine without the use of very expensive standoff missiles that are in dwindling supply with questionable ability to replenish stocks anytime soon....
While air defenses help in stopping these attacks, the most important thing is intelligence— as in keeping Russia from gaining critical intelligence on targets and dispersing and hiding critical supplies as much as possible so they cannot be hit. Remember...
Unless its a radar (and it is equipped specifically for the anti-radiation mission set) these cannot hit dynamic targets. Russia totally lacks this capability beyond the front lines. Only stationary, established targets are at risk. A point on a map. Although Iran's...
medium-altitude, long/medium endurance drones that are man-in-the-loop controlled and armed with munitions are meant to be able to go after dynamic targets a bit beyond the front lines, they have been few in number and/or ineffective so far. The suicide drones are the big issue..
So complicating Russia's targeting process, keeping critical items and capabilities moving around, and doing anything possible to deny them quality real-time intelligence is key. Stopping these attacks so-called 'left of launch'...
and upgraded air defenses, especially NASAMS, arrayed around critical areas where many high-value targets are located, or even high-population centers if they go the Vengence Weapon route, will be extremely important if Russia's supply of suicide drones ramps up.
*excuse any errors, long day, and thanks for reading and interacting as always.
A few other points as I am seeing some comments asking for clarification: 1.) There is a big misunderstanding about the range of these weapons as they are new to many even though they have been used effectively for years. They can travel hundreds of miles. These are fixed-wing...
gasoline-powered aircraft that usually are very efficient in their design (primarily flying wing). They are slow and can fly low along waypoints that are pre-programmed, so very hard to spot and engage even by capable air defenses...
2.) When we talk shot exchange, for the Saudis for instance, they sling multi-million dollar Patriots and million dollar AMRAAMs at them constantly. They cost thousands of dollars in most cases, not even tens of thousands. I tried to not include links in this but more here:
and here: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4…
3.) Electronic warfare is not as relevant to counter these systems as they fly autonomously on autopilot. GPS is really their only potential vulnerability there, but that is complicated. So no, in many cases, typical lower-end EW drone defense systems will not effectively....
counter them. Their attack runs are also far more abrupt than what we see with most quadcopters and that type of thing, not much time to react. There is also a terror/psychological aspect — the sound as they dive to their targets: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4…
And I am keeping things very VERY general here so everyone can access this thread and not feel lost. There are many caveats with everything mentioned, but I hope this helps answer some questions about the Shahed-136 and suicide drones in general.
You can read more about this topic in the following past posts prior to the Feb 24 invasion: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/2…
And yes, Israel pioneered this technology, from 2016: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4…
And Ukraine, some of the many articles on this topic: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u…
On defense, many say what about lasers? Yes lasers are very promising, but they can only engage one at a time and the lower the power the longer the 'dwell time' to disable/destroy a target. This defense becomes an issue for larger scale/multi-drone attacks...
High power microwave systems are perhaps better for point defense against swarms/large scale attacks as they can knock down multiple drones at a time. Drones that intercept drones are also promising, along with missiles and gun systems...
and the sensors that support them that are developed/adapted specifically for this threat. Along with EW and other non-kinetic options. You solve the problem via a layered defense by mixing and matching these countermeasures depending on the threat...
There is no one magic thing that will counter the problem efficiently and effectively, with a wide range of scalability and flexibility, alone. Just reality.
And more can be done to try and better control the components that go into these systems, especially for the threat posed by nonstate actors which have relatively easy access to these capabilities. It won't be easy, and it will upset some, but it is inevitable.
Final tweet! Also remember, that these have considerable range and can take the roundabout way to targets, making them less predictable. This also means one target can get attacked from multiple vectors near-simultaneously by multiple drones. Can complicate defenses in a big way
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