What I learned at IMF/WB meetings 1. No consensus on monetary policy. Most policy makers want to keep hiking aggressively, most market participants want central banks to slow. Best quote I heard: "When I drive into fog, I slow down." There's massive global uncertainty. Slow down!
2. Debt-to-GDP ratios are back! Many G10 countries have gov't debt that's higher than the UK (GB). Market focus is now squarely on them. #MMT is seen as totally discredited, by the rise in global inflation, by the collapse of the Yen and - most recently - by the UK experience...
3. Most think Ukraine will win and take back ALL its territory from Russia. Some even expect the war to end within a few months. No one thinks the war can drag on for a long time, i.e. Ukraine may be the new "transitory." Few are aware how precarious Ukraine's finances are...
4. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a total game changer for global capital flows. Front and center is China, where anecdotal evidence that new money is no longer being put to work by foreign investors lines up with our flows going flat. Saudi Arabia is also under scrutiny...
5. Lots of focus on deteriorating market liquidity. This is attributed to market makers at their risk limits due to volatile commodity prices. It's also linked to high uncertainty (Ukraine, Taiwan) and hawkish central banks who seem determined to hike until something breaks...
6. German deindustrialization. Focus on Germany is intense. Worries of energy rationing are fading, given growing evidence that energy consumption is falling. Instead, there is growing focus on the medium-term, with manufacturing leaving Germany for locations with cheap energy...
7. Growing dismay over de facto Euro zone spread control. Wide-spread consternation that the volatility of Italy's spread was near all-time lows into the Sep. 25 election. Spread control is seen as unsustainable in a global rising rate environment. Lots of skepticism of ECB TPI.
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Pushbacks to the G7 oil price cap 1. West won't set the cap low enough to hurt 2. Russia will retaliate to spike global oil prices 3. China & India help Russia circumvent the cap 4. Enforcing that Russia is paid the cap is difficult 5. Putin will escalate the war in Ukraine
1. This is the focus of G7 negotiations now. It is likely Europe wants a higher cap, which hurts Putin less, while the US is happier setting a low cap. If Putin currently gets $75 per barrel of oil, I think the cap should be no higher than $30 for it to materially hurt Russia...
2. Russia has little storage capacity for crude. Closing its many "low-flow" oil wells is labor-intensive and time consuming. So Russia has very little leverage in threatening the West with an oil price spike, unless Putin is willing to blow up his only cash cow. Not credible...
Lessons from Russia sanctions 1. Sanctioning a c/a surplus country is harder 2. You have to hit a c/a surplus country's exports 3. We purposefully avoided that with our carveouts 4. So the sanctions worked / didn't work debate is silly 5. We avoided hitting Russia where it hurts
1. Sanctioning a c/a surplus country: financial sanctions work best on c/a deficit countries that import capital. US sanctions on Turkey in 2018 caused a massive crisis and recession. You can't expect the same for Russia, as it is a c/a surplus country & thus a capital exporter.
2. Hitting a c/a surplus country: Achilles heel of any c/a surplus country is its exports, which - in Russia's case - account for the bulk of the massively higher trade surplus. Instead of financial sanctions, you must embargo Russian exports to cause maximum damage. We didn't.
No one disputes that the ECB has a role in preventing Euro periphery spreads from going crazy. Instead, the issue is whether this gets done via the OMT with strict conditionality or via a new tool that has what many see as pro forma conditionality. That difference really matters.
OMT conditionality acts as a deterrent to politicians who'd rather not do hard reforms. If all they have to fall back on is OMT, which imposes difficult reforms, politicians might as well just do reforms and avoid the "stigma" of OMT. "Stigma" is thus a key feature of OMT...
Now think of a new tool that caps spreads with looser conditionality than OMT or pro forma conditionality as some fear. There's little incentive for politicians to do hard reforms, as it's comparatively "costless" to use the new tool. It's not "toxic," i.e. there's no stigma...
The G7 price cap on Russian oil can be highly effective at cutting the flood of money to Russia (black). Key is to think of the cap as a waiver for sanctions on maritime insurance. Oil tankers only get the insurance if the price Putin gets is the "cap," as @baselinescene argues.
We've been hammering the message for many months that the key to cutting Putin's cashflow are Western oil tankers. If maritime insurance is available only to ships that respect the price cap, that cashflow to Putin collapses and - with it - Russia's economy. With @JonathanPingle
The insurance oil tankers need comes from the UK, Norway and - within the EU - Sweden. If the cap helps build consensus around sanctions on maritime insurance, it may stop oil from going to China at a higher price for Putin. If China wants Russian oil, Putin gets paid the "cap."
Let's say the ECB's new anti-fragmentation tool is used to cap periphery yields. Such a cap means periphery yields stay below where markets think they must be, so the ECB stays the only buyer of new issuance, as has been the case in recent years. A yield cap means QE infinity...
In the extreme, if the ECB were to announce a hard cap on periphery spreads, this could mean potentially unlimited QE of periphery debt. That would (a) violate the prohibition of monetary financing; (b) equate to a synthetic Eurobond, which is well beyond the ECB's mandate...
This is why the new anti-fragmentation tool cannot be used to permanently cap spreads. It can only be used temporarily during market stress. This is why the current debate over "fragmentation" is so important. This question determines how "permanent" the new tool will be...
Why is Putin cutting gas exports to Europe? The West - reluctant to sanction maritime insurance - has created a monster. The hard currency windfall from the rise in oil prices gives Putin the space to weaponize gas exports. He is swimming in cash. So why not turn the screws...
Ironically, the EU - by permitting the massive rise in Greek tankers taking oil out of Russian ports (blue) - is the biggest enabler of this weaponization of gas exports, by giving Putin the shipping capacity to take his oil to places all around the world. With @JonathanPingle
The other big enabler of Putin turning the screws on Europe via gas exports is China, which is importing lots of Russian oil, which has caused China's imports from Russia to jump sharply from previous years. This jump is mostly a volume effect and only secondarily a price effect.