1/ With the news today that Russia has arrested eight people as suspects for the bombing of the Crimea Bridge on 8 October, I thought it would be useful to try to piece together a full account of the Russian narrative, as I've not yet seen it in Western sources. Long 🧵 follows.
2/ I'm not endorsing this account – aspects have already been disputed – but it's worth looking at what regional media reports are saying. The Russians say that a truck bomb caused the blast; western experts have endorsed this theory (see below).
3/ According to the Russians, the cargo was sent from Odesa in Ukraine to Ruse on the Bulgarian border in early August 2022. It travelled via Romania and likely Moldova, sent under a contract with Kyiv-based company Translogistik UA to a company called Baltex Capital SA.
4/ Bulgarian National Radio reports that Baltex is registered in Panama, not Bulgaria. Its customs representatives are a Bulgarian forwarding company called Tivacom. Baltex instructed it to be sent to an Armenian company called Gu AR G Group.
5/ The Bulgarian newspaper Dnevnik reports that the cargo went to the Bulgarian port of Burgas, from where it was shipped by ferry to Poti in Georgia. It arrived there on 26 September.
6/ Armenian media reports say it was driven from Poti to Armenia in a Georgian-registered DAF truck driven by Artur Terjanyan, an Armenian-Georgian citizen. It arrived at the Bagratashen border post at 14:53 on 27 September, where it was inspected and X-rayed.
7/ No irregularities were found. The cargo was then driven to the Alliance Terminal, a customs warehouse on the outskirts of Yerevan, arriving on the same day at 22:46. It remained there temporarily before it was inspected again on 29 September and documents were submitted.
8/ According to the manifest, which the Russians have published, the cargo comprised 22 pallets with a total weight of 22,770 kg (50,200 lb) of Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene edge banding (used to finish the sides and ends of wood-based materials), stacked in rolls.
9/ Marked with "Made in China" stickers, the cargo was photographed and inspected by the Armenians. The lamination of one of the rolls of ABS plastic was checked to verify that it was correctly classified according to the trade rules.
10/ I haven't seen any clear explanation for why the truck went to Armenia. It might well be related to the fact that when it entered Armenia, customs checks were done under Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) customs rules, which also cover Russia. Georgia isn't a member.
11/ This may have provided a back door route into Russia – checks done at the EEU economic border presumably do not have to be redone at the Russian border if a cargo travels from one EEU country to another.
12/ The Armenian authorities say that the customs service at the Ararat Regional Customs House in Yerevan certified the cargo as being "goods of the EEU" on 30 September and issued a transit declaration. This likely made it easier to bring it into Russia.
13/ While at the Alliance Terminal, according to the Armenians, the truck was under camera surveillance for the whole time. It was neither loaded nor unloaded, nor was anything else added. It left Armenia at 00:38 on 1 October via the Bagratashen border post, again being X-rayed.
14/ The pictures of the truck above and the X-ray images were published by the State Revenue Committee of Armenia on Facebook (link below). The X-ray image was likely made at Bagratashen on either 27 September or 1 October. facebook.com/petekamutner/p…
15/ Some commentators have misinterpreted this X-ray as showing the alleged bomb truck or have misattributed it as coming from the Russians. The image comes from Armenia and is of the Georgian DAF truck, not the truck that exploded, which was a different model entirely.
16/ Having entered Georgia again, the truck entered Russia at the Verkhniy Lars checkpoint in North Ossetia – the only open border crossing between the two countries. Curiously, it arrived there only on 5 October. What Terjanyan was doing in the intervening 4 days is not stated.
17/ The DAF truck was then driven 434km from Verkhniy Lars to Armavir, a city in Russia's southern Krasnodar Krai region (which lies to the east of Crimea). It arrived at the warehouse of a company called Agro-Business.
18/ The company is reportedly owned by Georgy Azatyan, a native of Makiivka (near Donetsk city in occupied eastern Ukraine), and his father Samvel. Another son, Artyom, is a lawyer in Simferopol in Crimea.
19/ Artyom reportedly called his father to ask him to accept the cargo for a day on behalf of a friend. This was not communicated to Georgy and the cargo arrived unexpectedly on 6 October. It didn't cause a problem as there was plenty of room in the warehouse.
20/ Terjanyan handed the warehouse operator a pile of invoices but they were not read or signed by the receiver. The cargo was unloaded in the warehouse, where it was to remain overnight.
21/ On the same day, Thursday 6 October, the cargo became the subject of a delivery order posted on ATI (), a Russian freight exchange website, by an Ulyanovsk-based company called TEK-34, with a contact listed as 'Oleg'. ati.su
22/ The cargo was listed as a 'container and packaging'. It was to be delivered to Simferopol, Crimea on 7 October (probably not coincidentally, Vladimir Putin's birthday). The named recipient was a non-existent company supposedly based in Crimea.
23/ TEK-34 seems to have a curious history. It reportedly received good customer reviews between 2009–2020, when it was active, but ceased operating at the end of 2020 when it was sold to a man named Oleg Antipov. It was delisted in 2021 for not having a valid legal address.
24/ In March 2022 it 'came back to life', obtaining a legal address and registering for tax and pensions payments. However, it reportedly did not engage in any activity.
25/ Ten minutes after the job was posted on ATI, Azerbaijan-born truck driver Mahir Yusubov accepted it for a fee of 48,000 rubles ($753). It was removed from ATI shortly afterwards. Yusubov had moved from Kazan to Krasnodar two years ago. He was married and had three children.
26/ Prior to taking the job on 6 October, Yusubov had spent all of September driving around the Krasnodar region making deliveries. His movements were recorded on cameras in the region.
27/ On 7 October, Yusubov drove from Kanevskoy in the north of the region to Armavir, arriving at the warehouse at lunchtime. The cargo was loaded onto his truck, an International ProStar with 870,000 km on the clock, using the warehouse's mechanical loader.
28/ Yusubov was last spotted in Armavir at 16:04. Although the contract required him to deliver the cargo to Simferopol on 7 October, he stopped instead at the village of Svetlyi Put about 99 km from the Crimea Bridge, where he was spotted at 23:06. He likely slept in his truck.
29/ Yusubov was next seen in the village of Strelka, en route to the Crimea Bridge, at 05:00 on 8 October. At 05:52 he crossed onto the bridge, and at 06:03 his truck exploded. /end
1/ Russian commanders routinely tie soldiers to trees, sometimes for days on end, as a punishment for disciplinary offences. In some cases they are deliberately left to be killed by Ukrainian drones. This thread compiles filmed instances of 'tree punishments'.
2/ Tied to a tree and left to be killed by Ukrainian drones - a practice called 'sacrificing to Baba Yaga'.
1/ Russian commanders are robbing and deliberately killing their men, forcing female subordinates into sex and engaging in corruption with impunity, due to attitudes in the Russian army that a Russian commentator says are unchanged since the 19th century. ⬇️
2/ Over the past three years of war in Ukraine, abuses by Russian officers have frequently been reported. Dissent is often punished by sending the culprits to die in unsupported assaults (an approach nicknamed Puzikism, after one particularly notorious commander).
3/ Theft from subordinates is commonplace, with men imprisoned under false pretences, made to pay bribes to be released, or sometimes even murdered.
1/ Only 40% of US Republicans see Russia as an enemy, a majority have a negative opinion of NATO, and an overwhelming majority say they are unconcerned about Russia invading other countries or the consequences of Russia winning in Ukraine. ⬇️
2/ A new poll by Pew Research has found that the share of Americans who consider Russia an "enemy" has fallen to its lowest number since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This has been driven largely by Republicans and Republican-leaners changing their views on Russia.
3/ In March 2022, the figure stood at 70%; it is now down to 50%. This reflects Republicans shifting from 58% saying Russia is an enemy last year, to only 40% now. There has also been a slight shift among Democrats, with 5% fewer seeing it as an enemy.
1/ Further updates on the situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine illustrate the relentless nature of the fighting. It's all "blood and rubble", says one Russian soldier, with so many Ukrainian drones that they are "like mosquitoes on a lake". ⬇️
2/ The Russian 'DONTSTOPWAR' Telegram channel has been posting more short updates from Russian soldiers fighting in ruined villages along the frontline in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhanks regions (see below for previous updates):
3/ "Novopavlivka direction: We work between Solone and Volchya. Slowly, we press them to Kotliarivka. We're coming in from the east and south. The terrain is difficult, but we're moving. Kotliarivka is still holding, but it's almost empty with few living souls left.
1/ Commenting on a video showing a huge number of destroyed vehicles on a 'road of death' in the Belgorod region, a Russian warblogger describes how the area behind the front lines has become defined by the ranges of various types of Ukrainian drones. ⬇️
2/ The author of the 'Vault No. 8' Telegram channel comments that whereas in 2023 the rear was defined by the ranges of various types of artillery, aided by Ukrainian observation drones, it is now defined by the various types of drones that Ukraine uses:
3/ "– The rear 15 km from the front line can now be safely called close, since in this zone the enemy FPV forces [troops] to move quickly, in single vehicles (from 7 to 15 km, closer than 7 km to the front line - only buggies and motorcycles). From 0 km to 5 km – on foot.
1/ Russian sources complain that they face a "systemic and extremely acute" situation with the supply and capability of drones on the front lines in Ukraine. They say they are still using off-the-shelf Mavics, while the Ukrainians have rapidly advanced their own capabilities. ⬇️
2/ The 'Philologist in ambush' Telegram channel publishes "a signal from the ground from a comrade from an ordinary Russian people's (motorised) rifle regiment":
3/ "I have a few thoughts on our Pokrovsk direction. I don't know about other units, but it's as if we've stopped at the situation from a year ago, when we were mastering the [DJI] Mavics and the FPV [drones].