1/ With the news today that Russia has arrested eight people as suspects for the bombing of the Crimea Bridge on 8 October, I thought it would be useful to try to piece together a full account of the Russian narrative, as I've not yet seen it in Western sources. Long 🧵 follows.
2/ I'm not endorsing this account – aspects have already been disputed – but it's worth looking at what regional media reports are saying. The Russians say that a truck bomb caused the blast; western experts have endorsed this theory (see below).
3/ According to the Russians, the cargo was sent from Odesa in Ukraine to Ruse on the Bulgarian border in early August 2022. It travelled via Romania and likely Moldova, sent under a contract with Kyiv-based company Translogistik UA to a company called Baltex Capital SA.
4/ Bulgarian National Radio reports that Baltex is registered in Panama, not Bulgaria. Its customs representatives are a Bulgarian forwarding company called Tivacom. Baltex instructed it to be sent to an Armenian company called Gu AR G Group.
5/ The Bulgarian newspaper Dnevnik reports that the cargo went to the Bulgarian port of Burgas, from where it was shipped by ferry to Poti in Georgia. It arrived there on 26 September.
6/ Armenian media reports say it was driven from Poti to Armenia in a Georgian-registered DAF truck driven by Artur Terjanyan, an Armenian-Georgian citizen. It arrived at the Bagratashen border post at 14:53 on 27 September, where it was inspected and X-rayed.
7/ No irregularities were found. The cargo was then driven to the Alliance Terminal, a customs warehouse on the outskirts of Yerevan, arriving on the same day at 22:46. It remained there temporarily before it was inspected again on 29 September and documents were submitted.
8/ According to the manifest, which the Russians have published, the cargo comprised 22 pallets with a total weight of 22,770 kg (50,200 lb) of Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene edge banding (used to finish the sides and ends of wood-based materials), stacked in rolls.
9/ Marked with "Made in China" stickers, the cargo was photographed and inspected by the Armenians. The lamination of one of the rolls of ABS plastic was checked to verify that it was correctly classified according to the trade rules.
10/ I haven't seen any clear explanation for why the truck went to Armenia. It might well be related to the fact that when it entered Armenia, customs checks were done under Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) customs rules, which also cover Russia. Georgia isn't a member.
11/ This may have provided a back door route into Russia – checks done at the EEU economic border presumably do not have to be redone at the Russian border if a cargo travels from one EEU country to another.
12/ The Armenian authorities say that the customs service at the Ararat Regional Customs House in Yerevan certified the cargo as being "goods of the EEU" on 30 September and issued a transit declaration. This likely made it easier to bring it into Russia.
13/ While at the Alliance Terminal, according to the Armenians, the truck was under camera surveillance for the whole time. It was neither loaded nor unloaded, nor was anything else added. It left Armenia at 00:38 on 1 October via the Bagratashen border post, again being X-rayed.
14/ The pictures of the truck above and the X-ray images were published by the State Revenue Committee of Armenia on Facebook (link below). The X-ray image was likely made at Bagratashen on either 27 September or 1 October. facebook.com/petekamutner/p…
15/ Some commentators have misinterpreted this X-ray as showing the alleged bomb truck or have misattributed it as coming from the Russians. The image comes from Armenia and is of the Georgian DAF truck, not the truck that exploded, which was a different model entirely.
16/ Having entered Georgia again, the truck entered Russia at the Verkhniy Lars checkpoint in North Ossetia – the only open border crossing between the two countries. Curiously, it arrived there only on 5 October. What Terjanyan was doing in the intervening 4 days is not stated.
17/ The DAF truck was then driven 434km from Verkhniy Lars to Armavir, a city in Russia's southern Krasnodar Krai region (which lies to the east of Crimea). It arrived at the warehouse of a company called Agro-Business.
18/ The company is reportedly owned by Georgy Azatyan, a native of Makiivka (near Donetsk city in occupied eastern Ukraine), and his father Samvel. Another son, Artyom, is a lawyer in Simferopol in Crimea.
19/ Artyom reportedly called his father to ask him to accept the cargo for a day on behalf of a friend. This was not communicated to Georgy and the cargo arrived unexpectedly on 6 October. It didn't cause a problem as there was plenty of room in the warehouse.
20/ Terjanyan handed the warehouse operator a pile of invoices but they were not read or signed by the receiver. The cargo was unloaded in the warehouse, where it was to remain overnight.
21/ On the same day, Thursday 6 October, the cargo became the subject of a delivery order posted on ATI (), a Russian freight exchange website, by an Ulyanovsk-based company called TEK-34, with a contact listed as 'Oleg'. ati.su
22/ The cargo was listed as a 'container and packaging'. It was to be delivered to Simferopol, Crimea on 7 October (probably not coincidentally, Vladimir Putin's birthday). The named recipient was a non-existent company supposedly based in Crimea.
23/ TEK-34 seems to have a curious history. It reportedly received good customer reviews between 2009–2020, when it was active, but ceased operating at the end of 2020 when it was sold to a man named Oleg Antipov. It was delisted in 2021 for not having a valid legal address.
24/ In March 2022 it 'came back to life', obtaining a legal address and registering for tax and pensions payments. However, it reportedly did not engage in any activity.
25/ Ten minutes after the job was posted on ATI, Azerbaijan-born truck driver Mahir Yusubov accepted it for a fee of 48,000 rubles ($753). It was removed from ATI shortly afterwards. Yusubov had moved from Kazan to Krasnodar two years ago. He was married and had three children.
26/ Prior to taking the job on 6 October, Yusubov had spent all of September driving around the Krasnodar region making deliveries. His movements were recorded on cameras in the region.
27/ On 7 October, Yusubov drove from Kanevskoy in the north of the region to Armavir, arriving at the warehouse at lunchtime. The cargo was loaded onto his truck, an International ProStar with 870,000 km on the clock, using the warehouse's mechanical loader.
28/ Yusubov was last spotted in Armavir at 16:04. Although the contract required him to deliver the cargo to Simferopol on 7 October, he stopped instead at the village of Svetlyi Put about 99 km from the Crimea Bridge, where he was spotted at 23:06. He likely slept in his truck.
29/ Yusubov was next seen in the village of Strelka, en route to the Crimea Bridge, at 05:00 on 8 October. At 05:52 he crossed onto the bridge, and at 06:03 his truck exploded. /end
"Rule 47. Attacking persons who are recognized as hors de combat is prohibited. A person hors de combat is:...
(b) anyone who is defenceless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds or sickness...
3/ "... provided he or she abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape."
I expect that Hegseth and others involved will get a preemptive pardon from Trump eventually, but they might want to avoid travelling outside America for the rest of their lives.
1/ Wounded soldiers in Russia's 51st Army say they have been banned from going back to Russia for medical treatment. Instead, they're sent straight back, unhealed, to the fighting. "Tie a crutch to his leg and let him go to the front line," one commander has reportedly said. ⬇️
2/ The 51st Guards Combined Arms Army, currently fighting at Pokrovsk, is a Russian formation that was originally created in the 'Donetsk People's Republic' as its 1st Army Corps. It has attracted a reputation for brutality and the careless expenditure of the lives of its men.
3/ According to soldiers who have written to the 'Brothers in Arms' Telegram channel:
"The partially recovered are sent to the front lines, they don't roll back the 300s [wounded], and they're sent further. No leave, no compensation. No vacations. There are no rotations."
1/ Hardline Russian nationalists and war supporters have reacted with hostility to the Dmitriev-Witkoff peace proposals. Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin's detailed critique is of particular interest, as it is likely representative of this powerful faction's views. ⬇️
2/ Girkin's comments provide an insight into the fine line that Putin is having to walk between reaching a settlement that he can accept and one that the hardliners will accept. Putin likely agrees with many of their objections, but knows that they are unachievable.
3/ Girkin says, in a letter from his prison, that a correspondent has sent him the leaked list of the plan's 28 points (which he says have not been published in the Russian media). He is aware that subsequent US-Ukraine talks have reduced them to 19 points, but observes sourly:
1/ Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin is sceptical of "the mega-crook Donald and his cronies" and is confident there won't be a peace deal soon. In a fresh missive from prison, he draws attention to the Zaporizhzhia front, but says that Russia is unable to exploit successes there. ⬇️
2/ Replying to an earlier letter from a friend, he comments:
"Now we have yet another “sweet expectation of a quick and inevitable deal” (that is, a “compromise”), inspired by the statements of the mega-crook Donald and his cronies."
3/ "Naturally, my assessment of the situation hasn't changed at all: I'm confident there won't be a fixed deal, as we failed to achieve successes during the entire summer-fall campaign that went beyond the operational (at most, in isolated areas, but mostly beyond tactical).
1/ Russian State Duma deputy and surgeon Badma Bashankaev boasts that wounded Russian soldiers enjoy a 96% survival rate. Russian warbloggers point out, however, that only the lightly wounded usually get treated; most seriously injured Russians die on the battlefield. ⬇️
2/ Badma Bashankaev is a fervent supporter of Russia's war effort and represents Putin's United Russia party in the State Duma. He has recently appeared in an interview with state news agency TASS speaking about Russia's ostensible success in treating wounded soldiers.
3/ Russian warbloggers, however, are sceptical. Ilya Ovsyannikov writes in his 'INSTRUCTOR'S NOTES' Telegram channel that: "These statistics only show that the seriously wounded are not being transported and that they cannot organize a mass evacuation!!!"
1/ While Russia is making incremental advances in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian soldiers say that it's resulting in carnage among their units. Conditions at Stepnohirsk are said to be dire, with entire battalions virtually wiped out. ⬇️
2/ Russian soldiers fighting at Stepnohirsk on the road to Zaporizhzhia city have told the 'Brothers in Arms' Telegram channel that "the situation there is, to put it mildly, dire."
3/ "The battalion has been practically wiped out. Only company and platoon commanders, sergeants majors, and clerks remain. The rest are reinforcements who arrive, complete the training ground, and immediately go on to storm Stepnohirsk."