Trent Telenko Profile picture
Oct 9 19 tweets 5 min read
The logistical crisis the loss of the Kerch Bridge represents for the Russian military, in the map below, is fuel.

Fuel is heavy & bulky, while jets & tanks gulp it by the ton.

The Russians no longer have a railway distribution system to deliver it to jets, tanks & trucks.
1/
The most efficient stop gap would be to use rail ferry's to deliver cistern cars to Crimea.

There are two problem with this.

The first is the queueing up of cistern cars onto a ferry is simply much lower volume compared to the Kerch bridge.

2/
The second is Russian rail ferry service stopped in 2020 & the status of the rail ferries is uncertain.

There are tweets claiming the ferries "were disposed" of since then.

So, getting those ferries back will take time.
3/
The Sevastopol Marine Trade Port (SMTP) Transloading complex #1 (PK-1) has the ability to load and unload complete rail cars.

So coastal tanker bulk transfer to cistern rail cars there is also a possibility, with some engineering effort & tankers.

4/
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_S…
Another short term option is simply to lay a Russian Army tactical pipeline across the remains of the Kerch Bridge to patch a fuel connect between the two rail networks.

See this Nov 2021 article which addresses Russian Army logistics w/pipelines.

5/
warontherocks.com/2021/11/feedin…
The tactical pipeline will be faster than the rail ferry/tanker options, but simply won't deliver the same tonnage of fuel into the now isolated Crimea rail network distribution system

A commercial semi tractor trailer fuel truck shuttle is not an option as the remaining
6/
...two lanes of the Kerch bridge has a serious amount of blast damage.

Plus those lanes will be needed at some point to stage heavy cranes to repair the rail bridge.

7/
The idea that the Russian Army has the tactical fuel trucks to patch the railway fuel distribution gap across the Kerch road bridge lanes is risible.

The "Feeding the Bear" article up thread makes that clear.

8/
The two major problems with these patchwork repairs is time and fuel volume.

Taken together all of these patchworks together don't provide enough fuel and they won't all be quick.
9/
Russia's current Tsar seems to have chosen the FAFO** option of minor surface repairs and pushing fully laden trains over the heavily fire damaged Kerch bridge until it collapses under the strain, reasons.

** (F--k Around & Find Out)
10/

Now let's explain the reasons.

Fully laden semi tanker truck fires in the USA cause result in interstate highway bridges being condemned, demolished & replaced because the released heat load anneals the steel rebar and causes spalling of the concrete
11/
nbcdfw.com/news/local/dal…
This is something that happened on a pretty regular basis in the USA and there are now multiple construction firms that specialize in good, quick but very expensive repairs of such structures using the US free market of precast concrete structures.

12/
cbsnews.com/losangeles/new…
The Pine Island to Cape Coral temporary bridge that was built in a week after Hurricane Ian by Honc Marine is an example of these firms in action.

This is the classic industrial quality trade off triangle of "Good, fast, cheap, pick two."

13/
rumble.com/v1mt88g-desant…
The toxic waste dump of an economy under Putin's government of thieves simply cannot support such construction firms.

There is no free market of precast concrete structures in the Russian economy because the risk of government theft of said structures is too high.

14/
I've detailed this 'corruption-construction problem' with the Russian economy back in early April 2022 in a couple of threads.

This is one:

15/
So Putin is going the FAFO route with the Kerch railway bridge to restore the fuel flow ASAP because he has no other realistic political choice.

The problem for Tsar Putin is politics can't cheat either structural physics or wartime military logistics.

17/
Russia's air bases in Crimea are going to run out of fuel at current sortie rates or simply fly less.

The Russian fuel supplies past the Donbass border are slowly drying up, immobilizing Russian military vehicle traffic in Ukraine's south.

18/
And we are all going to be treated to the spectacle of the Kerch railway bridge collapse in the near future with a loaded train falling into the strait.

I've reserved some popcorn, waiting to be popped, just for that event.

19/19 End

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More from @TrentTelenko

Oct 9
While I agree with @noclador list below, I don't agree with his choice, ATACMS.

We have both Ukrainian media & Washington Post on-line saying it was a Ukrainian SBU truck bomb.

1/5
This is the Ukrainian media source:

The SBU is behind the blowing up of the Crimean bridge - source
Antonina Dolomanzhi
13:51, 08.10.22

2/5
unian.net/war/za-podryvo….
And this is a later article from unian -dot- ua referencing the Wash Post:

"According to UNIAN sources in law enforcement agencies and The Washington Post portal, the operation was organized by Ukrainian special services."

3/5
unian.ua/war/na-krymsko…
Read 5 tweets
Oct 8
The Kerch Bridge has been heavily damaged by a large explosion. One of the two road bridge spans is in the water, the second road lane has blast damage and a cistern train of fuel was set on fire in the same blast in multiple places.

Implications 🧵

1/
The first and most glaringly obvious implication:

In terms of strategic effect, this was a small 🇺🇦covert operation with gigantic systemic effects.

2/
2nd implication.

Such an operation could not originate inside Russian territory.

Crimea isn't Russian territory.

It is occupied Ukrainian territory that has a 🇺🇦friendly population as a base for such a covert operation.
3/
Read 22 tweets
Oct 7
The comparison General Hertling is making here is actually mind blowingly worse than he knows.🤯🤯🤯

2022 Russian Army versus 1980's Iraqi Army Artillery logistics thread🧵

1/
The highest single Russian artillery shell in a day count Ukraine has provided to date is 65,000 shells in May 2022 as Siervodonesk & Lysychansk were over run.

That sounds like a large number.

It isn't.

2/
My research quest for the Soviet/Russian Cold War ammunition budget involved researching the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980's since Iraq used Soviet guns & used oil money to buy ammo.

Documents relating to Iraqi artillery use during Iran's Karbala-5 offensive were mind blowing
3/ Image
Read 22 tweets
Oct 5
The Russo-ukrainian War is a railway logistics war, so people need to bookmark this map from @xaliu5👇

The denial of the Snihurivka railway hub to the Russians cuts Kherson city proper from rail logistics through Nova Kokhovka & strands engines & rolling stock between

1/5
Snihurivka and either Nova Kokhovka or Kherson city proper.**

**The Russians have put a temporary bypass at Nova Kokhovka by filling the locks with soil for trucks. I haven't seen anything about rail traffic there being similarly restored.

2/5
The Snihurivka railway hub is also of strategic importance for AFU railway artillery logistics supporting future operations.

It's capture will give AFU superior lateral logistics to the Russians across the Kherson front.

4/5
Read 4 tweets
Oct 4
Russian "Good Will Gesture" in progress in Northern Kherson.

Key Ukrainian artillery max range #'s.

55 km - 2S7 Pion 203mm gun
50 km -- Excalibur guided shell range in a 155mm 52 caliber gun
40 km -- 2A36 Giatsint-B 152mm Gun w/OFARS & NATO 155mm 52 cal gun w/RAP shells

1/8
30 km -- 155mm/39 Caliber RAP shells

Those ranges are the key distances AFU needs to be within to use that artillery on the Nova Kakhovka dam road/rail bottleneck in Russian logistics.

Russia lacks anything that can stop artillery shells.
2/8
The closer Ukraine gets, the more artillery systems can exert "fire control" on that bottleneck.

The pacing items here for the Russians are fuel and ammunition, in that order.
3/8
Read 8 tweets
Oct 3
This is the first coherent Russian description of AFU's light motorized forces playing Cossack in the Russian rear areas.

Please carefully note these forces are using small UAV's to dominate the Russian rear area battle space.
1/
What I find highly amusing is I was expecting exactly this pattern to appear because I spent time doing a survey of Ukrainian music videos👇

Blood Lands Rising! — A Music Video Tour of Modern Ukrainian National Identity
July 1, 2019 by Trent Telenko

2/
chicagoboyz.net/archives/60102…
The two videos that relate to AFU's light motorized Cossacks @wartranslated mentioned are first :

Riffmaster – Тихо прийшов, Тихо пішов”, або “Пісня спеціального значення”

3/
Read 15 tweets

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