Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian attack schemes:
I decided to compare the offensive of Russia in the spring and the counteroffensive of Ukraine in September in order to understand the reasons for such different results 1/17 #RussiaUkraineWar#kharkivcounteroffensive
2/ Russia
From the very beginning of the war, Russia built its offensive operations along the main highways and key population centers. This is understandable because the Russian offensive relied primarily on heavily armored vehicles.
3/ In this war we saw tank columns trying to storm a city without any infantry, air, or artillery cover. Which is an absolutely failed strategy.
4/ This led to the fact that tank columns were ambushed. Large forces could be blocked in narrow directions, as we saw near Kyiv, where a column of equipment stretched for tens of kilometers. theguardian.com/world/2022/mar…
5/ Since May, Russia has somewhat changed its tactics, increasingly using assault groups of light infantry (mainly mobilized in Luhansk and Donetsk). The task of which is to find a weak spot in the defense for further breakthroughs of the main forces. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobilizat…
6/ The attacks were accompanied by massive artillery fire. In May-June, Russia apparently reached the peak of the use of its artillery. At that time, the number of shots reached 50-65 thousand shells per day, if we rely on the data of the Ukrainian military.
7/ But the concept of the Russian attack remained unchanged. Russia moves from one settlement to another, moving along the main roads.
The disadvantage of this strategy is: 1) high military losses (because the Russians carry out a lot of assaults, most of which are unsuccessful);
8/ 2) high dependence on Soviet artillery, which requires intensive logistics and a large number of warehouses; 3) the slowness of the war (instead of one attack, the Russians have to repeat the same sequence with each subsequent city).
9/ All this led to the fact that in July-August Russia no longer had enough forces to continue the massive offensive. In July, the Russians called it an "operational pause", but later the "pause" turned into a retreat and flight of Russian soldiers from Kharkiv Oblast
10/ Ukraine
Ukraine has built a completely different concept of attack. Many mobile groups move not on the main roads but on forest and steppe roads. These groups "fill the space" between Russian forces, cut supply routes and create the effect of a local encirclement.
11/ After breaking through the defensive line, the second offensive line attacks the Russian positions from different directions.
This requires high coordination of actions and reliable communication in order to understand where one's own/someone else's is.
12/ Russia has very poor intelligence and coordination. After the breakthrough of the defense line, the military command often does not understand the operational situation, receives information with a significant delay, and therefore makes many wrong decisions
13/ Often, the Russian military retreats when they should rush into battle. And vice versa - they continue the fight when they should retreat.
This leads to high military losses during the retreat.
14/ Result:
Russia has a significant advantage in the number of armored vehicles and artillery, but this creates big problems for logistics. The Russian army needs a lot of fuel and ammunition.
15/ Because of this, the Russian army is "clumsy". Poor coordination, intelligence, and training of soldiers only worsen the situation.
16/ The Ukrainian army is much more mobile and organized. Ukraine has better intelligence, which allows you to accurately assess the situation on the battlefield.
17/ But the insufficient number of armored vehicles leads to the fact that a large part of the army is made up of light infantry, which is unprotected from artillery fire (especially during the offensive).
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Battle of Pokrovsk
The battle of Pokrov became the biggest battle of this war. But it also became one of the largest battles in history in terms of the number of armored vehicles lost. 1/
2/ In the battles near Pokrovsk, Ru losses are close to the number of the entire Western Military District of the Ru Fed as of 2022, which was being prepared for war with NATO. And this is about 60% of the forces with which Russia planned to seize Ukraine in three days in 2022
3/ In October 2023, Ru defined the offensive on Pokrovsk as the main axis of its offensive campaign. Obviously, Putin is focused on the goal of completely capturing the Donetsk region as the highest priority goal in the coming years. But this offensive led to colossal losses.
Russia is suffering more and more losses trying to look like the side that is winning.
The dynamics of Russian losses indicates the price of the Russian offensive. 1/6
Russia had to go to a colossal increase in its losses in order to continue to look like the winning side. If in 2022 Russian losses amounted to about 200 soldiers per day (killed and wounded), in 2023 - about 500, then in 2024 Ru reached the mark of 1,0 and 1.5K soldiers per day
Russian losses increased 10 times compared to the first months of the war.
Given that the hostilities are taking place in fairly limited territories, the overall losses of the Russians are unprecedented. 3/6
Resources of war
Can Russia sustain this war for years? Here are some calculations to help estimate this.
Thread 1/
@RALee85 @olliecarroll @ragnarbjartur @konrad_muzyka @McFaul @HelloMrBond @SpencerGuard @JominiW
2/
Let's start with artillery, which looks the most vulnerable
Standard calculations of the resource of artillery barrels show that at the current rate of firing, Ru needs about 2.5-4К barrels per year. If we add to this direct losses in battles, Ru total need is about 4-5K per year
Half a year ago, I joined the procurement reform team of the Ministry of Defense-the Non-Lethal Procurement Agency (DOT)
This is my second "campaign" for reforms in the defense sector after Ukroboronprom in 2019. And here I would like to share some thoughts and my own experience
2/ Soviet architecture and corruption are the worst things Ukraine inherited from the USSR. In Soviet times, corruption was the only way to become a wealthy person. Wealth and commerce were prohibited by law, but the desire of people to live better did not disappear anywhere.
3/ For the first twenty years after the collapse of the USSR, Ukrainian society was aware of the problem of corruption, eventually defining it as the main enemy of democracy and the development of the state.
Struggle for resources
When Ukrainians say that we need more weapons, the West often thinks that it is a sign of ingratitude.
In fact, Ukrainians are grateful, but there is another side - how many weapons your enemy supplies to the front.
This thread will explore this topic 1/
2/ Russia
Many people look down on the Russian army after its defeats in Ukraine in the first year of the war.
But the Russian doctrine is based on the fact that Russia is able to withstand heavy defeats and incredible losses, but not to give up its political goals.
3/ Ru is still a significant power, if not in terms of the quality of weapons, but in terms of their quantity.
Since the beginning of the war, Ru has removed approximately 6,000 howitzers from its storage facilities.
Russia spent $22.8 billion on missile attacks on Ukraine.
This is more than half of all US military aid to Ukraine ($43 billion).
A short thread about missile attacks this winter: 1/7
2/7 Despite the sanctions, Russia has increased its missile production and can now produce about 100 missiles per month.
In October, Russia reduced the intensity of its use of missiles, apparently preparing for winter attacks on UA energy.
3/7 Air Defense Ukraine has become much more effective than a year ago. If until October 2022, Ukrainian air defenses shot down about 30% of missiles, then after the transfer of NASAMS, Iris-T, Patriot, Samp-T, Ukrainian air defenses began to intercept up to 80-90% of missiles.