Wanna know what it's like to be a battlefield commander & have a bridge blow up in your area of operations?
Having had that experience, under different circumstances, it is not a good day in Moscow.
A "war story" 🧵 that will provide some insight into the Kerch attack. 1/
In 2007, I assumed command of the storied @1stArmoredDiv. We would deploy to N. Iraq as "Task Force Iron," and become Multinational Division North, conducting operations in the 7 northern provinces.
Before going, we spent some time training...to include "staff training." 2/
The Division conducted 'battle drills' exercises with our staff at the simulation center at Grafenwoehr, a state of the art facility in S. Germany. During a two week period we practiced everything we thought we might see in combat under the watchful eye of trainers. 3/
The last scenarios we addressed was a potential for Al Qaida in Iraq to blow one of the many bridges in our area of operations.
My Division Chief of Staff - who was a great engineer officer - included that scenario to test our reaction to unique challenges. It was prescient. 4/
As an aside, I didn't think we would ever have to address that kind of attack.
But we'd never have to do that, I thought.
But at least it was a good drill to integrate our operations & intelligence sections while developing our planning & reaction, I thought.
Was I wrong. 5/
After the trainning, the HQs deployed to Tikrit in late September & began operations with our 30,000 US forces & 5 Iraqi Army Divisions.
Our mission was to conduct counter-insurgency, train the emerging Iraqi Army, contribute to the economic & political stability of N. Iraq. 6/
To my surprise, 2 months into our mission (in early November), AQI used a suicide truck bomb to blow a segment of the Qayyarah Bridge over the Tigris River. 7/
AQI had targeting this bridge because: 1. It was the sole east-west transport route on the upper Tigris, near Mosul 2. Blowing it disrupted transportation a& thus economics (especially for local farmers) 3. The attack would embarrass us, as it was near our base at Q-West 8/
AQI had executed a tactical target that had significant operational implications.
We had to react very quickly to counter the damage...and to counter the enemy's messaging.
The procedures we developed in training allowed us to act quickly. 9/
Within 3 days, engineers had secured the bridge & rebuilt a span. This is the initial picture, and it was harder than it looks.
While doing that, our intel teams focused on "reflections" of enemy activity in the area & found several cells of AQI. 10/
Our preparations in training contributed to success in this battle drill.
As I said, this was a tactical target that had operational repercussions.
Bridges are extremely important for military logistics & civilian travel. 11/
Which brings us to the attack on the Kerch Straight Bridge.
Unlike our situation in Iraq, this morning's attack was an operational target with strategic implications.
Qayyarah was a local bridge.
Kerch is a critical node for RU's logistics support of forces in Crimea. 12/
The targeting of Qayyarah by AQI barely generated a blip in Baghdad.
The Kerch attack is resonating in Crimea & Moscow, throughout Russia, and across the globe.
Doing it the day after Putin's 70th birthday only adds to the sting. 13/
Putin drove a truck across the newly constructed Bridge in 2018 & declared Crimea was Russian "holy land."
The targeting & the related messaging of of this attack will drive further protests against the war in Russia...and in the Autonomous Region of Crimea. 14/
W/ the Q bridge, @1stArmoredDiv "messaged" our competence to local audiences & our ability to quickly react to AQ. It worked.
UKR has already brilliantly "messaged" this strike to the world is a more decisive & immediate manner.
In Iraq, our terrific military engineers were able to quickly repair the Q Bridge.
Due to the location, the scope of the damage on both rail and road sections, & the incompetence of RU military, I don't see repairs being possible on the Kerch Bridge any time soon. 15/
This operational strike will affect future strategies of Russia and Ukraine.
As the saying goes: "forget logistics, you will lose."
RU is constantly being reminded of that & they now have fewer opportunities to adapt.
Watch the south & Putin's reaction to this strike. 16/16
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Interestingly, RU State TV now claiming it will take “two months” to get recently mobilized to the front lines in Ukraine.
Great. But will they be able to do anything? No friggin’ way.
RU may be able to train the basics of soldiering in 2 months.
But…. 1/5
-You can’t “train” combined arms warfare, especially for large formations, in 2 months
-You can’t “teach” Generals, Colonels and new Sergeants the tenets of leadership in 2 months
-You can’t “fix” a supply system that has been plagued with corruption for years in 2 months. 2/
-You can’t “coordinate” tankers, infantry, arty, intel, engineers, air forces & others for battlefield operations in 2 months
-you can’t “counter distrust” soldiers have in RU govt in 2 months
-after 60,000 dead soldiers, you can’t reverse the loss felt by RU mothers & wives 3/
A 🧵on recent media stories about US "planning reaction to Putin's potential use of nuclear weapons."
While Americans may have concerns about how Ukrainian successes may cause Putin to do more dumb things (use nukes), the US does extensive planning on these (& other) issues. 1/
1. @DeptofDefense, the Joint Staff, and several combatant commands develop "contingency plans" based on strategic guidance for all threats. See chart ⬇️ 2/
COCOM Contingency Plans (at the bottom) are written based on @POTUS & DOD guidance. Those span a spectrum of actions the military must execute, including humanitarian efforts, combat, & deterrence of/reaction to enemy use of nuclear weapons.
US society (& young men) protested the Vietnam war because they believed it was immoral and most believed it was not in the national interest.
There is more to why RU men are refusing service:
1. Most haven't been trained (they served in RU army because they had to...2/
...the choice was service or jail 2. They have no trust in RU's way of war. 3. These are not "reservist" as the US knows them. US reserves train with their units, have skills. RU have not, do not. 3. These men have seen RU's soldiers killed in droves in Ukraine. 3/
"Everything is very simple in war, but even the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction, which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war." Clausewitz, chapter 1, book 7.
Because it's Friday, here's a short 🧵 1/
I'm a big fan of Clausewitz, was introduced to him when attending the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies @us_sams as a young major in 1988.
An extremely formative 1-year course.
4 small groups of majors intensely studying theory, doctrine, history, battles & war. 2/
We debated & discussed Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet, du Picq, and others ad nauseam. We called it the "book a day club."
But "Old Dead Carl" (as we called Clausewitz) came alive for me. as it was interesting applying his Napoleonic thoughts to today's problems. 3/
Putin's announced mobilization of 300,000 "reservists" was jaw-dropping to me this morning, but not for the reason some might suspect.
Why? Because know how Russian soldiers are trained, in basic training & in their units.
A brief 🧵 on some fun facts. 1/
While I commanded US Army Europe before retiring, before that I commanded all basic & advanced soldier training for the Army (2009-11).
During that period,≈150,000 new soldiers/year at (then) 5 basic training sites & 21 advanced training locations, received training.2/
Most new US soldiers get 10 weeks of basic training (some get more at one-station unit training (OSUT) sites, like infantry, artillery, MPs). Those that don't go to OSUT travel off to different length courses for advanced training in a "specialty" (logistics, intel, etc). 3/
Let me get this straight: 1. Russia thought their "special operation" would last 3 days. 2. After 2 months of fighting with Spetsnaz, Airborne & 190+ BTGs, they achieved NONE of their Strategic, Operational or Tactical Objectives. 3. Based on #2, they decided to shift... 1/8
...their main effort to the Donbas, where they expended 70+% of their precision munitions hitting civilian targets, while failing to gain any significant military objectives. 4. Then, Putin announced RUF would secure Luhans'k & Donetsk by 15 September. 5. RU "mobilized"...2/
... the LPR & DPR militias, "recruited" prisoners, "drafted" locals, asked for soldiers from other countries & brought in the Wagner Group to execute #4. 6. But, after announcing & then delaying the Kherson referendum & under threat of a UKR offensive in Kherson...3/