1/ With the news today that Russia has arrested eight people as suspects for the bombing of the Crimea Bridge on 8 October, I thought it would be useful to try to piece together a full account of the Russian narrative, as I've not yet seen it in Western sources. Long 🧵 follows.
2/ I'm not endorsing this account – aspects have already been disputed – but it's worth looking at what regional media reports are saying. The Russians say that a truck bomb caused the blast; western experts have endorsed this theory (see below).
3/ According to the Russians, the cargo was sent from Odesa in Ukraine to Ruse on the Bulgarian border in early August 2022. It travelled via Romania and likely Moldova, sent under a contract with Kyiv-based company Translogistik UA to a company called Baltex Capital SA.
4/ Bulgarian National Radio reports that Baltex is registered in Panama, not Bulgaria. Its customs representatives are a Bulgarian forwarding company called Tivacom. Baltex instructed it to be sent to an Armenian company called Gu AR G Group.
5/ The Bulgarian newspaper Dnevnik reports that the cargo went to the Bulgarian port of Burgas, from where it was shipped by ferry to Poti in Georgia. It arrived there on 26 September.
6/ Armenian media reports say it was driven from Poti to Armenia in a Georgian-registered DAF truck driven by Artur Terjanyan, an Armenian-Georgian citizen. It arrived at the Bagratashen border post at 14:53 on 27 September, where it was inspected and X-rayed.
7/ No irregularities were found. The cargo was then driven to the Alliance Terminal, a customs warehouse on the outskirts of Yerevan, arriving on the same day at 22:46. It remained there temporarily before it was inspected again on 29 September and documents were submitted.
8/ According to the manifest, which the Russians have published, the cargo comprised 22 pallets with a total weight of 22,770 kg (50,200 lb) of Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene edge banding (used to finish the sides and ends of wood-based materials), stacked in rolls.
9/ Marked with "Made in China" stickers, the cargo was photographed and inspected by the Armenians. The lamination of one of the rolls of ABS plastic was checked to verify that it was correctly classified according to the trade rules.
10/ I haven't seen any clear explanation for why the truck went to Armenia. It might well be related to the fact that when it entered Armenia, customs checks were done under Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) customs rules, which also cover Russia. Georgia isn't a member.
11/ This may have provided a back door route into Russia – checks done at the EEU economic border presumably do not have to be redone at the Russian border if a cargo travels from one EEU country to another.
12/ The Armenian authorities say that the customs service at the Ararat Regional Customs House in Yerevan certified the cargo as being "goods of the EEU" on 30 September and issued a transit declaration. This likely made it easier to bring it into Russia.
13/ While at the Alliance Terminal, according to the Armenians, the truck was under camera surveillance for the whole time. It was neither loaded nor unloaded, nor was anything else added. It left Armenia at 00:38 on 1 October via the Bagratashen border post, again being X-rayed.
14/ The pictures of the truck above and the X-ray images were published by the State Revenue Committee of Armenia on Facebook (link below). The X-ray image was likely made at Bagratashen on either 27 September or 1 October. facebook.com/petekamutner/p…
15/ Some commentators have misinterpreted this X-ray as showing the alleged bomb truck or have misattributed it as coming from the Russians. The image comes from Armenia and is of the Georgian DAF truck, not the truck that exploded, which was a different model entirely.
16/ Having entered Georgia again, the truck entered Russia at the Verkhniy Lars checkpoint in North Ossetia – the only open border crossing between the two countries. Curiously, it arrived there only on 5 October. What Terjanyan was doing in the intervening 4 days is not stated.
17/ The DAF truck was then driven 434km from Verkhniy Lars to Armavir, a city in Russia's southern Krasnodar Krai region (which lies to the east of Crimea). It arrived at the warehouse of a company called Agro-Business.
18/ The company is reportedly owned by Georgy Azatyan, a native of Makiivka (near Donetsk city in occupied eastern Ukraine), and his father Samvel. Another son, Artyom, is a lawyer in Simferopol in Crimea.
19/ Artyom reportedly called his father to ask him to accept the cargo for a day on behalf of a friend. This was not communicated to Georgy and the cargo arrived unexpectedly on 6 October. It didn't cause a problem as there was plenty of room in the warehouse.
20/ Terjanyan handed the warehouse operator a pile of invoices but they were not read or signed by the receiver. The cargo was unloaded in the warehouse, where it was to remain overnight.
21/ On the same day, Thursday 6 October, the cargo became the subject of a delivery order posted on ATI (), a Russian freight exchange website, by an Ulyanovsk-based company called TEK-34, with a contact listed as 'Oleg'. ati.su
22/ The cargo was listed as a 'container and packaging'. It was to be delivered to Simferopol, Crimea on 7 October (probably not coincidentally, Vladimir Putin's birthday). The named recipient was a non-existent company supposedly based in Crimea.
23/ TEK-34 seems to have a curious history. It reportedly received good customer reviews between 2009–2020, when it was active, but ceased operating at the end of 2020 when it was sold to a man named Oleg Antipov. It was delisted in 2021 for not having a valid legal address.
24/ In March 2022 it 'came back to life', obtaining a legal address and registering for tax and pensions payments. However, it reportedly did not engage in any activity.
25/ Ten minutes after the job was posted on ATI, Azerbaijan-born truck driver Mahir Yusubov accepted it for a fee of 48,000 rubles ($753). It was removed from ATI shortly afterwards. Yusubov had moved from Kazan to Krasnodar two years ago. He was married and had three children.
26/ Prior to taking the job on 6 October, Yusubov had spent all of September driving around the Krasnodar region making deliveries. His movements were recorded on cameras in the region.
27/ On 7 October, Yusubov drove from Kanevskoy in the north of the region to Armavir, arriving at the warehouse at lunchtime. The cargo was loaded onto his truck, an International ProStar with 870,000 km on the clock, using the warehouse's mechanical loader.
28/ Yusubov was last spotted in Armavir at 16:04. Although the contract required him to deliver the cargo to Simferopol on 7 October, he stopped instead at the village of Svetlyi Put about 99 km from the Crimea Bridge, where he was spotted at 23:06. He likely slept in his truck.
29/ Yusubov was next seen in the village of Strelka, en route to the Crimea Bridge, at 05:00 on 8 October. At 05:52 he crossed onto the bridge, and at 06:03 his truck exploded. /end
1/ An apparent attack on a 'shadow fleet' tanker off the coast of Senegal means that Ukraine may now be able to attack Russian interests worldwide, says Russian war correspondent Alexander Kots. He calls it a new and threatening phase in the war. ⬇️
2/ Kots, who writes for Komsomolskaya Prava, has asked how Russia should respond to the severe damage suffered on 27 November by the oil tanker Mersin. Its Turkish owners report that the vessel was hit by four external explosions while it was in the eastern Atlantic Ocean.
3/ The crew is reportedly safe, but videos show the vessel down by the stern after the engine room flooded. The incident is strikingly similar to the confirmed Ukrainian attacks on 28 November against two oil tankers which were travelling to Russian Black Sea ports.
1/ A video showing alcoholics, newly recruited into the Russian army, has attracted scorn, concern, and even some compassion from Russian warbloggers. They suggest that the men will be deliberately killed for being useless when they arrive at the front. ⬇️
2/ "We are Russians - we don't care' comments that this video is far from being a unique case (a fact that other warbloggers have confirmed). "If you think these are just the most hopeless ones, then I have some bad news for you – these are only the ones that got busted."
3/ The 'House among the Laurels' Telegram channel writes:
"Oh, this war and its long duration, during which unknown meanness and a multitude of "grey" schemes have proliferated—options for greedy profits among participants in or close to the frontline communities."
1/ Russian warbloggers conclude gloomily – and angrily – that the Russian Black Sea Fleet is so weakened and so far behind technologically that it cannot retaliate effectively against Ukraine's attack on two Russian 'shadow fleet' tankers. ⬇️
2/ On 28 November, the tankers Kairos and Virat were struck and seriously damaged by Ukrainian sea drones in the southern Black Sea. Both ships were disabled and had to be towed to Turkish ports. Ukraine subsequently declared a de facto blockade of Russian maritime cargo traffic.
3/ The news has been greeted by Russian warbloggers with resignation and complaints about the deficiencies of the Black Sea Fleet. 'Informant' writes:
"Responses to such attacks are purely political, as they involve the destruction of ships and bulk carriers heading to Odesa."
1/ Relationships between neighbouring Russian units in the Pokrovsk area are reportedly so tense that commanders have had to publish instructions on how to behave – including refraining from stealing from each other. A lack of training and incompetent command is blamed. ⬇️
2/ 'Callsign OSETIN' explains the context:
"Comrades in Pokrovsk, I'm addressing you. Information is coming in from various units that there's discord between some units; no one wants to cooperate, and no one likes their neighbours, blaming each other for everything."
3/ "If this is true, I ask all soldiers, including brigade commanders, to resolve this issue and forget all grievances. We have one enemy, and squabbling among ourselves is absolutely unacceptable, especially when several cities containing U.S. forces [sic] are about to fall.
1/ The Wall Street Journal reports that the main focus of the US-Russia peace talks is to get commercial advantage for American companies, and personal benefits for individuals linked to the Trump Administration. European officials are said to be shocked by the plans. ⬇️
2/ According to the WSJ, talks between Trump's golfing friend Steve Witkoff, his son-in-law Jared Kushner, and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev have bypassed the US national security and diplomatic apparatuses to focus on economic benefits for well-connected American companies.
3/ The paper reports that "a cast of businessmen close to the Trump administration have been looking to position themselves as new economic links between the U.S. and Russia." Friends of the Trump family and Trump donors are working on lucrative deals with Russian companies.
1/ The Russian army has to rely on modified civilian vehicles purchased with soldiers' own money, because military trucks are in such short supply. According to a Russian soldier-warblogger, units have to wait between 5 to 12 months to receive trucks. ⬇️
2/ Probably as a result of heavy losses due to Ukrainian attacks and a slowdown of production at Russian manufacturers, trucks are now scarce in the Russian army. Light vehicles and motorcycles are not supplied by the army, forcing soldiers to buy them themselves.
3/ 'Vault No. 8' comments:
"It wasn't until mid-2024 that the regiment finally received a few Chinese buggies out of the 1,500 sent to the Special Military Operation."