Share this page!

George Perkovich Profile picture
Twitter logo
Oct 19 • 2 tweets • 1 min read
In sum, offering ceasefire TALKS puts Russia on back foot, mitigates nuclear risks, puts China/India on the spot, and allows Ukraine to keep fighting until Russia accepts reasonable terms. (15/16)
If Russia agrees to negotiate, Ukraine does not have to say yes in talks unless the terms are better than the alternative on the horizon. (16/16)

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
　

Keep Current with George Perkovich

George Perkovich Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @PerkovichG

George Perkovich Profile picture
Oct 19
A response to critics of Eli Levite’s and my piece in @ForeignPolicy on how to avoid nuke use in Ukraine & strengthen global pressure against Putin before Winter. foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/nuc… A thread (1/16)
Our central argument is that by offering ceasefire NEGOTIATIONS, Ukraine could further weaken Russian position. (2/16)
We want Russia driven entirely out of Ukraine, Putin replaced by someone more humane, etc. But we haven’t seen any plausible blueprints for actually returning Crimea & removaing the FSB/siloviki from power in Russia w/o nuclear use? Have you? (3/16)
Read 14 tweets
George Perkovich Profile picture
May 13
Biden is right to scrap a nuclear-armed SLCM.

The weapon is unnecessary, would divert military capabilities and funding from more pressing threats, and fuel an arms race that no one can win.

Yet some are fighting hard to revive it. Ahead of upcoming HASC hearings, a thread:
1st question: Is the SLCM-N even necessary?

In a letter to the Senate, STRATCOM Commander Adm. Richard offered the following criteria as needed to fill a “deterrence and assurance gap”: defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/…
The artifice of Richard’s pitch—suggesting that one weapon needs all five attributes he lists—betrays its weakness.

The U.S. already has or will soon have three other nuclear weapon systems that can, together, do whatever SLCM-N is supposed to do.
Read 16 tweets
George Perkovich Profile picture
Sep 28, 2021
Twitter might be a good medium for my mischievous thoughts about the AUKUS submarine deal.

Herewith a thread.
The AUKUS deal resembles the US-India nuclear deal of 2005—done by a handful of self-confident officials in secrecy, precluding interagency vetting that might have revealed flaws and hurdles to the deal.

carnegieendowment.org/2005/09/07/fau…
The nuclear deal was announced with great fanfare, heralding the beginning of a new, deep strategic partnership between the US and India, with an eye toward balancing China’s power.
Read 17 tweets
George Perkovich Profile picture
May 7, 2020
Dr. Chris Ford and State Department colleagues recently published online a thoughtful and interesting paper on regional deterrence and low-yield nuclear weapons. Here with a thread distilling my critique of the paper. (1/18) carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/06/cri…
Debate will focus on the case Ford et al make for deploying low-yield SLBM warhead (W76-2).
state.gov/wp-content/upl…

Yet, Ford’s introductory explanation of the 2018 NPR deserves more attention. (2/18)
Previous admins (Rep and Dem) have declared “extreme circumstances” to be the threshold whereupon the United States would consider using nuclear weapons. Ford correctly says this phrasing is excessively ambiguous. (3/18) fas.org/wp-content/upl…
Read 18 tweets
George Perkovich Profile picture
Feb 27, 2020
THREAD summarizing my new paper “Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?” (reducing 15,000 words to 15 tweets). carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/11/tow…
For decades, nuclear debates have centered on the question, “how much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? 1/15
Deterrence theory is very elastic and “allows” players to build and threaten to use boundless numbers of weapons with boundless destructiveness. This leads to “overkill." 2/15 jstor.org/stable/pdf/262…
Read 16 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!

This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

Send Email!

Email the whole thread instead of just a link!

Separate emails with commas

:(