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@james_acton32

Oct 12

<THREAD>Sorry, but nuclear deterrence is a two-way street. Just as NATO’s nuclear weapons deter Russia, so Russia’s deter us.

This isn’t fair or just. But it's the reality of life under the shadow of the Bomb. Ignoring the risk of escalation is a recipe for catastrophe. (1/17)

Nuclear deterrence has been a mixed blessing during the Ukraine war.

On the plus side, I’m sure it’s been a major factor in dissuading Putin from launching strikes on NATO to try to interdict equipment on its way to Ukraine.

Unfortunately, Russia also has nukes. (2/17)

Biden’s openly expressed concerns about “Armageddon” are likely limiting the extent of U.S. support to Ukraine.

The funny thing is that many of his critics are, in other contexts, strong believers in nuclear deterrence. (3/17)

https://twitter.com/kaitlancollins/status/1578182142315532288?s=20&t=KcWad4yQOAl_AVzyxB8XFQ

Read 17 tweets

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@james_acton32

Sep 21

<THREAD>How should we interpret Putin's latest nuclear threat?

BLUF: Don't read it like a lawyer; read it like the parent of a petulant child. The general mood it conveys is more important than the specific words. (1/n)

en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…

Many people are parsing Putin's words for consistency with existing policy on the assumption that any difference results from careful deliberation and indicates the precise circumstances in which Russia would resort to nuclear use.

I think this is a mistake. (2/n)

First, I strongly doubt that Putin knows the precise circumstances in which he would resort to nuclear use. From my experience, real politicians simply don't think that way. (3/n)

Read 8 tweets

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@james_acton32

Sep 6

@iaeaorg

<THREAD>Some initial thoughts on reading the @iaeaorg report about its inspection of Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

BLUF: This situation is still very dangerous but there are some near-term steps to reduce the risk. (1/n)

https://twitter.com/iaeaorg/status/1567156554691973122

@iaeaorg

First off, hats off to the @iaeaorg inspectors and @rafaelmgrossi. This mission was seriously dangerous (the plants was shelled while the team was there). Moreover, the report pulls no punches; it is blunt, clear, and damning. (2/n)

@gbrumfiel

I won't give you a Twitter summary of the report (@gbrumfiel has a good one). The bottom line is very clear: None of the seven pillars of safety are fully intact at the plant, resulting in a real chance of a serious accident. (3/n)

https://twitter.com/gbrumfiel/status/1567154692056023041?s=20&t=-occ0kAQD_x_J_mTPBEf3g

Read 12 tweets

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@james_acton32

Jul 25

@KatieBoLillis

<THREAD>Why I doubt that Chinese cell phone equipment could disrupt U.S. nuclear command and control (even if it could be used for espionage).

My take on yesterday’s @KatieBoLillis/@cnn story. (1/n)

cnn.com/2022/07/23/pol…

According to the story, “the FBI determined [Huawei] equipment [on cell towers] was capable of capturing and disrupting highly restricted Defense Department communications,” including for “command and control with the nuclear triad.” (2/n)

The idea that this equipment may be used for general espionage seems entirely possible to me. But I am skeptical that it could disrupt (or frankly even intercept) messages sent to U.S. nuclear forces. (3/n)

Read 17 tweets

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@james_acton32

May 5

A nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile wouldn't be developed to meet well-defined military requirements. On the contrary, its supporters are developing requirements to justify the weapon.

This is clear from the way the justification for SLCM-N has changed. (1/n)

Back in 2018, when the Trump administration announced its plan to pursue SLCM-N, facilitating arms control was a major justification for the weapon. (Essentially SLCM-N was trade bait for an agreement with Russia.) (2/n)

media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/20…

Now Strategic Command is essentially arguing the exact opposite--that SLCM-N is valuable because it isn't accountable! (Quite why non-accountable weapons deter less well than accountable ones isn't explained.) (3/n)

https://twitter.com/Leone_EXM/status/1521959742100418561?s=20&t=tQHT3JEXBA7XAnG5tjDcCw

Read 6 tweets

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@james_acton32

Mar 4

https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1499539732182802436

Short thread on the dangers of the fire at Zaporizhzhya NPP.

As of 8am this morning, according to Ukraine's regulator, three of six reactors were connected to the grid; the other three were offline. However, ALL the units will need cooling if they have any fuel inside. (1/n)

https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1499539732182802436

I assume that the three operational reactors have now been scrammed (switched off). In this case, all six reactors will be reliant on external power for cooling. (2/n)

A fire could damage the connection to the national power grid (if it was still intact after the shelling). It could also threaten backup power supplies (including emergency diesel generators and diesel supplies). (3/n)

Read 11 tweets

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