Volodymyr Dacenko Profile picture
2022-2023 a columnist in Forbes Ukraine 2019-2021 SC Ukroboronprom (a group of state defense companies of Ukraine)
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Nov 10 6 tweets 2 min read
Russia is suffering more and more losses trying to look like the side that is winning.
The dynamics of Russian losses indicates the price of the Russian offensive. 1/6 Image Russia had to go to a colossal increase in its losses in order to continue to look like the winning side. If in 2022 Russian losses amounted to about 200 soldiers per day (killed and wounded), in 2023 - about 500, then in 2024 Ru reached the mark of 1,0 and 1.5K soldiers per day
Jun 12 20 tweets 5 min read
Resources of war
Can Russia sustain this war for years? Here are some calculations to help estimate this.
Thread 1/
@RALee85 @olliecarroll @ragnarbjartur @konrad_muzyka @McFaul @HelloMrBond @SpencerGuard @JominiW Image 2/ Image
Jun 6 16 tweets 3 min read
Half a year ago, I joined the procurement reform team of the Ministry of Defense-the Non-Lethal Procurement Agency (DOT)
This is my second "campaign" for reforms in the defense sector after Ukroboronprom in 2019. And here I would like to share some thoughts and my own experience Image 2/ Soviet architecture and corruption are the worst things Ukraine inherited from the USSR. In Soviet times, corruption was the only way to become a wealthy person. Wealth and commerce were prohibited by law, but the desire of people to live better did not disappear anywhere.
Nov 13, 2023 24 tweets 5 min read
Struggle for resources
When Ukrainians say that we need more weapons, the West often thinks that it is a sign of ingratitude.
In fact, Ukrainians are grateful, but there is another side - how many weapons your enemy supplies to the front.
This thread will explore this topic 1/ Image 2/ Russia
Many people look down on the Russian army after its defeats in Ukraine in the first year of the war.
But the Russian doctrine is based on the fact that Russia is able to withstand heavy defeats and incredible losses, but not to give up its political goals.
Oct 31, 2023 7 tweets 2 min read
Russia spent $22.8 billion on missile attacks on Ukraine.
This is more than half of all US military aid to Ukraine ($43 billion).
A short thread about missile attacks this winter: 1/7 Image 2/7 Despite the sanctions, Russia has increased its missile production and can now produce about 100 missiles per month.
In October, Russia reduced the intensity of its use of missiles, apparently preparing for winter attacks on UA energy.
Jun 22, 2023 8 tweets 2 min read
The beginning of the offensive is the most difficult stage of the attack.
If you do not expect to catch the enemy by surprise, then the beginning of the assault is the most challenging stage 1/8
Inspired by: @bradyafr @WarintheFuture @Inkvisiit 2/8
At the beginning of the offensive, the enemy is in the most advantageous position:
1. The army has been preparing for defense for a long time and has strong defensive positions.
2. There are still enough soldiers to hold the defense and there are also reserves.
Jun 8, 2023 15 tweets 5 min read
What happened to Kakhovska HPP
Debunking myths about self-destruction
1/15
@CITeam_en @nytimes @TheStudyofWar @washingtonpost @leonidvolkov @shashj ImageImageImageImage 1. Some believe that the dam collapsed on its own due to previous damage. Satellite images of water discharge are cited as evidence 2/15 Image
May 9, 2023 5 tweets 1 min read
Before a counteroffensive, Ukraine probably has as many tanks as Russia.
Russia has also lost most of its advantage in ground military equipment.
Brief overview: 1/5 Image 2/5 Ukraine had 858 tanks at the beginning of the war (the Military Balance). In 14 months, 605+ tanks were delivered by the Allies (including about 90+ Leopard 2 and Challenger 2 tanks). Another 80 Leopard 1 will arrive in June. Also, the AFU captured at least 544 Ru tanks
Apr 17, 2023 7 tweets 4 min read
Comparison of the cost of destroying a target with different weapons 1/7
#RussiaUkraineWar #OSINT #javelin #UAV @sambendett @SpencerGuard @shashj @FeWoessner @RALee85 @ragnarbjartur
Target - infantry: Image 2/7 Target - armor: Image
Mar 20, 2023 8 tweets 3 min read
Chronology of the battle for Bakhmut
#RussianUkrainianWar @Deepstate_UA #Bakhmut
1/8 2/ The battle in the Bakhmut direction began after Popasnaya and Svitlodarsk were captured by Ru in May 2022. Bakhmut became the next city on the way of the Ru army. It is hard to imagine, but already in June 2022 Ru troops were 10 km from Bakhmut
Mar 15, 2023 14 tweets 4 min read
We all see many statements about war losses that are difficult to put together.
How can Ukraine lose 5 times fewer killed and at the same time the total number of losses is called 200K/120K in Ru/Ua?
I will try to explain it briefly:
#RussiaUkraineWar #RussianArmy
1/14 2/14
1. Different ratio of killed/wounded
In the Russian army, the ratio of killed/wounded troops is usually called 1/3. In the Ukrainian army - 1/7-1/8, and sometimes even as much as 1/10 or more.
There is a great point @shashj about this:
Feb 15, 2023 12 tweets 3 min read
Losses in wars
I decided to compare losses in different wars in order to understand how big Russia's losses are in this war
1/12
#RussianArmy #RussiaUkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar 2/12 Average daily losses of the main attacking country:
1. Germany (World War II) - 2415 killed soldiers per day.
2. USSR (Finnish War 1939) - 1440
3. Germany (World War I) - 1280
4. Russia (Ukrainian war 2022) - 380 (about 650 per day after mobilization).
Jan 23, 2023 25 tweets 6 min read
How Russia's tactics have changed since the beginning of the war - 4 strategies of the Russian command 1/
#russianlosses #Russiawar #UkraineRussiaWar ImageImage Phase I - Blitzkrieg
Initially, the Ru attack was planned as a large-scale rapid operation from the air, land and water. It was planned in 4 acts:
Act 1: A large-scale missile attack was supposed to suppress the Ukrainian air defense system and create chaos in defense management
Dec 20, 2022 18 tweets 5 min read
Balance of power
This is a comparison of the available military power of Ukraine and Russia (according to open data) 1/17
#UkraineRussiaWar #RussiaInvadedUkraine #ATACMSForUkraine #OSINT Image 2/17 Now I only have electricity for 4-6 hours a day, so I can't spend as much time on Twitter as I used to.
But I finally got to my calculations and clarified them to give you a clear picture (it may not be perfect and contain errors, like any analytics).
Nov 28, 2022 20 tweets 5 min read
In 9 months, Russia has already spent a quarter of its annual budget on the war, but the needs of the war will only grow 1/20
#RussiaIsLosing #RussiaUkraineWar #RussianArmy #UkraineUnderAttack @HelloMrBond Image 2/20 Russia's direct military costs for the 9 months of the war, are about $82 bln. This estimate includes direct costs that are necessary to support military operations. The estimate does not include others defense spending or economic losses forbes.ua/war-in-ukraine…
Nov 3, 2022 17 tweets 4 min read
The number of weapons that the West has/supplies to Ukraine
How many Western countries have weapons and how many of these weapons were transferred to Ukraine during the 8 months of the war?
1/17
#russianinvasion #UkraineRussiaWar #Artillery #atacmsforukraine 2/17 NATO transferred 1.4-3.6% of its heavy weapons systems to Ukraine. The highest percentage is for artillery - about 3.6%.
Oct 15, 2022 17 tweets 4 min read
Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian attack schemes:
I decided to compare the offensive of Russia in the spring and the counteroffensive of Ukraine in September in order to understand the reasons for such different results 1/17 #RussiaUkraineWar #kharkivcounteroffensive Image 2/ Russia
From the very beginning of the war, Russia built its offensive operations along the main highways and key population centers. This is understandable because the Russian offensive relied primarily on heavily armored vehicles.
Oct 7, 2022 4 tweets 2 min read
The Armed Forces Ukraine currently uses 25 different models of NATO armored vehicles and 15 different NATO artillery systems
To solve this problem, it is necessary to switch to an integrated supply of weapons 1/4
@SpencerGuard @McFaul @CinC_AFU @oleksiireznikov @USAmbKyiv Image 2/4 Perhaps it is worth switching to a different approach when a country (or a group of countries) completes a separate military unit (starting with a tank and ending with a repair vehicle).
I made an infographic on how it can be based on the example of the USA and Germany.
Sep 7, 2022 25 tweets 7 min read
The dynamics of the balance of power are gradually changing in favor of Ukraine. But Ukraine needs more help0/24
#UkraineRussiaWar #RussianUkrainewar @KofmanMichael @JominiW @shashj @McFaul @IAPonomarenko @MarkHertling @konrad_muzyka @apmassaro3 @POTUS @USAmbKyiv @MelSimmonsFCDO 1/24 At the beginning of the war, Russia had a total advantage in all parameters. 1.5 times more soldiers, 4 times more tanks, 6 times more armored vehicles, 2 times more artillery. The advantage in aviation, navy and long-range systems is 10 times or more.
Sep 2, 2022 22 tweets 7 min read
What forces does Russia have on the western bank of the Dnipro?
Are there enough Ukrainian troops to attack? 1/17
#RussiaUkraineWar #Kherson #KhersonCounteroffensive @KofmanMichael @IAPonomarenko @JominiW @HN_Schlottman @DefMon3 @daxe #OSINT 2/17 There are different assumptions about what is currently being will happen near Kherson.
Someone is talking about an attack on Kherson. Someone is about probing weak spots in the RU defense. Someone claims that the counterattack "failed" (@JulianRoepcke).
Aug 26, 2022 25 tweets 6 min read
Losses of Russia in the war:
1/25 Now there is a lot of controversy about how many soldiers Russia has lost.
But in reality, there is no magic number after which war must stop
@SpencerGuard @TheStudyofWar @shashj #oryx #RussiaUkraineWar #RussianArmy 2/25 Tempos are more important. Rates of losses and rates of mobilization of reserves.
If you lose more than you can mobilize - your army is shrinking.
If mobilization exceeds losses, your army accumulates reserves.