<THREAD>Sorry, but nuclear deterrence is a two-way street. Just as NATO’s nuclear weapons deter Russia, so Russia’s deter us.
This isn’t fair or just. But it's the reality of life under the shadow of the Bomb. Ignoring the risk of escalation is a recipe for catastrophe. (1/17)
Nuclear deterrence has been a mixed blessing during the Ukraine war.
On the plus side, I’m sure it’s been a major factor in dissuading Putin from launching strikes on NATO to try to interdict equipment on its way to Ukraine.
Unfortunately, Russia also has nukes. (2/17)
Biden’s openly expressed concerns about “Armageddon” are likely limiting the extent of U.S. support to Ukraine.
The funny thing is that many of his critics are, in other contexts, strong believers in nuclear deterrence. (3/17)
Only a few folks are willing to say openly that we should not be deterred by the risk of nuclear escalation. @MatthewKroenig is. I respect his honesty—especially because it undermines his theory about the value of more lethal nuclear arsenals. (4/17)
Instead, many Biden critics (wrongly) argue the United States is “self-deterred” from taking more action. It’s a way of implying that fear of nuclear war is irrational and Biden should ignore it.
But this isn’t self-deterrence; it's the unpleasantness of BEING deterred. (5/17)
Others simply assert (complete with scare quotes) that we should just ignore the risk of escalation in forming policy—which is effectively another way of saying the same thing. (6/17)
Indeed the U.S. has tried to escape *mutual* deterrence for almost 80 years. Missile defenses, for example, are as much about trying to prevent us from being deterred as about deterring adversaries.
Here’s the thing. None of the people I’ve cited are psychopaths. For all their Twitter bravado, if they were elected leaders responsible for the lives of tens or hundreds of millions of people, they would act more cautiously than they are now demanding of Biden. (8/17)
To be sure, being deterred by Russia isn’t good or just.
Russia’s invasion was evil and illegal. It is just for Ukraine to fight to liberate its territory (including Crimea) and just for the U.S. and its partners to assist. (9/17)
The rightness of Ukraine’s cause, however, should not blind us to the appalling consequences of a nuclear war, even if the responsibility for starting such a war would inevitably lie with Putin. (10/17)
Put another way: The uncomfortable reality for supporters of Ukraine (including me) is that the interests of Ukraine and its backers are closely, but not perfectly, aligned.
Rationally, Zelenskyy is more willing than Biden to risk nuclear war over Ukrainian territory. (11/17)
People perform extreme wishful thinking to try to avoid facing the profoundly painful but very real resulting trade-offs by telling themselves, in essence, that a nuclear war wouldn’t be that bad. (It really could be.) (12/17)
However, unless you really, honestly believe that the likelihood of the Ukraine war’s turning nuclear is vanishingly small (as a few do), then the possibility of Armageddon should factor into your policy cost-benefit analysis. (13/17)
I support the military assistance given to Ukraine so far; the benefits seem to me to outweigh the risks—in part because the United States has imposed strings, including on the supply of HIMARS. (14/17)
For now, my main purpose is simply to argue that such limits are in the interests of the U.S. and its partners, and to point out that we have two tools to encourage Ukraine to accept them: the weapons we supply and the conditions of supply. (16/17)
In short, there's no shame in being deterred by the threat of nuclear war. That’s what we tell our adversaries and we’re right when we do so. #keeprealismreal, as @ProfPaulPoast would say. (17/17)
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And @CornelFeruta, @HannaNotte, Sergey Rogov, Wendin Smith, and Judy Dempsey (moderator) will ask whether there is any future for arms control in Europe. (3/4)
<THREAD>How should we interpret Putin's latest nuclear threat?
BLUF: Don't read it like a lawyer; read it like the parent of a petulant child. The general mood it conveys is more important than the specific words. (1/n)
Many people are parsing Putin's words for consistency with existing policy on the assumption that any difference results from careful deliberation and indicates the precise circumstances in which Russia would resort to nuclear use.
I think this is a mistake. (2/n)
First, I strongly doubt that Putin knows the precise circumstances in which he would resort to nuclear use. From my experience, real politicians simply don't think that way. (3/n)
First off, hats off to the @iaeaorg inspectors and @rafaelmgrossi. This mission was seriously dangerous (the plants was shelled while the team was there). Moreover, the report pulls no punches; it is blunt, clear, and damning. (2/n)
I won't give you a Twitter summary of the report (@gbrumfiel has a good one). The bottom line is very clear: None of the seven pillars of safety are fully intact at the plant, resulting in a real chance of a serious accident. (3/n)
According to the story, “the FBI determined [Huawei] equipment [on cell towers] was capable of capturing and disrupting highly restricted Defense Department communications,” including for “command and control with the nuclear triad.” (2/n)
The idea that this equipment may be used for general espionage seems entirely possible to me. But I am skeptical that it could disrupt (or frankly even intercept) messages sent to U.S. nuclear forces. (3/n)
A nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile wouldn't be developed to meet well-defined military requirements. On the contrary, its supporters are developing requirements to justify the weapon.
This is clear from the way the justification for SLCM-N has changed. (1/n)
Back in 2018, when the Trump administration announced its plan to pursue SLCM-N, facilitating arms control was a major justification for the weapon. (Essentially SLCM-N was trade bait for an agreement with Russia.) (2/n)
Now Strategic Command is essentially arguing the exact opposite--that SLCM-N is valuable because it isn't accountable! (Quite why non-accountable weapons deter less well than accountable ones isn't explained.) (3/n)
Short thread on the dangers of the fire at Zaporizhzhya NPP.
As of 8am this morning, according to Ukraine's regulator, three of six reactors were connected to the grid; the other three were offline. However, ALL the units will need cooling if they have any fuel inside. (1/n)
I assume that the three operational reactors have now been scrammed (switched off). In this case, all six reactors will be reliant on external power for cooling. (2/n)
A fire could damage the connection to the national power grid (if it was still intact after the shelling). It could also threaten backup power supplies (including emergency diesel generators and diesel supplies). (3/n)