"An idiot could've told you there was no possibility of losing money."
"You don't get that many great opportunities. When life finally gave me one, I blew it."
"That decision cost me about $5 billion."
Why was Belridge so appealing? See thread:
Belridge owned 33K acres in Kern County. They had 3K shallow stripper wells producing 7M barrels of heavy crude a year. And these wells had three advantages:
1) Cheap finding & lifting costs 2) Exemption from price controls 3) Low-risk growth capex in EOR (steam & fracking)
These advantages produced excellent financial performance.
Belridge's 1975 results:
Revenues: $85M (23% y/y)
EBIT: $49m (57% margin)
Net profit: $25 million (31% ROE)
The valuation?
Munger paid $115 per share for Belridge in 1976, which was:
- 4x earnings
- 2x earnings net of cash
- 1x book value
He was also getting a 12% yield on his purchase price.
Why was Belridge so cheap?
Belridge didn't:
- File with the SEC
- Trade on an exchange
- Meet with outsiders
- Provide reserve estimates
They also had just 9% of the shares held by non-insiders.
How did Munger's investment perform?
In late 1979, Shell acquired Belridge for $3,665 per share.
Munger made:
- 32x his purchase price in capital gains
- 75% of his purchase price in dividends
His CAGR? +150% a year (with reinvestment)
Were there risks? Yes
- Belridge's field was in decline until 1973 (Pre-EOR)
- Belridge earned low returns before 1973
- The founding family controlled Belridge
- The CEO was an unknown quantity (Munger: [He was] eccentric and heavy-drinking. But the oil field wasn't drinking.)
Note on reserves:
Before 1978, Belridge didn't publish reserve tables. But Munger could've estimated reserves via Belridge's Form EIA 23 filing with the DOE. Even at the low-balled estimate (248M million barrels estimate vs 377M actual), Belridge was a bargain.
From another investor that was involved with Belridge:
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In 1982, Buffett bought 6% of Bayuk for his private account. His $572,907 investment produced a 50% IRR with "virtually no risk."
Here's the story…
Bayuk was the US's fourth-largest cigar maker. Their low-priced Phillies and Garcia Y Vega brands earned $3M pre-tax but "had been in decline over the past decade." Bayuk also owned $15M of securities. The board wanted to sell these assets "without paying [capital gains] taxes."
The solution? Liquidate.
On December 21, 1981, shareholders voted to (a) sell the cigar assets to American Maize, (b) convert the securities to cash and (c) liquidate the company and distribute the proceeds to shareholders.
In 1964, Buffett put $2.8M of his $17.5M fund into AMEX. AMEX grew to a 40% holding, "the largest investment the partnership ever made," and compounded at 50% for four years.
Here's the story…
"Things had never looked rosier at AMEX than they did in mid-November 1963." Traveler's checks. Charge cards. Deposits. Earnings. The stock. Everything was "growing by leaps and bounds." AMEX was a "true growth stock of prime investment quality.
But that was about to change.
On December 2, 1963, the WSJ broke a story about fraud at an AMEX subsidiary. American Express Warehousing, Ltd. issued $82M of receipts against salad oil inventory that "was either missing or had never existed." And this subsidiary had just $100K of net worth to back the claims.
A Case Study in Capital Allocation: Philadelphia & Reading
In 1955, Ben Graham took control of P&R. Over the next 12 years, Graham transformed P&R from a failing coal mine into a high-return holding company.
Here's why P&R was Buffett's
- Largest investment
- Berkshire template
P&R was "a leading producer of anthracite coal." Anthracite was a dying market that had been "artificially inflated" by a postwar boom. And the boom allowed P&R to do "pretty well from 1946 on" despite management that ran the company "like a fine old nonprofit."
Enter Ben Graham
Why'd Graham like P&R?
Three reasons: "room for smart management to make improvements"; an "overcapitalized" balance sheet and "enormous" inventories; and an $18 stock vs $2 of EPS and $32 of equity.
"It was tailored to Ben Graham's specifications as an attractive investment."
NAFI was a long-forgotten fraud. It didn’t file with the SEC or trade on an exchange, and the guy who ran it “hated stockholders.” Yet Buffett went door-to-door buying 10% of the float. Why? See below to find out.
NAFI began in 1919 as a stock promotion. The promoters sold shares to “Nebraska and Iowa farmers and small-town merchants who had little idea what it was worth.” These retail investors soon learned their shares were “worthless” and “lost hope ever seeing their money again.”
For the next 30 years, shares sat “crumbling in drawers.” But NAFI had been transformed from a fraud into a thriving business. Howard Ahmanson, the original promoter’s son, took control and “was feeding top-drawer insurance business into NAFI” through his California S&L empire.