Thread by @witte_sergei

Thread: Steering a Steamroller

It's been a while since we did a battle thread, so I thought it would be fun to look at an underappreciated but very informative campaign: the German invasion of France in 1914, at the onset of World War One. (1)

This was an operation that was unique in the broad annals of military history. It threw enormous armies (nearly 1.5 million on each side) comprised almost exclusively of infantry against each other on a narrow front. Nothing like this would ever be seen again. (2)

German planning was occupied entirely with preparing for the unpleasant prospect of a two front war against France and Russia. Once Germany diplomacy failed to maintain friendly relations with Russia, the two front war became a certainty, and a military solution was needed. (3)

The solution, proposed by the Chief of the General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, was a massive, all out offensive against France at the onset of the war, with the intention of knocking France out entirely within 6 weeks. Troops could then be transferred east to fight Russia. (4)

Operationally, it was proposed to achieve this by marching the German army through Belgium, down into Northern France, past Paris, and then back up again in a giant wheeling maneuver to encircle the entire French Army. A cross country march to bag the mother of all pockets. (5)

This plan is known colloquially as the "Schlieffen Plan", but Schlieffen himself contributed only the broad operational outline. He retired in 1906, and by 1914 the actual details of Germany's planning were the purview of the new Chief of Staff, Helmut von Moltke the Younger. (6)

Meanwhile, France was making its own plans, which were decidedly less technical and more, shall we say... emotional? France's guiding military animus was the desire to get revenge for her humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and restore French fighting pride. (7)

French planning emphasized "Elan Vitale" - a sort of fighting spirit, vital energy, and offensive enthusiasm. The belief was that superior moral energy and attacking spirit was the key to successful offensives. In practice, this meant taking initiative and attacking head on. (8)

So, while Germany prepared its wheeling maneuver through Belgium, France landed on "Plan 17": a straight on attack directly at the German border. The interaction of these operational schemes spelled potential disaster for France. (9)

If all went according to plan, France would be moving east towards Germany, while the German Army went west over the top of them through Belgium. France would attack deeper into the pocket that Germany wanted to create, and the two armies would slide past each other. (10)

Implementing these plans, however, proved very difficult due to the sheer size of the armies involved. France mobilized five field armies, Germany seven - these were huge units, in excess of 250,000 men each. Maneuvering them proved harder than expected. (11)

France implemented Plan 17 on August 14 and sent the 1st and 2nd armies hurtling into Germany. Or, at least they tried to hurtle them. The 1st Army managed to advance ten miles into German Lorraine in the first six days. The shock offensive was more like a crawl. (12)

In the first collision with the German army, these French forces were badly mauled. Unit composition was key. German divisions all carried an organic complement of 72 artillery pieces - far greater density than other armies, and the weight of this firepower was decisive. (13)

The French attack on Lorraine collapsed with heavy losses, but the 1st and 2nd armies were able to withdraw intact. This was key: they were bloodied, but intact. Germany was seeking an annihilation campaign, to encircle and completely destroy these formations. (14)

Meanwhile, five of Germany's initial seven field armies were wheeling over the top through Belgium and Luxemburg. France could not ignore this force sweeping across their north, and the supreme commander - Joseph Joffre - dispatched two more of his field armies northward. (15)

On August 24th, the French 4th and 3rd armies collided with the German 4th and 5th in the Ardennes region. These were huge forces battling in confined quarters, and casualties were predictably huge - but again, Germany's superior artillery forced the French to withdraw. (16)

Taking the measure of the campaign, therefore, in the first 10 days France had thrown 4 of its 5 mobilized field armies into battle and all of them were forced to pull back with heavy casualties, but still intact. This was not a decisive result - where was the encirclement? (17)

Germany got its chance. The French 5th army - the last undamaged army - went north into Belgium to block the German advance, and accidentally wandered directly in between the paths of advance of two German armies. The French had offered themselves up on a platter. (18)

The French army was wedged in between the Meuse and Sambre Rivers, with two German armies parked directly on the opposite banks. All Germany had to do was close the gap (barely 30 miles) and they would wipe 300,000 French soldiers off the board.

They couldn't do it. (19)

These armies were very cumbersome and hard to steer. The German commander of the 2nd army, General Bulow, could not quite get a handle on where the French were, and he was vaguely concerned about the arrival of British forces in theater. He ordered a halt on August 21st. (20)

Bulow only truly figured out where the French army was because their patrols bumped into each other, drawing more and more units in until the armies were locked in combat. But still, Germany couldn't get itself organized to cut off the French. (21)

The French commander realized that he was being hemmed in, and on August 23rd he ordered a withdrawal. Meanwhile, back at German high command, von Moltke saw the opportunity slipping away and ordered the 3rd army to cross the Meuse immediately - but they were far too slow. (22)

The Germans did not cross the river in force until the 27th - but by this time, the French were long gone, retreating at high speed to the south. Germany's best chance had slipped away due to clumsy command and control. (23)

On paper, Germany won all the initial battles of the war. All five of France's first line armies were battered and forced to withdraw, and the Germans were able to advance into central France. Yet, the German operational scheme had in fact failed spectacularly. (24)

The goal wasn't to simply maul these French armies, it was to encircle and destroy them entirely. The fact that all five French armies withdrew intact represented an operational disaster for Germany, and they were forced to push further into France seeking a decisive battle. (25)

The campaign culminated at the legendary "Battle of the Marne", where the Germans were stonewalled and forced to withdraw. But the Marne was, fundamentally, an uncreative battle. It was simply parallel lines of armies hacking at each other. No encirclement was possible here. (26)

Germany lost at the Marne because they were in central France, now fighting an attrition battle, and the French were therefore far more readily able to draw on reserves and reinforcements. No creative operational maneuver was possible, so the Germans withdrew. (27)

Maneuver warfare failed in World War One, but not for the reasons people think. People presume that the issue was the power of trenches and defensive warfare - but the trenches were only dug *after* Germany's attempt at a maneuver victory had failed. (28)

Trenches were the result, not the cause of maneuver's failure. The cause was the inadequacy of the command and control systems and technology of the day, and the impossibility of deftly maneuvering a million men on foot with the methods available in 1914. (29)

Germany had a real chance to encircle and destroy an entire French field army in the opening weeks of the war, and they failed because they couldn't get their army to behave and move the way they needed it to. They were waiting for motor vehicles and radios. (30)

Ultimately, the failure of maneuver in the Great War was about the gap between bureaucratic prowess and military command and control. Governments could mobilize millions of men and deploy them by rail, but once they were in the field the armies could not easily steer them. (31)

Addendum: just for context, the German 1st army during the opening campaign had over 15,000 men for every mile of front. It was simply impossible for a force like this to move with any sort of agility given the transportation and communication technology of the day.

Addenda/Mini Thread:

Elaborating on "Command and Control" disfunction. Why was Germany unable to encircle the French 5th Army after it had offered itself up? To accomplish this, Germany 3rd Army needed to get forces across the Meuse behind the French. Why didn't they?

3rd Army's southernmost unit was the 19th Corps - at the far south (left) of the army's line, this was the formation that needed to get across and cut off the French line of retreat. It was also a mess. A total tangle.

Both of 19th Corps' infantry divisions were already engaged with the French flank. Therefore, to send units south to cross the river, either units from the army's other corps (farther north) needed to be pulled down in a castling move, or 19th Corps needed to extricate itself.

What they ended up trying to do was create ad-hoc units (pulling unengaged regiments and battalions from here and there, putting together a strike package), which they then sent south to cross the river and cut off the French retreat.

This improvised division took all day to put together, and once it got on the road in bumped into a unit from the 4th army (confused yet?) that was guarding lines of communication between the 4th and 3rd. That created a traffic jam and delayed the move south.

By the time they reached their crossing and got over, the French were gone and the encirclement opportunity had been wasted. This is what we mean by command and control disorder. Just a tremendous organizational mess trying to get units put together and going where you want them.

So sad, too bad.