It's been a really tough week for our favourite democratically elected President.
The Russian Army was forced to retreat out of basically their entirety of Kharkiv Oblast and this, obviously, turned on the rumour mill about an imminent Kremlin coup.
2/23
Of course, no coup has happened, yet, and signs of internal dissent in Moscow appear abysmally low.
Regardless of whatever rumours keep surfacing, Russia continues to appear stable and united, no matter what happens on the ground.
Reasonably, we ask, "what's going on"?
3/23
Before starting this thread, I want to make clear that I consider those "FSB Letters" and what the Ukrainian SBU claims simple propaganda.
So, with all that ridiculousness out of the way, let's analyse the internal workings of the Kremlin and the likelihood of a coup.
Why is Ukraine focusing so much on attempting to retake Kherson?
While a seemingly simple question, there's much more we need to look at in order to get the full picture, and analyse the thinking that went into making this decision.
2/21
First of all, it's obvious that Ukraine has been planning to retake the city ever since it's disastrous fall at the beginning of the war.
The continuous shelling of important bridges connecting the two sides of the Oblast and the continual reinforcement makes it clear.
3/21
It is theorised that the announced counter-offensive is a ploy to distract Russian forces from elsewhere, however I find that unlikely.
The most advanced systems in Ukrainian hands have been targeting the Oblast constantly, while Ukrainian forces elsewhere stay defensive.
The main issue for the Russian soldiers north of the Dnieper, charged with safeguarding Kherson, isn't Ukraine's Armed Forces.
It's attrition and a lack of supplies that's taking it's toll, as the conditions they created, along with UA strikes, make holding Kherson unattainable.
Any territory on the "wrong" side of the Dnieper, bar the complete collapse of the Ukrainian state, would be extremely difficult to sustain.
With only a couple of now destroyed bridges connecting the two halves of Russia's army, this was a disaster waiting to happen.
After the drive towards Mykolaiv and the rest of Ukraine's Black Sea coast failed, it will have been prudent to withdraw from Kherson.
However, assurances given to both local power brokers and Kremlin higher-ups made withdrawing from Kherson an impossibility.