The theme of Belarusian military threats to Ukraine is making its way into the discourse again.
Our @TheStudyofWar report from yesterday assesses Belarusian forces likely won't conduct a ground attack against Ukraine, nor will Russian forces likely attack from Belarus.
Thread.
Russian and Belarusian forces remain unlikely to attack Ukraine from the north despite Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's October 10 announcement that Belarus and Russia agreed to deploy the Union State’s Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) —a strategic formation...
of Russian and Belarusian units tasked with defending the Union State. Lukashenko stated that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on October 7 on an unspecified “deployment” of the Russian-Belarusian RGV in “connection with the escalation on the western borders...
of the Union State” but did not clearly define the deployment’s parameters. Lukashenko stated that over a thousand Russian personnel will deploy to Belarus and that a Russian-Belarusian group began forming on October 8.
The Russian component of any RGV formations in Belarus will likely be comprised of low-readiness mobilized men or conscripts who likely will not pose a significant conventional military threat to Ukraine.
The Russian component of the RGV is comprised of elements of the 1st Guard Tank Army, 20th Combined Arms Army, and airborne units– formations that have all sustained heavy combat losses in Ukraine and have a severely reduced combat capacity.
A Kyiv Post reporter claimed that Russian soldiers are deploying to Belarus en masse via cattle railcars without mechanized equipment on October 10—a characterization consistent with ISW's assessment.
ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian reports from late September of Belarus preparing to accept 20,000 mobilized Russian men indicate that Russia hopes to use Belarusian military facilities and infrastructure to hold and potentially train newly mobilized Russian forces...
but that it remains exceedingly unlikely that these are leading indicators of imminent Belarusian involvement in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf. understandingwar.org/backgrounder/r…
The Kremlin may seek to use additional Russian forces in Belarus to fix Ukrainian forces near Kyiv and prevent their redeployment elsewhere to participate in counter-offensives.
We've also previously assessed that Lukashenko cannot afford the domestic ramifications of Belarusian involvement in Ukraine.
We also assess that Russia does not have the ability to form a ground strike force from scratch or from existing units in Belarus quickly.
The Ukrainian General staff is remaining clear-eyed about this and reported that it has not observed indicators of 🇷🇺 forces forming offensive groups in Belarus and explicitly stated “there is no threat of an attack from the territory of the Republic of Belarus as of October 10.”
/End
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We expanded Ukrainian counteroffensives around Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, given multiple Russian reports and geolocated imagery indicating Ukrainian advances around Lyman.
1. We expanded Ukrainian counteroffensives to Yampil and Drobysheve, Donetsk Oblast, given geolocated footage showing Ukrainian forces in both settlements. Donetsk People’s Republic leader Denis Pushilin reported on September 30 that Yampil and Drobysheve are “not fully” ...
1. We expanded Ukrainian counteroffensives to Petropavlivka in Kharkiv Oblast given the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack in the direction of Petropavlivka on September 24. Geolocated combat footage posted on September 23 shows...
Ukrainian forces destroying a Russian tank east of Petropavlivka, supporting this assessment.
1. We recessed the Russian control line from the Oskil River closer to Borova, Kharkiv Oblast, and recoded the remaining area as Ukrainian counteroffensives based on Russian claims that Ukrainian forces crossed the Oskil river near Borova on September 13.
We recoded the entirety of the all of Russian assessed advances and control of terrain north and west of the Oskil River as Ukrainian counteroffensives on September 11. Ukrainian forces are likely still clearing northern Kharkiv Oblast but Russian forces have largely withdrawn.
The Russian Ministry of Defense’s daily briefing map confirmed on September 11 that Russian forces are withdrawing from settlements around Kharkiv City, in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and settlements on the western bank of the Oskil River.
For context, this is the terrain the Russians trying to escape from Izyum have to deal with.
It's nasty. It's wetlands and forests with few roads.
Forces in Izyum need to cross the Oskil River while getting shot at.
Forces south of Izyum City near Kamianka and Mala Komyshuvakha need to cross the Seversky Donetsk River AND the Oskil Eiver while defending the whole group's southern flank from Ukrainian forces advancing in the Dibrove - Sulyhivka - Dovhenke direction.
There are two (2) roads that lead in and out of the pocket.
1. Ukrainian forces are likely 25 kilometers of the international border with Russia. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces captured Velyky Burluk in Kharkiv on September 10. Russian milblogger Yuriy Kotenyok stated that Ukrainian forces took advantage of the absence...
of a continuous front line while advancing on Velyky Burluk.