Why has TTF collapsed? Is Europe out of the woods? What matters for commodity price formations? What will matter in 2023...?
1/n
European gas prices - both TTF & NBP - have collapsed right into the start of the winter season, down from its peak of €338/MWh post Nord Stream 1 sabotage news to now €63/MWh.
Mind you though, TTF was €13/MWh 2 years prior - up still 370%.
2/n
Why is TTF lower?
Because natgas can only be consumed or stored. If storage is (95%) full & not consumed (mild weather), prices have to do the work to keep system balanced as comdties trade in present (d-s), unlike equities/bonds which discount future.
3/n EU storage in %
And Europe has not yet began to consume gas as it experiences and exceptionally mild October so far.
4/n EU gas withdrawal in (GWh/day)
So is the gas crisis over? Of course not.
Europe needs to replace even more LNG in 2023 which will get much harder.
One way to verify that is by looking at the futures curve. It prices TTF at €140/MWh come Nov 2022 and into April 2024.
5/n
For now, let's be grateful EU operaters filled storages across Europe "comme il faut" by saving 13% YTD yoy & helped by the weather gods (summer heat wave; mild winter start).
6/n 14 day weather forecast vs 30y normal
Not just EU savings and weather helped, China too!
20% lower Chinese LNG purchasing yoy matters a lot too as it dragged Asian JKM prices lower into winter months as Asia obviously competes for those same LNG spot barrels with Europe (ex Australia; ex l-t Qatar contracts).
7/n
Here is a visual how to think about the global LNG market.
In general: US, Qatar & Australia are the big 3 exporters while EU, China, Japan & South Korea are the big importers of the global LNG market.
Of course, Middle East (UAE; Oman) & Nigeria or Angola matter too.
7/n
So how can Europe balance its 2023 market?
It will have to source approx 210bcm LNG, ceteris paribus.
That is 60bcm > than 2022 (which was 60bcm > than 2021).
Weather + Groningen field spare cap of 20bcm are only factors that can change this forecast meaningfully.
8/n
China freed-up 13-15bcm in 2022 for Europe to contract away in the LNG spot market.
If they will re-engage (which we suspect) & continue LNG growth path to replace some coal use, prices (not politicans god forbid!) will have to do the work - like now - to clear market!
9/n
Europe was able to purchase 60% more LNG mainly from the US (75% incremental vol).
That is because US contracts have destination flexibility = means cargos owner were able to sell on the way to its original destination (say Japan) into Europe to make instant profit - nice!
10/
In 2021, US operators had total export capacity of 141bcm pa (13.7bcf/d) & ran it at capacity (never without risk).
US operators have incentive (lower HH prices; arbitrage) to increase such capacities. But infra expansion takes time. 2025/26 is the time for more exports.
11/n
The return of the Freeport Terminal in Q4 2022 helps but will not move the dial.
It adds 6bcm incremental supply for Europe in 2023. We are looking for 60bcm!
12/n
So far in 2022, cargo owners had a huge incentive to re-sell LNG at spot to EU - if they could.
They usually purchased LNG pre-2020 on a long-term contract paid $6-10/MMBtu. Such LNG could be sold for >$30 all year, at times at $75 in spot market.
13/n
What matters however is that Qatar does not have break-up clauses or destination flexibility.
Re-directing Qatar cargos requires (Asian) buyers to return it to Qataries at par (<$10/MMBtu). Why would they?
Here is my theory how the major incident - a so called blackout - occurred at 12:30 CET today in the power system of Spain & Portugal:
1/n
At the time of the incident, Spain and Portugal operated the grid at very high renewables share of about 66% - i.e solar (55%) and wind (11%; eolica)
2/n
While this isn’t unusual for Spain, it does mean that the grid operates with little inertia (resistance to change) during such time. The grid is therefore vulnerable to external effects…!
On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.
Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!
Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.
1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeo
The problem with their logic?
a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).
b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.
2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPR
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
1/n
What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
2/n
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).
The current Comex price action in the U.S. is basically a Trump tariff trade mirage and is otherwise as misleading of fundaments as the May 2024 price action of which I warned on multiple occasions.
1/n $/pound
In May 2024 however, U.S. price action was more in synch with London. But it didn't reflect weak Chinese housing & construction fundamentals which has been 15-30% of GLOBAL copper use for the past two decades. Today, U.S. prices trade as if borders close tomorrow.
2/n Comex - LME arb in $/t
Unlike May 2024, copper blue chips like $FCX, however, do not buy the rally. So at least it seems that the equity market understands the tariff aspect of the copper price mirage.
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, China’s rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, China’s economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
2/n
Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.