Planners analyze & assess:
-enemy launch platforms (land, sea, air)
-potential "tracks" (the anticipated route the enemy missile will take)
-what they enemy wants to hit
-the critical thing being defended (e.g., airfield, port, infrastructure, specific building, forces). 9/
-enemy launch platforms (land, sea, air)
-potential "tracks" (the anticipated route the enemy missile will take)
-what they enemy wants to hit
-the critical thing being defended (e.g., airfield, port, infrastructure, specific building, forces). 9/
Here's the point:
It's impossible to line a bunch of ADA systems long the 2500-mile Ukrainian border & expect them to stop missiles launched from RU subs in the Azov, or dropped from RU bombers circling 1500 miles away, or land-based RU missile batteries in RU. 10/
It's impossible to line a bunch of ADA systems long the 2500-mile Ukrainian border & expect them to stop missiles launched from RU subs in the Azov, or dropped from RU bombers circling 1500 miles away, or land-based RU missile batteries in RU. 10/
What makes it even harder:
RU is not aiming at "critical infrastructure" or "military targets," (which, in an area like Ukraine would require literally hundreds of ADA systems), RU is striking random civilian targets - to include playgrounds! - all over the country. 11/
RU is not aiming at "critical infrastructure" or "military targets," (which, in an area like Ukraine would require literally hundreds of ADA systems), RU is striking random civilian targets - to include playgrounds! - all over the country. 11/
Wait a minute, you might say, what about Israel? Give Ukraine the IRON DOME!
Iron Dome was designed - over several years - for a small area (a couple of key cities) to counter rockets (not missiles) coming from two specific areas: Gaza & S. Lebanon. 12/
vox.com/22435973/israe…
Iron Dome was designed - over several years - for a small area (a couple of key cities) to counter rockets (not missiles) coming from two specific areas: Gaza & S. Lebanon. 12/
vox.com/22435973/israe…
Many don't realize modern ADA systems consist of many elements, are extremely difficult to operate, & exceedingly tough to repair & keep running.
Launchers, phased-array radars, command & control centers.
Again, extremely expensive, hard to maintain, difficult to learn.
13/
Launchers, phased-array radars, command & control centers.
Again, extremely expensive, hard to maintain, difficult to learn.
13/
In the US Military, these Army ADA capabilities are 1 part of a bigger, joint (Air Force, Navy, SpaceForce) system of systems that counter incoming missile threats. 14/
Bottom line:
Just like it was difficult to stop Saddam from launching SCUDs, and as much as we want to help Ukraine, it's challenging to completely counter all Putin's war crimes that unfortunately include launching missile strikes against civilian targets. 15/15
Just like it was difficult to stop Saddam from launching SCUDs, and as much as we want to help Ukraine, it's challenging to completely counter all Putin's war crimes that unfortunately include launching missile strikes against civilian targets. 15/15
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