Annexation of Ukrainian territory, shipment of UKR civilians to Crimea or Russia, absconding with UKR children to Russia, "dragooning," are all indications of Putin's continued strategic failure.
He's now -and I'll use a doctrinal term- "winging it." 7/
I did a "podcast" with West Point's @WestPointSOSH yesterday with two very bright scholars.
One of them, @RTperson3 and his colleague MAJ Kathryn Hedgecock, wrote an interesting piece on "bargaining theory" in war. It's fascinating & I recommend it. 8/
Bottom line, they posit it's now - as it's always been - Ukraine vs Putin. With both fighting for their future.
If you apply Clausewitz's trilogy that wars are decided by the strength of the army, the support of the population, & the power of the govt, I bet on UKR. 9/
One last point...the NOUN version of "Dragoon."
Having served with 1-1 Cavalry during Desert Storm (whose heraldry comes from the 1st Regiment of Dragoons, formed in Missouri in 1855), the noun Dragoons mean something different.
10/
Historically, these soldiers rode were "dual purpose."
They rode into battle on horseback, but usually fought with short barreled rifles at close range. They could also perform as cavalry, fighting with sabres on horseback. 11/
Today, 1st Cavalry Regiment still serves in the US Army. Many are proud veterans of this historic unit, which was the savior at Gettysburg. I know I am.
(Below is our 1-1 Cav crew, on the final day of Desert Storm, 1991)
Come for dragooning, leave with Dragoons. 12/12
A mistake in this tweet. The Regiment was formed in 1833, NOT 1855. My mistake.
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Facts about the G2:
-It has a published range of 2500 km (about 1500 miles). That's suspect.
-It weighs about 200 kg (≈ 450 lbs)
-The payload (explosives) are estimated to be ≈ 50-60kg (130 lbs of explosives, smaller than the lightest 250 lb bombs delivered by aircraft). 3/
Mick describes the actions of Generals Valeriy Zaluzhnyy & Andrii Kovalchuk, and Col-Gen Oleksandr Syrskiy and how those will go down in Ukraine's military history (similar to Eisenhower, Bradley & Montgomery on D-Day).
Aggressive, adaptive, innovative...a new breed. 2/
In April, @politico did a great piece on Zaluzhnyy, saying he is part of a "new generation of Ukrainian officers who cut their teeth in the grinding eight-year war in Donbas and...deployed to training ranges across Europe to drill with NATO forces." 3/
Planners analyze & assess:
-enemy launch platforms (land, sea, air)
-potential "tracks" (the anticipated route the enemy missile will take)
-what they enemy wants to hit
-the critical thing being defended (e.g., airfield, port, infrastructure, specific building, forces). 9/
Here's the point:
It's impossible to line a bunch of ADA systems long the 2500-mile Ukrainian border & expect them to stop missiles launched from RU subs in the Azov, or dropped from RU bombers circling 1500 miles away, or land-based RU missile batteries in RU. 10/
What makes it even harder:
RU is not aiming at "critical infrastructure" or "military targets," (which, in an area like Ukraine would require literally hundreds of ADA systems), RU is striking random civilian targets - to include playgrounds! - all over the country. 11/
After the strike on the Kerch Bridge, it was expected Putin would respond.
He did so by launching 84+ missiles & dozens of drones against Ukrainian civilian targets (an initial assessment) and making more threatening speeches.
A 🧵on that & thoughts on air defense. 1/
As I said in a weekend tweet, the operational strike on the Kerch Bridge resulted in strategic implications.
-Militarily, it affects RU's belief they have a secure line of communication for logistics in a safe area.
-It also negatively affects RU ability to move forces. 2/
RU is now constrained in using the bridge for transport & resupply, and now must use either ship transport to Berydansk or the M4 road from Rostov.
Informationally the RU's - & RU's in Crimea - know about the strike. They can't understand how this "defended" asset was hit. 3/
Wanna know what it's like to be a battlefield commander & have a bridge blow up in your area of operations?
Having had that experience, under different circumstances, it is not a good day in Moscow.
A "war story" 🧵 that will provide some insight into the Kerch attack. 1/
In 2007, I assumed command of the storied @1stArmoredDiv. We would deploy to N. Iraq as "Task Force Iron," and become Multinational Division North, conducting operations in the 7 northern provinces.
Before going, we spent some time training...to include "staff training." 2/
The Division conducted 'battle drills' exercises with our staff at the simulation center at Grafenwoehr, a state of the art facility in S. Germany. During a two week period we practiced everything we thought we might see in combat under the watchful eye of trainers. 3/
Interestingly, RU State TV now claiming it will take “two months” to get recently mobilized to the front lines in Ukraine.
Great. But will they be able to do anything? No friggin’ way.
RU may be able to train the basics of soldiering in 2 months.
But…. 1/5
-You can’t “train” combined arms warfare, especially for large formations, in 2 months
-You can’t “teach” Generals, Colonels and new Sergeants the tenets of leadership in 2 months
-You can’t “fix” a supply system that has been plagued with corruption for years in 2 months. 2/
-You can’t “coordinate” tankers, infantry, arty, intel, engineers, air forces & others for battlefield operations in 2 months
-you can’t “counter distrust” soldiers have in RU govt in 2 months
-after 60,000 dead soldiers, you can’t reverse the loss felt by RU mothers & wives 3/