Over the past months, air defense has received significant attention. In case you'd like to understand more about radar, jamming, decoys, surface-to-air missiles, and the like, here some sources I found very useful.
I'd start from this article from 1999 that puts things in perspective and explains why air defenses posed a problem also for the US Air Force in the War in Kosovo.
Then, I would look at this book. It is very accessible, has some jokes, and some interesting anecdotes. Moreover, it will help you understand not only radar but also sonar. There is barely any math or physics, only some very introductory statistics.
(If you liked the first few chapters of Denny's book, you will like these two books, which provide an historical overview of the relevance of the electro-magnetic spectrum (mostly) through US experience).
To understand radar, this is a great source to start with, if you do not have the basics - all you need is some physics and familiarity with math & stats. Older versions (co-authored by the late Toomay) are good too, but the 4th ed includes a discussions on countermeasures.
This is a great complement to the book by Hannes. Very accessible, it will explain some aspects much more in depth. And even though it is now more than 20 years old, it's probably my favorite "intro" book on radar.
Speaking about introductory books, Skolnik's Introduction to Radar Systems is considered the Bible. Some find Skolnik's book more demanding than the other two, but I guess it is a matter of preferences.
This relatively unknown report will connect for you radar engineering and air defense. it is more than 30 years old now, but the key principles are still valid, and are presented in a simple way (you will find also a general introduction of radar).
Speaking about air defense, this is a more recent report published by the US Army, which summarizes in a very accessible combined arms for air defense. Strongly recommended.
This is, by far, one of my most favorite works on air defense. It has some technical discussions, but it puts them together with air defense more in general. I consider it one of those works for which there is a "before and after".
This is another great source, an article by JHUAPL: it discusses air defense at sea, but the principles underlying it apply broadly. Look closely at the pictures, because some are extremely informative.
This short report by the Mitchell Institute provides an accessible summary of what integrated air defense systems are.
This report by Justin Bronk is also very useful. It does much more than the title suggests. Whereas it is focused on Russian and Chinese capabilities, it still provides a general summary and it has some really clear figures.
Speaking about air defense, this book will put in historical perspective the attempt to defeat them through suppression of enemy air defense systems.
Here we get more technical, so you might find it a bit demanding. But this book has so much it's difficult to summarize it. Written by a former Lockheed employee, it includes also detailed discussions about electronic order of battles.
This guy. As far as I know, it is the only book specifically on airborne radar out there. And it is one of those books for which I would recommend that you read both the 2nd & the 3rd version to appreciate how technological change has enhanced radar systems over the past decades.
This is a demanding book. I have read it some 6 or 7 times, and there are still parts that I do not fully understand. But it is the one that really helped me understand scattering and signal processing. Among "pros" it is considered the to-go book.
And if you do not have time to read all these works, with my co-authors, we have tried to summarized them in a recent article about the "Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare."
Data la malafede dimostrata, qui metto alcuni pensieri sparsi sul dilemma della sicurezza - che è diventato parte del dibattito politico sul programma di riarmo Europeo per via di Barbero, e ora tutti ne parlano.
Punto primo: l’idea è tanto semplice quanto banale, ovvero la corsa agli armamenti sarebbe una sorta di profezia che si auto avvera. Gli Stati si armano per difendersi, ma così facendo, il riarmo crea paura nei vicini.
Così, questi vicini si trovano a dover scegliere di attaccare “preventivamente” per scongiurare di trovarsi, nel giro di pochi anni, si fronte ad una minaccia militare troppo forte che non possono più fermare.
Yesterday I had the pleasure to give a presentation at the European Central Bank about European defense. The discussion was very interesting and enriching. Here are a couple of points that I made during & after the presentation:
1) European countries depend on the US for several “enablers” (in the language of economics: complementary goods), & it will be very demanding to replace the US. In this regard, the discussion about the kill-switch about the F-35 hides a much larger dependency
of European countries on American technology: the architecture for long-range detection, identification and tracking/geolocating of targets and for transmitting in real time the targeting data beyond line of sight over advers territory, airborne electronic warfare,
For those who wonder, this relatively unknown books helps understand what the US is trying to achieve with its tariffs. Of course, things are much more complicated, but the US, in virtue of the size and dynamism of its economy, has the "go-it-alone" power, as the author calls it
Which means that it suffers much less than its partners in restricting trade with them. Such "inequality in pain", if you want, is a source of leverage for the US. The US has always used such leverage, as the author demonstrates in its book.
The Trump administration is simply bringing the use of such leverage to a new level.
Very happy to see that the article "Weapons of the Weak: Technological Change, Guerrilla Firepower, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes" that @CostantinoPisch @aa_gilli and I have written is finally out in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, open access.
Our articles starts from a simple but important question, namely: what explains counterinsurgency outcome (COIN)? This topic has received extensive attention over the past 20+ years, and existing contributions have enhanced our understanding of the dynamics .
As we note, however, existing works have, for the most part, not investigated the role of insurgent firepower, and whether variation in firepower explains variation in counterinsurgency outcomes.
This is a very interesting and detailed article. But on three parts, it should have contextualized better the points some analysts advanced. foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/16/sub…
First, ocean transparency is something that nobody in the submarine field takes seriously. Sorry to be blunt, but this is how it is (I experienced it first hand when presenting a paper that challenges ocean transparency).
The reason being how anti-submarine warfare works, namely it is a massive endeavor in terms of asset and personnel involved: the ocean is huge, sensors have relatively short ranges, after detection, you need to carry out area-search, which will happen t+1 from detection
At least for my small number, my thread about Elon's wrong take on the F-35 got some attention yesterday. Logging off today as I have work to do. Thanks to @Hertie_Security alumn @sochnyev who pointed to me Elon's comments, which followed discussions we have had on this topic.
One general comment about the whole debate: When I teach about air defenses, stealth, radar (as well as the defense industry, weapons design, military operations, personnel policy) I always preface my lectures telling students that my goal is to make them informed citizens.
That is: whatever career they will have, I believe it is important that students who are interested in politics and economics can follow, understand and contribute to public debate about defense, as it should be in a democracy.