The #IranRevolution has made clear that Iranians despise their regime.
I'm looking at some Iran commentators to assess what they conveyed to Western audiences over the years.
Today: What the #IranLobby said about Qassem Soleimani
2/ To start, Soleimani's background: in short, he was a mass murderer.
> he & other IRGC commanders demanded that Prez Khatami crush the Iran's student protesters in 1999
> His Quds Force carried out attacks in Thailand, New Delhi, Lagos, and Nairobi
3/
> he was behind many of the IED attacks in Iraq.
> killed tens of thousands, including women and children, in Syria.
As soon as the #IranRevolution began, one of the first acts of revolutionaries, in his hometown, was to rip down his picture.
4/ So, what was the take of some of the Iran "experts" in the West, many of whom are quoted by the media?
Mr. Trita Parsi, formerly of NIAC & now of Quincy Institute, say that Soleimani was actually trying to reduce tensions! Yes, blessed be the peacemakers!
5/ Here is Trita Parsi again claiming that Iran (by which I assume he means the Iranian public) has become more united as result of the grief of Soleimani's killing by Trump.
This is a recurring theme in the "expert" analysis, as you will see.
6/ Another point repeatedly made by Parsi & his associates was that killing Soleimani sets us on a path to war with Iran. As the new head of NIAC, Mr. Jamal Abdi, phrased it, the killing of Soleimani was a "Franz Ferdinand moment", igniting a world war.
7/ Of course, the prediction ended up being totally wrong. It was the IRI's *claim* that war was inevitable (a claim Parsi, Abdi and others dutifully echoed.)
The only "hard revenge" Iran got on Soleimani was the killing of 176 innocent people aboard civilian flight #PS752.
8/ Here is Ms. Azadeh Moaveni, a journalism prof at @nyu_journalism, formerly of @CrisisGroup, and regular contributor to the @nytimes & @NewYorker, on how "massively popular" and "admired" Soleimani was.
9/ Negar Mortazavi, a pundit regularly in Western media, portrayed Soleimani as a "heroic underdog" killed in "cowardly fashion" (like Imam Hossein, a story Shi'a Muslims would know well), & claimed Iranians were "outraged" and would mourn him in a "rare show of national unity".
10/ Here is Ms. Assal Rad, Research Dirctor at NIAC. I have to devote several tweets to her statements about Soleimani.
Soleimani's death stirred "nationalist feelings" best captured in song. He was mourned by "millions".
11/ Ms. Rad disseminated a University of Maryland poll (the same polling company that recently said people had high hopes for Raisi) claiming that Soleimani "has continuously been 'the most popular Iranian public figure'" who will now be "revered as a martyr" by the public.
12/ The killing was awful, according to Ms. Rad, that Iranians "won't soon forget" the "historical moment" of his killing. Makes sense since, according to Ms. Rad, Soleimani was "seen as [the] nation's bodyguard".
13/ Echoing the earlier sentiment of Negar Mortazavi, Ms. Rad, too, draws from Shi'a theology, comparing Soleimani to Imam Hossein (a figure whose killing, in the Shi'a mind, represents the ultimate act of cruelty.)
14/ Ms. Rad also conveyed anecdotal evidence from her "family & friends", reiterating her earlier claim that Soleimani was a nation "bodyguard" whose killing wounded our [query who is included in 'our'] "national pride".
15/ The reporting and analysis of Ms. Farnaz Fassihi of the @nytimes also merits a mention. She noted that "millions" attended Soleimani's funeral in a show of "genuine" grief.
16/ Ms. Fassihi also echoed themes you've seen earlier: the killing of Soleimani would "[unite] Iranians of all stripes" and would take the "region to the brink of war."
She told her massive readership that even "dissidents & activists" were at "Gen. Soelimani's funeral."
17/ This analysis found its way into her actual reporting in the @nytimes.
She said that "Iran unites in millions to mourn Gen Soleimani" and that he was "universally admired" and had "near cult figure status."
18/ I'd worked on this thread, not knowing that @y_fazeli would be doing something similar, so I urge you to also read his thread on the topic of "“Qassem Check" (i.e. your ability to tell a lot about commentators based on how they wrote about Soleimani.)
19/ I write these threads for several reasons: (1) so maybe Western media will see them & question why these ppl, and not others with a more accurate understanding of the mood in Iran, were platformed; &(2) to remind Western leaders & public that they were lied to for years. /END
۱/ دیروز نوشتم که سیاستی که برای دادخواهی در فردای پس از پیروزی انقلاب نیاز داریم به جای «نه میبخشیم و نه فراموش میکنیم» باید «کمیسیون حقیقت همراه با عفو و بخشش» باشد. در پاسخ به سوالات و انتقادات میخواهم که دربارهی این بیشتر توضیح دهم.
۲/ اول میخواهم درباره زندگینامه و پیشینه خودم نکاتی را یادآوری کنم. خانواده من با اعدام و شکنجه و زندان در دهه شصت از هم پاشیده شد. سالهای کودکیام به ملاقات تعدادی از بستگان شکنجهشدهام در اوین، گوهردشت و قزلحصار گذشت....
۳/ …و در ۲۰ سال گذشته، تلاش کردهام تا با قربانیان و خانوادههای بازمانده برای جلب توجه جهانی به جنایات رژیم همکاری کنم.
دلیل بازگویی پیشینهام این است که بگویم بیش از هر چیز خواهان محاکمهی کسانی هستم که خانوادهام را نابود کردند. کمیتهچیهایی که عزیزانم را دستگیر کردند،…
🧵۱. من واقعا اطلاع ندارم که اپوزسیون متحد خواهد شد و #ائتلاف_اپوزیسیون شکل خواهد گرفت یا نه. ولی اگر قرار باشد این اتفاق بیفتد قطعا باید برای آن برنامهریزی داشت.
در این رشته توییت به این پرداختهام که چه باید کرد که ائتلاف موثر باشد.
۲. بنظر من اپوزیسیون باید فعالیتهای پیش روی خود را در دو فاز مجزا ببیند: ۱- فاز انقلاب و ۲- فاز انتقال
۳. امروز به بررسی فاز اول میپردازم. ولی باور دارم که تصمیماتی که در فاز انقلاب گرفته میشود، به شدت بر فاز انتقال تاثیر خواهد گذاشت. (به عنوان مثال، یک انقلاب خشونتآمیز، دوره انتقال متفاوتی در پی خواهد داشت تا انقلابی خشونت پرهیز.
🧵* 1/Why we need an opposition coalition comprised of figures inside & outside Iran, and why we need it urgently: a message to leaders of the opposition, including those reluctant to take up the mantle
[* A translation of the thread below, for friends who requested it ]
2/ Everyone has their reasons for why a coaltion is necessary. I see three reasons for it. But before stating them, let me say that I don't think forming this coalition is a "political" (or, more accurately, "partisan") act. It is a civil act.
3/ I believe that b/c the goal of the coalition isn't to have one's preferred faction win power. It's not a left-wing or right-wing move. Its only purpose is to ensure that this regime is toppled in the most peaceful way possible so that Iranians can choose what comes next.
🧵۱/ چرا ما به ائتلافی از اپوزیسیون متشکل از چهرههای داخل و خارج از ایران نیاز داریم و چرا این نیاز فوری و اضطراری است: پیامی برای رهبران اپوزیسیون، بخصوص آنانی که تمایلی به پوشیدن ردای رهبری ندارند.
۲/ هر کس دلایلی برای ضرورت ایجاد ائتلاف در اپوزیسیون دارد. من سه دلیل عمده بر ضرورت چنین ائتلافی میبینم. اما پیش از بیان دلایلم، لازم میدانم تاکید کنم که به نظر من تشکیل یک جبهه ائتلافی کاری «سیاسی» یا دقیقتر بگویم «حزبی» نیست. بلکه یک کار مدنی است.
۳/ دلیل باورم این است که هدف این ائتلاف به قدرت رسیدن حزب مورد نظر شخص نیست. همچنین حرکتی در جهت طیف چپ یا راست سیاسی نیست. تنها هدفش این است که کمک کند رژیم جمهوری اسلامی به صلحآمیزترین راه ممکن سقوط کند تا مردم ایران بتوانند برای آینده پس از جمهوریاسلامی تصمیم بگیرند.
1/ A few days ago, I criticized @DokhiFassihian for her long-ago involvement with NIAC. But she's very open with her criticism now 👇 & a trusted friends in the human rights community tells me that she has aince been a solid voice for human rights protections in Iran, including..
2/... with respect to the establishment of the UN special rapporteur on Iran.
It's not my place, and I have no authority, to absolve anyone of anything. But my personal drive in talking about these issues has always been accountability, not vindictiveness.
3/ The goal should be to get people of good faith to genuinely recognize why their involvement with the #IranLobby was harmful and to take steps to rectify harms they may have caused.
Based on what I've been told and what I see, Ms. Fassihian meets that test.