Since March,we've been tracking Belarusian military activity. There are some important points to be made. Apart from @MotolkoHelp and @Rochan_CONS, no one else does this as the Belarusian Armed Forces are relatively weak, and apart from Luka's rhetoric, there's nothing there. 1/
The Belarusian Armed Forces are largely a mobilisational force. Their manpower is at around 50-60% of the required peacetime strength. To reach 100%, they'd need to mobilise at least 20k men. Operationally, they are subordinated to the Russian Western MD. 2/
They don't have Land Forces Command, and they do not conduct exercises above battalion level, but even these are rare. They mostly train platoons and companies. More forces are deployed for Russia-organised drills such as Zapad or Union Shield. 3/
Currently, they maintain some presence near the border with Ukraine (1k km long). Size varies depending on the source. Ukrainians claim Belarusians deployed up to 7 BTGs, but we assess these are actually CTGs, which would correspond with their level of training and capability. 4/
But,since April, Belarusian exercise tempo has been the highest since the end of the Cold War. Minsk tested all capabilities as if it was preparing to go to war: the creation of territorial def battalions, mobilisation, and postal service to deliver orders (and draft notices?) 5/
You name it, they tested it. The "problem" is that these drills were, again, small and did not usually go beyond a city or an oblast. But it allowed them to see what works and what does not. 6/
There are three possible explanations behind this behaviour: 1 ) Prep for a NATO attack 2) To tie up Ukrainian forces near the border to prevent their deployment to other areas 3) Prep for an attack on Ukraine. 7/
Currently, we do not know which scenario is more likely, although our focus is primarily on the latter two. The Belarusian regime is more secretive than its Russian counterpart, so we will need to be reactive to what Minsk does. It is very difficult to forecast anything 8/
However, given that the Belarusian Armed Forces are a mobilisation force, given they would need to deploy a lot of personnel towards the border, create concentration areas, etc., I am certain we will be able to pick up changes in the Belarusian posture 9/
and provide strategic warning when an attack could happen (if at all). 10/end
One more thing: In recent weeks we have seen increasingly threatening but still defensive Belarusian rhetoric towards Ukraine: "Don't attack or else". This could be a prep for a false flag attack. 11/end
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Kharkiv Oblast is either fully liberated or will soon be liberated. I think that just as Russians could not recover from losses suffered north or Kyiv, which ultimately proved determinantal to their failures elsewhere in the second stage of this war, 1/
I think the loss of equipment in Kharkiv may decimate Russian offensive combat potential. Or in other words, combined with the UAF initiative, with what they currently have, the Russian ability to wage any type of offensive is probably non-existent over the medium term (+6m). 2/
It is now important to look beyond Kharkiv. UAF has the momentum to carry forward. The obvious choice is to move into the Luhansk Oblast. It's important to note that Moscow recognised LPR and DPR within their administrative borders. UAF could very soon enter this territory. 3/
Ukraine Conflict Monitor: It is important to note that most of the best Russian formations (or what is left of them) had in recent weeks been deployed to the Kherson Oblast, which means that proxies and Wanger mercenaries are doing most of the fighting. 1/5 (data source @DefMon3)
This especially pertains to the most neuralgic areas in the Donetsk Oblast. The frontline between Kharkiv and Zaporozhihia is therefore deprioritised as long as the situation in the Kherson Oblast is not stabilised. This has three consequences. 2/5
Po 1. od ponad miesiąca mówiłem, że duża ofensywa a tym kierunku jest mało prawdopodobna. Po 2. Teraz dużej ofensywy nie widzę. Po 3. Nadal upieram się że atak mógł wyjsc za wcześnie, a data jego rozpoczęcia nie była decyzją stricte wojskową i podjętą przez SG.
Po 4. Ukraincy nie przekazują żadnych informacji, aby w przypadku wtopy jeszcze bardziej nie pogorszyć swojej sytuacji (uważam że FR ma dobre rozpoznanie ma tym kierunku wiec wie jakimi siłami i środkami dysponują SZ UA). Po 5. nie wiemy jakie tak naprawdę cele postawił Kijów.
Ciężko jest wiec określić czy jest sukces, czy porażka. Jest tez na to za wczesnie. Po 6. Z perspektywy osoby, która patrzy na to z boku, widzę juz oznaki wyczerpania UKR potencjału ofensywnego. Ale dużo zależy,czy i ile wejdzie rezerw do boju i czy to jest na pewno kierunek...
Not quite. Since 2019 a lot has been done to force company and battalion commanders to show leadership and “tactical flexibility” on the battlefield. This has probably been one of the largest departures from the Soviet era thinking on a tactical level since the end of the ColdWar
Surely, you cannot train subunits’ commanders to show ingenuity in three years, especially given such heavy legacy. Yet, the process started and was abruptly stopped by the war. The fact that so many high-level commanders have been killed probably means that they don’t think..
Low level commanders can get job done. And I am not surprised.
From today's Ukraine Conflict Monitor: On 01APR2022, Ukraine's General Staff reported that Russia controlled Izium with elements of the 1st Guard Tank Army and the 20th Guard Combined Arms Army. @capellaspace SAR acquired 2305Z 03APR2022 shows Russian ground force positions ..1/4
in prepared fighting positions south of the city. These positions were north of the pontoon bridges. With elements being redeployed from around Kyiv and Chernihiv, it is expected that Izium, and the Kharkiv region more generally, could be reinforced. 2/4
Concurrently, a part of the original group that captured the city is now probing defences towards Nova Dmytrivka and Barvinkove. Russian operational pace appears to be high as there seem to be relatively few breaks between various stages of tactical operations. 3/4
A quick round-up of this weekend's events. 1) We are seeing more equipment being moved to the border with Ukraine. Clearly, Russians are preparing 4-5 staging areas from Belarus to Crimea. 2) We are seeing more aircraft and helos coming into Belarus and Western Russia.
In a typical fashion, Russians are using reserve airbases (Luninets and Novoozernoe) to move airframes closer to the frontline (this actually also refers to land forces ->easy to supply with helos and aircraft).
This week Russia's reportedly to start its Grom strategic nuclear force exercise. It'll test all legs of Russia’s nuclear triad and probably theatre-range systems. If an attack on Ukraine happens soon, the exercise could be used as a deterrent against Ukrainian or NATO's response