Effective monetary tightening began around the beginning of this year, as long-term rates started rising in anticipation of Fed hikes. But even long rates affect the real economy with a lag 2/
Say the lag is 6 months, which I think is conservative. Here's the 10-year rate lagged 6 months. We're just at the beginning of a large Fed-induced cooling/contraction 3/
Lots of people pointing out that August's sharp decline in the job openings/unemployment ratio still leaves us well above pre pandemic level. But how many months like August would it take to eliminate the gap? Two. 4/
Yes, the Fed was behind the curve on rising inflation. But I worry that we may be enacting the old joke about the driver who runs over a pedestrian, then tries to fix it by backing up — and runs over the guy a second time 5/
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A useful set of slides by Ramey more or less confirms one point in my earlier thread: it's very hard to get useful information from data for the past few decades, because we basically haven't been experiencing old-style monetary shocks (until now) 2/ econweb.ucsd.edu/~vramey/econ21…
A key question is how much of the effect of Fed tightening on the real economy is still in the pipeline. I would say almost all of it, both on general principles — changing real investment plans in the face of financial conditions takes time — and history 1/
Now, finding relevant history is hard. Since 1990, all US recessions have been the result of private-sector overreach (dotcom bubble, housing bubble) rather than Fed tightening, so they don't tell us much 2/
But look at the 1981-2 recession, which was a relatively pure case of the Fed hitting the economy upside the head. Long-term interest rates peaked in Sept. 1981, unemployment more than a year later 3/
OK, a few notes — and some eyeball econometrics — on why some of us are very happy about today's JOLTS report 1/
Here's the puzzle: the unemployment rate is currently about what it was on the eve of the pandemic, but underlying inflation, by whatever measure you choose, is much higher than it was then 2/
This could in principle be caused by self-fulfilling expectations of higher inflation — but there's no evidence, from surveys or market data, that this is the story 3/
Historically, big drops in breakevens have been associated not so much with fears of deflation as with market breakdowns — the TIPS markets are relatively thin, so Lehman and early pandemic stress drove prices down 2/
And this latest drop, although much smaller, has been associated with widening spreads in general 3/
Those of us who used to be on Team Transitory have been burned repeatedly, so don't want to make too much of this. But now multiple indicators that seem to show rents leveling off 1/ wsj.com/articles/rents…
Shelter is 40 percent of core CPI, so this is a pretty big deal if it persists. But why is this happening even though the labor market still looks very tight? 2/
One answer may be that much of the rent surge was a one-time shock caused by the rise of work-from-home rather than general overheating 3/ frbsf.org/economic-resea…