Facts about the G2:
-It has a published range of 2500 km (about 1500 miles). That's suspect.
-It weighs about 200 kg (≈ 450 lbs)
-The payload (explosives) are estimated to be ≈ 50-60kg (130 lbs of explosives, smaller than the lightest 250 lb bombs delivered by aircraft). 3/
-It's usually launched from a "rack" of 5
-It's launched w/ "rocket-assistance" (but that kicks over to a moped-type engine for flight).
-It does NOT have a camera
-It flies via GPS/satellite navigation.
-It's built from cheap & easily available parts; costs about $20k 4/
-It's mobile (put on a truck, ships, etc)
-It has a nearly invisible radar signature, so it's very difficult to detect.
-It's designed to evade technologically-advanced & costly air defense.
-It's noisy, slow & visible when flying overhead. 5/
Iran's design is cheap, small yield, difficult for advanced air defense to shoot down. Desire is to attack critical & easily damaged STATIONARY military targets: Airfields, radars, command centers, fuel & ammo dumps.
While Iran designed it for specific military targets...
...RU is using G2's as a terror weapons.
Some have compared it to Hitler's use of V1 or V2 terror weapons used against England, but those had a higher yield, were more expensive, & were not precision weapons. 7/
Some suggest these are another reason Ukraine needs more Air Defense (ADA).
Would C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, mortar) systems work?
Recall, ADA relies on radar warning, defend a small area/point targets.
It's impossible to predict G2 targets 8/
For G2s, the best counter:
-electronic jamming
-shoulder-fired AD (Stingers)
-massed small arms fire
-Laser weapons (under development)
Though a few G2 struck buildings & caused civilian deaths today, there are also reports of most being engaged. 9/
Drones are valuable weapons when used against military targets.
When used for terrorizing civilians & civilian infrastructure, they are evidence of war crimes & Putin's increasingly failed attempts to subjugate Ukraine.
The intent of this 🧵 is to provide info. 10/
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Mick describes the actions of Generals Valeriy Zaluzhnyy & Andrii Kovalchuk, and Col-Gen Oleksandr Syrskiy and how those will go down in Ukraine's military history (similar to Eisenhower, Bradley & Montgomery on D-Day).
Aggressive, adaptive, innovative...a new breed. 2/
In April, @politico did a great piece on Zaluzhnyy, saying he is part of a "new generation of Ukrainian officers who cut their teeth in the grinding eight-year war in Donbas and...deployed to training ranges across Europe to drill with NATO forces." 3/
Planners analyze & assess:
-enemy launch platforms (land, sea, air)
-potential "tracks" (the anticipated route the enemy missile will take)
-what they enemy wants to hit
-the critical thing being defended (e.g., airfield, port, infrastructure, specific building, forces). 9/
Here's the point:
It's impossible to line a bunch of ADA systems long the 2500-mile Ukrainian border & expect them to stop missiles launched from RU subs in the Azov, or dropped from RU bombers circling 1500 miles away, or land-based RU missile batteries in RU. 10/
What makes it even harder:
RU is not aiming at "critical infrastructure" or "military targets," (which, in an area like Ukraine would require literally hundreds of ADA systems), RU is striking random civilian targets - to include playgrounds! - all over the country. 11/
After the strike on the Kerch Bridge, it was expected Putin would respond.
He did so by launching 84+ missiles & dozens of drones against Ukrainian civilian targets (an initial assessment) and making more threatening speeches.
A 🧵on that & thoughts on air defense. 1/
As I said in a weekend tweet, the operational strike on the Kerch Bridge resulted in strategic implications.
-Militarily, it affects RU's belief they have a secure line of communication for logistics in a safe area.
-It also negatively affects RU ability to move forces. 2/
RU is now constrained in using the bridge for transport & resupply, and now must use either ship transport to Berydansk or the M4 road from Rostov.
Informationally the RU's - & RU's in Crimea - know about the strike. They can't understand how this "defended" asset was hit. 3/
Wanna know what it's like to be a battlefield commander & have a bridge blow up in your area of operations?
Having had that experience, under different circumstances, it is not a good day in Moscow.
A "war story" 🧵 that will provide some insight into the Kerch attack. 1/
In 2007, I assumed command of the storied @1stArmoredDiv. We would deploy to N. Iraq as "Task Force Iron," and become Multinational Division North, conducting operations in the 7 northern provinces.
Before going, we spent some time training...to include "staff training." 2/
The Division conducted 'battle drills' exercises with our staff at the simulation center at Grafenwoehr, a state of the art facility in S. Germany. During a two week period we practiced everything we thought we might see in combat under the watchful eye of trainers. 3/
Interestingly, RU State TV now claiming it will take “two months” to get recently mobilized to the front lines in Ukraine.
Great. But will they be able to do anything? No friggin’ way.
RU may be able to train the basics of soldiering in 2 months.
But…. 1/5
-You can’t “train” combined arms warfare, especially for large formations, in 2 months
-You can’t “teach” Generals, Colonels and new Sergeants the tenets of leadership in 2 months
-You can’t “fix” a supply system that has been plagued with corruption for years in 2 months. 2/
-You can’t “coordinate” tankers, infantry, arty, intel, engineers, air forces & others for battlefield operations in 2 months
-you can’t “counter distrust” soldiers have in RU govt in 2 months
-after 60,000 dead soldiers, you can’t reverse the loss felt by RU mothers & wives 3/
A 🧵on recent media stories about US "planning reaction to Putin's potential use of nuclear weapons."
While Americans may have concerns about how Ukrainian successes may cause Putin to do more dumb things (use nukes), the US does extensive planning on these (& other) issues. 1/
1. @DeptofDefense, the Joint Staff, and several combatant commands develop "contingency plans" based on strategic guidance for all threats. See chart ⬇️ 2/
COCOM Contingency Plans (at the bottom) are written based on @POTUS & DOD guidance. Those span a spectrum of actions the military must execute, including humanitarian efforts, combat, & deterrence of/reaction to enemy use of nuclear weapons.