The chaotic and barbaric shelling of Ukrainian cities looks like an act of desperation. Rather than pursuing a military purpose, it is rather meant to solve the rapidly internal problem 1/8
First, these attacks are precisely something the radicals were demanding long time ago. Putin was ignoring these demands for quite a while, and now he yielded to them immediately after the blowup of the bridge 2/8
Second, they are preceded by appointment of Surovikin – again, something the radicals were pushing through for a long time. This is not typical of Putin to give in to pressure so evidently – and now these people aren’t even afraid to claim they have forced Putin’s hand 3/8
It shows how dependent Putin has recently become on this hawkish part of the military. More importantly, with this decisions Putin also wholly embraces the radicals’ theory of victory 4/8
And the theory these people nurture is that they key for victory is awe. Basically, you have to scare the opponent to death, and that will be enough for it to surrender 5/8
That’s why what they are celebrating now is not some military achievement (there is none) but rather the suffering of Ukrainians. This theory is wrong in the Ukrainian case, and that is something the hawks are still to learn 6/8
This theory most probably means pushing up the escalation ladder – every new crime will be regarded as insufficiently scary. Putin would probably prefer to control the pace of escalation, for he is more interested in a protracted war and the West losing interest in Ukraine 7/8
However, at this point it is Ukraine who controls the escalation dynamic, Putin is only reacting to it. We are probably heading to a point when there will be no escalatory steps left. This could be the endgame 8/8
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There will probably appear very soon some poll numbers suggesting that Russians are incredibly enthusiastic about annexation. This was the case in 2014 with annexation of Crimea: on the Russian territory proper polls functioned as ersatz-plebiscites on admission 1/21
Several concepts that might be helpful in interpreting Russian polls.
1. Depoliticization. Almost all Russians have deep scorn and contempt for politics. Those who believe politics is meant to make society more just or free are usually considered childish or outright insane 3/21
A brief summary of what current mobilization is from the political viewpoint.
It is, of course, not partial at all, but I would still call it targeted/selective, and therefore not total.
There is a clear asymmetry in terms of groups affected 1/10
In the villages and little towns roughly 3% are mobilized, which is up to 10% of adult men (elderly excluded). The numbers tend to be higher among ethnic minorities that have even less real political representation and leverage compared to other Russians 2/10
In the bigger cities the number decreases to 1% of the population. In Moscow, it is likely to be somewhere at 0,1%. 300,000 looks plausible as a figure. There are strong rumors that this is only the first wave, and the total number will be above 1,000,000 3/10
Many requests to explain how Russians are likely to react to Putin’s speech.
Basic fact: the majority of Russians only care about their everyday life.
Hence, the reaction will depend on whether these decisions will affect everyday lives 1/5
This is unclear yet. Putin can very well continue with his piecemeal strategy. He created legal framework to extend it and stop/compensate for the leaks in his military. In that case, few people will be affected. 2/5
We witness a rush to leave the country/break a leg etc. However, the borders are not closed. It could be that people are allowed to leave and then return freely when they realize there is no imminent danger – as it happened in February.
Several points on recent dramatic developments in Armenia. They are largely overlooked but provide evidence of a catastrophic collapse of Russian foreign policy in a hugely important region🧵1/10
Point #1. Azerbaijan is not Ukraine, and Armenia is not Russia. Armenia is a democratic republic where large-scale protests against the government are normal. Azerbaijan is a despotic state. Azerbaijan has a common border with Russia, while Armenia doesn’t 2/10
Thinking in blocs is not useful, we’re not warming up for a sequel of the Cold War between Good Democracies and Evil Autocracies. World remains a complicated place 3/10
Since there is a lot of interest in what is the reaction to the recent military setbacks in Russia, a🧵with an update.
There are three distinct groups in Russia:
1/25
1) radicals – a sizeable but extremely loud minority that actively supports war, is engaged, follows the news and in rare cases even goes to the frontlines (15-25%). This is the audience of the milbloggers, Telegram channels and vampires like Solovyov or Skabeeva 2/25
2) dissenters – a sizeable minority that categorically opposes the war. It is banned from Russian-based media and generally depressed (20-25%) 3/25
I have been traveling a lot across Europe recently. Everywhere it was obvious that there is a major war in Europe, with one exception: Moscow.
A🧵on how Moscow has changed over the last month and how what I call the “normalization party” is emerging 1/19
2/19 Visible impact of war on everyday life is still very limited. After the two weeks of initial panic, the economy cheered up. People who rushed to buy foreign currency and withdraw cash are now blaming themselves for not trusting enough in Putin 2/19 economist.com/finance-and-ec…
Some stores have already reopened, others promise to reopen soon. Customers don’t care about legal details 3/19 diyinternational.com/content/news/2…