1/ With the news today that Russia has arrested eight people as suspects for the bombing of the Crimea Bridge on 8 October, I thought it would be useful to try to piece together a full account of the Russian narrative, as I've not yet seen it in Western sources. Long 🧵 follows.
2/ I'm not endorsing this account – aspects have already been disputed – but it's worth looking at what regional media reports are saying. The Russians say that a truck bomb caused the blast; western experts have endorsed this theory (see below).
3/ According to the Russians, the cargo was sent from Odesa in Ukraine to Ruse on the Bulgarian border in early August 2022. It travelled via Romania and likely Moldova, sent under a contract with Kyiv-based company Translogistik UA to a company called Baltex Capital SA.
4/ Bulgarian National Radio reports that Baltex is registered in Panama, not Bulgaria. Its customs representatives are a Bulgarian forwarding company called Tivacom. Baltex instructed it to be sent to an Armenian company called Gu AR G Group.
5/ The Bulgarian newspaper Dnevnik reports that the cargo went to the Bulgarian port of Burgas, from where it was shipped by ferry to Poti in Georgia. It arrived there on 26 September.
6/ Armenian media reports say it was driven from Poti to Armenia in a Georgian-registered DAF truck driven by Artur Terjanyan, an Armenian-Georgian citizen. It arrived at the Bagratashen border post at 14:53 on 27 September, where it was inspected and X-rayed.
7/ No irregularities were found. The cargo was then driven to the Alliance Terminal, a customs warehouse on the outskirts of Yerevan, arriving on the same day at 22:46. It remained there temporarily before it was inspected again on 29 September and documents were submitted.
8/ According to the manifest, which the Russians have published, the cargo comprised 22 pallets with a total weight of 22,770 kg (50,200 lb) of Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene edge banding (used to finish the sides and ends of wood-based materials), stacked in rolls.
9/ Marked with "Made in China" stickers, the cargo was photographed and inspected by the Armenians. The lamination of one of the rolls of ABS plastic was checked to verify that it was correctly classified according to the trade rules.
10/ I haven't seen any clear explanation for why the truck went to Armenia. It might well be related to the fact that when it entered Armenia, customs checks were done under Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) customs rules, which also cover Russia. Georgia isn't a member.
11/ This may have provided a back door route into Russia – checks done at the EEU economic border presumably do not have to be redone at the Russian border if a cargo travels from one EEU country to another.
12/ The Armenian authorities say that the customs service at the Ararat Regional Customs House in Yerevan certified the cargo as being "goods of the EEU" on 30 September and issued a transit declaration. This likely made it easier to bring it into Russia.
13/ While at the Alliance Terminal, according to the Armenians, the truck was under camera surveillance for the whole time. It was neither loaded nor unloaded, nor was anything else added. It left Armenia at 00:38 on 1 October via the Bagratashen border post, again being X-rayed.
14/ The pictures of the truck above and the X-ray images were published by the State Revenue Committee of Armenia on Facebook (link below). The X-ray image was likely made at Bagratashen on either 27 September or 1 October. facebook.com/petekamutner/p…
15/ Some commentators have misinterpreted this X-ray as showing the alleged bomb truck or have misattributed it as coming from the Russians. The image comes from Armenia and is of the Georgian DAF truck, not the truck that exploded, which was a different model entirely.
16/ Having entered Georgia again, the truck entered Russia at the Verkhniy Lars checkpoint in North Ossetia – the only open border crossing between the two countries. Curiously, it arrived there only on 5 October. What Terjanyan was doing in the intervening 4 days is not stated.
17/ The DAF truck was then driven 434km from Verkhniy Lars to Armavir, a city in Russia's southern Krasnodar Krai region (which lies to the east of Crimea). It arrived at the warehouse of a company called Agro-Business.
18/ The company is reportedly owned by Georgy Azatyan, a native of Makiivka (near Donetsk city in occupied eastern Ukraine), and his father Samvel. Another son, Artyom, is a lawyer in Simferopol in Crimea.
19/ Artyom reportedly called his father to ask him to accept the cargo for a day on behalf of a friend. This was not communicated to Georgy and the cargo arrived unexpectedly on 6 October. It didn't cause a problem as there was plenty of room in the warehouse.
20/ Terjanyan handed the warehouse operator a pile of invoices but they were not read or signed by the receiver. The cargo was unloaded in the warehouse, where it was to remain overnight.
21/ On the same day, Thursday 6 October, the cargo became the subject of a delivery order posted on ATI (), a Russian freight exchange website, by an Ulyanovsk-based company called TEK-34, with a contact listed as 'Oleg'. ati.su
22/ The cargo was listed as a 'container and packaging'. It was to be delivered to Simferopol, Crimea on 7 October (probably not coincidentally, Vladimir Putin's birthday). The named recipient was a non-existent company supposedly based in Crimea.
23/ TEK-34 seems to have a curious history. It reportedly received good customer reviews between 2009–2020, when it was active, but ceased operating at the end of 2020 when it was sold to a man named Oleg Antipov. It was delisted in 2021 for not having a valid legal address.
24/ In March 2022 it 'came back to life', obtaining a legal address and registering for tax and pensions payments. However, it reportedly did not engage in any activity.
25/ Ten minutes after the job was posted on ATI, Azerbaijan-born truck driver Mahir Yusubov accepted it for a fee of 48,000 rubles ($753). It was removed from ATI shortly afterwards. Yusubov had moved from Kazan to Krasnodar two years ago. He was married and had three children.
26/ Prior to taking the job on 6 October, Yusubov had spent all of September driving around the Krasnodar region making deliveries. His movements were recorded on cameras in the region.
27/ On 7 October, Yusubov drove from Kanevskoy in the north of the region to Armavir, arriving at the warehouse at lunchtime. The cargo was loaded onto his truck, an International ProStar with 870,000 km on the clock, using the warehouse's mechanical loader.
28/ Yusubov was last spotted in Armavir at 16:04. Although the contract required him to deliver the cargo to Simferopol on 7 October, he stopped instead at the village of Svetlyi Put about 99 km from the Crimea Bridge, where he was spotted at 23:06. He likely slept in his truck.
29/ Yusubov was next seen in the village of Strelka, en route to the Crimea Bridge, at 05:00 on 8 October. At 05:52 he crossed onto the bridge, and at 06:03 his truck exploded. /end
1/ The Russian government is a "great hypnotoad" that is trying to distract the population from the fact that things are bad and about to get worse, says Russian warblogger Anastasia Kashevarova. She complains that the government is attempting to "zombify people". ⬇️
2/ A common complaint among Russian warbloggers in recent months has been that the Russian government frequently but ineptly tries to play down the deteriorating situation with the Ukraine war, through so-called "anti-crisis" propaganda or simply not mentioning Ukrainian attacks.
3/ They point out that this is highly ineffective and erodes trust in the government, as anyone with an Internet connection can see – even on Russian pro-war Telegram channels – that things are not going well.
1/ Russian commanders are being accused of failing to ensure that their soldiers do not wear neo-Nazi and far-right insignia. The practice is said to be widespread. However, a crackdown is apparently underway, with offenders being sent to die in assault units. ⬇️
2/ Throughout the war in Ukraine, Russian soldiers have been photographed wearing unofficial patches representing extremist ideologies, such as death's-head insignia, Nazi runes, and the "black sun" Sonnenrad symbol.
3/ This reflects the appeal of far-right and neo-Nazi ideology among Russian nationalists. (Indeed, there is an entire neo-Nazi paramilitary group, the Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group (DShRG) 'Rusich', fighting alongside the Russian regular forces.)
1/ Russian warbloggers have steadily become bolder in calling for Russia's leadership to be replaced to overcome the current stalemate in Ukraine. Calling the current situation "hopeless", 'Verum Regnum' calls for new leadership in Russia so that it can win the war. ⬇️
2/ While well aware that open criticism of Vladimir Putin is still too dangerous a step, many warbloggers are willing to criticise "the system" in general terms or call out specific officials regarded as failing, such as Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov
3/ This kind of approach, which could be summed up as "the Tsar should replace his boyars", is clearly visible in what 'Verum Regnum' writes on Telegram:
"Do you know what a "hopeless situation" is? It's a situation where we don't like the simple, obvious way out."
1/ Russia's air defence teams are manned by "homeless people, alcoholics, deserters, disabled people, idiots", complains a Russian warblogger. In the face of continued failures to stop Ukrainian drone attacks, urgent investment in robotic defence systems is advocated. ⬇️
2/ 'Military Chronicle' argues that "recent incidents involving the use of attack drones against targets in Moscow and Voronezh demonstrate that the human factor is becoming the most critical vulnerability in modern air defence systems."
3/ 'Dead Heads' explains that Russia's mobile fire teams are attracting the wrong kind of recruits: "We're forming Mobile Task Forces (MOGs) and assembling them by units: homeless people, alcoholics, 500s, disabled people, idiots – why aren't they shooting down anything?"
1/ The Russian warblogger 'Fighterbomber', a retired Russian air force pilot, is taking heavy flak from other warbloggers for disclosing a fuel delivery to Crimea that the Ukrainians promptly blew up. "Go fuck yourself. Preferably holding hands," he responds. ⬇️
2/ On 17 June, in an apparent attempt to refute widespread accounts of fuel shortages in Crimea, 'Fighterbomber' wrote on his Telegram channel: "The audience is saying that fuel has arrived in Crimea. Lots of it. There's more coming. 😍"
3/ Three days later, Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch oil terminal's fuel depot, causing a major fire. An official Ukrainian Telegram channel trolled Fighterbomber by crediting the warblogger for the strike (it's unlikely that he had any influence on it).
1/ Dozens of specialist workers were likely killed or wounded in today's Ukrainian strike in Voronezh. Russian warbloggers are dismayed, complain that the Russian government is ignoring it, and call for London to be nuked in retaliation. ⬇️
2/ Heavy missiles (it's not yet clear what type; the Russian warbloggers assume a UK/French Storm Shadow or SCALP/ER) have caused heavy damage and raging fires at the Voronezh Semiconductor Devices Plant, a vital element of Russia's missile production chain.
3/ The regional governor says that five people are known to have died, with dozens more injured. He says that while most were able to take shelter and survived, many ignored the alert and were caught up in the attack.