Why has TTF collapsed? Is Europe out of the woods? What matters for commodity price formations? What will matter in 2023...?
1/n
European gas prices - both TTF & NBP - have collapsed right into the start of the winter season, down from its peak of €338/MWh post Nord Stream 1 sabotage news to now €63/MWh.
Mind you though, TTF was €13/MWh 2 years prior - up still 370%.
2/n
Why is TTF lower?
Because natgas can only be consumed or stored. If storage is (95%) full & not consumed (mild weather), prices have to do the work to keep system balanced as comdties trade in present (d-s), unlike equities/bonds which discount future.
3/n EU storage in %
And Europe has not yet began to consume gas as it experiences and exceptionally mild October so far.
4/n EU gas withdrawal in (GWh/day)
So is the gas crisis over? Of course not.
Europe needs to replace even more LNG in 2023 which will get much harder.
One way to verify that is by looking at the futures curve. It prices TTF at €140/MWh come Nov 2022 and into April 2024.
5/n
For now, let's be grateful EU operaters filled storages across Europe "comme il faut" by saving 13% YTD yoy & helped by the weather gods (summer heat wave; mild winter start).
6/n 14 day weather forecast vs 30y normal
Not just EU savings and weather helped, China too!
20% lower Chinese LNG purchasing yoy matters a lot too as it dragged Asian JKM prices lower into winter months as Asia obviously competes for those same LNG spot barrels with Europe (ex Australia; ex l-t Qatar contracts).
7/n
Here is a visual how to think about the global LNG market.
In general: US, Qatar & Australia are the big 3 exporters while EU, China, Japan & South Korea are the big importers of the global LNG market.
Of course, Middle East (UAE; Oman) & Nigeria or Angola matter too.
7/n
So how can Europe balance its 2023 market?
It will have to source approx 210bcm LNG, ceteris paribus.
That is 60bcm > than 2022 (which was 60bcm > than 2021).
Weather + Groningen field spare cap of 20bcm are only factors that can change this forecast meaningfully.
8/n
China freed-up 13-15bcm in 2022 for Europe to contract away in the LNG spot market.
If they will re-engage (which we suspect) & continue LNG growth path to replace some coal use, prices (not politicans god forbid!) will have to do the work - like now - to clear market!
9/n
Europe was able to purchase 60% more LNG mainly from the US (75% incremental vol).
That is because US contracts have destination flexibility = means cargos owner were able to sell on the way to its original destination (say Japan) into Europe to make instant profit - nice!
10/
In 2021, US operators had total export capacity of 141bcm pa (13.7bcf/d) & ran it at capacity (never without risk).
US operators have incentive (lower HH prices; arbitrage) to increase such capacities. But infra expansion takes time. 2025/26 is the time for more exports.
11/n
The return of the Freeport Terminal in Q4 2022 helps but will not move the dial.
It adds 6bcm incremental supply for Europe in 2023. We are looking for 60bcm!
12/n
So far in 2022, cargo owners had a huge incentive to re-sell LNG at spot to EU - if they could.
They usually purchased LNG pre-2020 on a long-term contract paid $6-10/MMBtu. Such LNG could be sold for >$30 all year, at times at $75 in spot market.
13/n
What matters however is that Qatar does not have break-up clauses or destination flexibility.
Re-directing Qatar cargos requires (Asian) buyers to return it to Qataries at par (<$10/MMBtu). Why would they?
1) oil on water (includes floating storage) and oil in transit well surpassed Covid levels.
Part of it reflects inefficiency of the sanctioned Russian & Iranian oil trade as well as the recent US sanctions on Rosneft & Lukoil.
Part of it is an outright bearish oil market = too many barrels chasing too few buyers -> needs lower prices.
2/n: Oil in transit
2) Weak Chinese petroleum product consumption:
China is in recession due to its property bust and despite the CCPs desire to steer clear of it by forcing every other industry to build what isn’t required domestically (overcapacity issue) and then dump goods onto global trade.
Because of the latter most observers still don’t get the painful economic status China is in. But China is in it.
Also, the CCP prefers coal fuelled transportation as well as LNG truck driving for the purpose of geopolitics.
Both requires less, not more, diesel and gasoline in 2026 vs 2025. Jet and Naphtha are different story but won’t drive oil buying by refineries => Oil demand by 2nd largest economy globally is bearish. Accept.
However, the CCP may take the absurd to the next level in 2026 and force refineries to build even more floating-roof oil tank storage (as part of meeting an artificial Soviet 2.0 plan within its Investment-led Growth Model) in which case refineries may buy more oil next year, but not for the purpose of producing more petroleum products but solely for storages. If they do so, however, their crude oil buying will be EXTREMELY price sensitive.
Time and State companies oil quotas will tell.
PS: If u care to understand China’s property bust structurally, here is a link to my 7 part Stack series. It remains as valid then as now.
Let me add a few more facts & figures and some high level observations about the United States goods trade deficits with Switzerland of some $20bn annually.
The Swiss government and certain companies have little reason to lament—these tariffs were foreseeable.
Yes, the real issue is their scale: 39% compared to Europe’s 15%, which clearly puts some Swiss exports at a competitive disadvantage. It is what it is.
And while I still believe this situation is fixable, we must be prepared for the worst-case scenario to persist—or even worsen, with potential new tariffs on pharmaceuticals (currently exempted).
So, who is at fault? As some of us learned in officer school during military service: the Bundesrat misjudged the fundamentals of strategic assessment—Lagebeurteilung (judgement of enemy situation). That needs to be addressed. Trump wants balanced trade. Address it. Period.
History is not kind to those who choose dreams over reality—or to the weak who paint themselves as victims.
Therefore, whether Trump’s trade deficit logic makes any sense whatsoever (which it clearly doesn't in the Swiss case) is beside the point.
He’s the president. He has communicated his views clearly and consistently for decades. Adapt. Take the man seriously.
Trustworthy or not, as lamented by President Keller Sutter is none of our business.
2/n @SecScottBessent @BobgonzaleBob
Let’s now take a closer look at Switzerland’s goods trade surplus with the United States.
At Burggraben, we rely on the OEC tool (a paywalled MIT spin-off) for robust global trade data as part of our investment analysis process of all sorts—so we can assess this with confidence. I hope our readers will appreciate the data quality shared herewith for free.
While the annual trade surplus has fluctuated in recent years, the underlying—or let’s call it intrinsic—gap consistently hovers around $20 billion, as the data below will show.
More concretely, Iran likely enriched some 250kg of HEU stockpiles since 2021. Worse, it also said to adds significant new capacities.
That material so far could quickly be turned into the fuel for the equivalent of 10 bombs, should Iran’s leadership take the political decision to pursue weapons, according to Bloomberg.
Here is my theory how the major incident - a so called blackout - occurred at 12:30 CET today in the power system of Spain & Portugal:
1/n
At the time of the incident, Spain and Portugal operated the grid at very high renewables share of about 66% - i.e solar (55%) and wind (11%; eolica)
2/n
While this isn’t unusual for Spain, it does mean that the grid operates with little inertia (resistance to change) during such time. The grid is therefore vulnerable to external effects…!
On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.
Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!
Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.
1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeo
The problem with their logic?
a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).
b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.
2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPR
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
1/n
What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
2/n
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).