A response to critics of Eli Levite’s and my piece in @ForeignPolicy on how to avoid nuke use in Ukraine & strengthen global pressure against Putin before Winter. foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/nuc… A thread (1/16) Our central argument is that by offering ceasefire NEGOTIATIONS, Ukraine could further weaken Russian position. (2/16)

Biden is right to scrap a nuclear-armed SLCM.

The weapon is unnecessary, would divert military capabilities and funding from more pressing threats, and fuel an arms race that no one can win.

Yet some are fighting hard to revive it. Ahead of upcoming HASC hearings, a thread: 1st question: Is the SLCM-N even necessary?

In a letter to the Senate, STRATCOM Commander Adm. Richard offered the following criteria as needed to fill a “deterrence and assurance gap”: defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/…

Twitter might be a good medium for my mischievous thoughts about the AUKUS submarine deal.

Herewith a thread. The AUKUS deal resembles the US-India nuclear deal of 2005—done by a handful of self-confident officials in secrecy, precluding interagency vetting that might have revealed flaws and hurdles to the deal.

carnegieendowment.org/2005/09/07/fau…

Dr. Chris Ford and State Department colleagues recently published online a thoughtful and interesting paper on regional deterrence and low-yield nuclear weapons. Here with a thread distilling my critique of the paper. (1/18) carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/06/cri… Debate will focus on the case Ford et al make for deploying low-yield SLBM warhead (W76-2).
state.gov/wp-content/upl…

Yet, Ford’s introductory explanation of the 2018 NPR deserves more attention. (2/18)

THREAD summarizing my new paper “Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?” (reducing 15,000 words to 15 tweets). carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/11/tow… For decades, nuclear debates have centered on the question, “how much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? 1/15